US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO2010

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  11-20-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINR, SOCI, CE, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  Sri Lanka's Sinhalese extremist Sihala Urumaya 
-- a small party that packs a political wallop 
 
Refs:  Colombo 2001, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Sihala Urumaya (SU) party is 
minuscule as an electoral force.  The party packs a 
political wallop, however:  its leadership is articulate 
and generates press coverage; its cadre are devoted to 
the party's extremist views; and it maintains strong 
support in the influential Buddhist clergy.  While 
unlikely to gain electoral power anytime soon, 
the SU -- in a sign that Sinhalese extremism cannot be 
written off as a force -- has shown the ability to get 
its anti-peace process message across and mold the 
public debate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) A SMALL PARTY:  Sri Lanka's Sihala Urumaya 
("Sinhalese birthright") party is minuscule as an 
electoral force, especially when compared with Sri 
Lanka's big four parties (the United National Party 
"UNP", the People's Alliance "PA", the Tamil National 
Alliance "TNA", and the Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna 
"JVP").  The SU holds no seats in Parliament and in the 
last parliamentary elections in December 2001 it won 
only .56 percent of the total vote.  The party also 
holds only a small smattering of seats in the country's 
provincial and local councils.  Moreover, the party's 
membership base is quite limited, with an active cadre 
numbering in the hundreds and actual dues-paying party 
members numbering in the low thousands. 
 
3.  (C) NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL INFLUENCE:  While the party 
lacks electoral muscle, however, it does maintain a fair 
degree of political influence.  One factor in its favor 
is that its major leaders, chief secretary Tilak 
Karunaratne and national organizer Champika Ranaweke, 
are young and articulate.  They manage to generate a 
fair amount of press coverage for the party's Sinhalese 
Buddhist extremist point of view through interviews in 
which they often make radical statements.  Karunaratne 
stated to the press earlier this year, for example, that 
the SU was ready to train suicide bombers in order to 
defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
While Karunaratne quickly backtracked on this statement, 
he netted a lot of publicity for his party in the 
process.  To some extent, in showing the ability to get 
in the press, the party is benefiting from press 
outlets, such as the ISLAND and DIVAINA, English-and 
Sinhala-language dailies respectively, which routinely 
take an anti-peace process, pro-Sinhalese editorial 
slant. 
 
4.  (C) In the meantime, SU cadre are fanatically 
dedicated to the parties' anti-peace process, anti-LTTE 
platform, and they consistently show up for its rallies 
(see below).  At the same time, the party maintains a 
high degree of support within Sri Lanka's influential 
Buddhist clergy.  Commenting on the SU's influence, 
Rohan Edirisinha, an analyst for the Center for Policy 
Alternatives (CPA), a local think-tank, told polchief on 
November 18 that the SU "while small, has shown the 
ability to nudge the political debate in its direction." 
 
5.  (C) RECENT ACTIVITIES:  In the past several months, 
the SU has been highly active and there is every sign 
that it will remain so.  Its recent activities included: 
 
-- In its recent public pronouncements, the SU came out 
strongly in favor of the President's November 4 sacking 
of three ministers and suspension of Parliament.  The 
party has also sponsored several small rallies in 
support of her actions. 
 
-- On October 29, SU members disrupted a "pro-peace" 
cultural festival sponsored by Tamils and some Sinhalese 
in Colombo.  Several people were lightly wounded in the 
ensuing fracas.  The SU, without convincing evidence, 
asserted that the event was sponsored by the LTTE. 
Several SU members were arrested at the scene, but were 
later released. 
-- On October 14, the SU led a protest march in 
Trincomalee District in the Eastern Province.  The 
marchers were protesting the LTTE's unauthorized camp 
located at "Wan Ela" near Trincomalee city.  The 
marchers were turned back by security forces before 
coming too close to the camp. 
 
-- In late September, SU members joined with the 
Patriotic National Movement ("Jathika Deshahitayashi 
Peramuna") in a lengthy protest march from the central 
city of Kandy to Colombo.  The Patriotic National 
Movement, which was formed earlier in September, is a 
grouping of opposition political parties including the 
JVP and some anti-peace process elements of the PA. 
(While the SU often joins in anti-peace process 
activities with the Marxist JVP, it differs from the JVP 
in that it has no discernible economic philosophy.) 
 
-- On September 15, approximately 400 Sihala Urumaya 
members joined radical Buddhist monks in a visit to an 
archaeological site in Ampara District, located in the 
southeast.  A prominent monk had been denied access to 
the site by the LTTE in August and the SU wanted to show 
that Buddhists had a right to visit the site. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENT:  Despite its best efforts, the SU 
appears unlikely to gain mass support anytime soon. 
After 20 years of conflict, the Sri Lankan public 
strongly supports the peace process and is unlikely to 
turn to the often shrill SU.  That said, the SU has 
shown the ability to mold the debate.  In doing so, the 
SU could make things easier down the road for mass 
parties that are skeptical toward the peace process, 
such as the People's Alliance, or out-and-out opposed, 
such as the radical JVP.  Moreover, the fact that the SU 
is able to get its anti-peace process, anti-LTTE views 
across, tends to underscore the point that Sinhalese 
extremism cannot be written off entirely as a force in 
Sri Lanka.  END COMMENT. 
 
7. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD