US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7213

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007213 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR PRM, S/CT, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA; 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2013 
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PTER, PREL, MOPS, MARR, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: A/S DEWEY AGREES NEXT STEPS ON REPATRIATING 
TURKISH REFUGEES IN IRAQ WITH GOT AND UNHCR 
 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Robert Deutsch. 
Reasons 1.5 b and d.  Recommendations at Para 2. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------------------- 
 
 
1. (SBU) On November 19, PRM Assistant Secretary Dewey met 
with Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sensoy, UNHCR Assistant High 
Commissioner Morjane, CPA rep Bartlett and Khalil Afar from 
the Iraqi Embassy on next steps for the voluntary 
repatriation of Turkish refugees in Iraq, including those in 
the Makhmour camp.  All agreed that no later than 
mid-December, the UNHCR would share with the participants a 
draft tripartite (GOT-CPA/IGC-UNHCR) agreement governing 
principles and modalities for voluntary repatriation.  They 
also agreed to re-convene in early January in Ankara to 
complete arrangements for the overall approach.  After the 
January meeting, UNHCR would visit Makhmour and provide 
general information to residents about opportunities for 
return.  GOT officials would next visit the camp in 
cooperation with UNHCR to answer specific questions the 
residents might have.  After this, UNHCR would oversee the 
completion of registration forms/questionnaires by camp 
residents.  The forms would allow the GOT to begin 
preparations for the actual repatriation, which Sensoy 
assured would be expedited by the Turks.  For now, Sensoy 
said he would try to get a public GOT statement welcoming the 
refugees to return, and asked the UNHCR to complete work on 
the form as soon as possible.  Sensoy noted that the 
discussion did not only apply to Makhmour residents but to 
all Turkish refugees in Iraq, and that some returns for 
people outside the camp might be possible in very short order 
as a confidence building measure.  The sides agreed that the 
USG/CPA/IGC would be responsible for ensuring the refugees 
were able to take decisions about voluntary repatriation with 
the minimum possible intimidation from the PKK/KADEK/KHK. 
 
 
2. (SBU) RECOMMENDATIONS: We recommend Geneva press UNHCR to 
complete the draft agreement as soon as possible to maximize 
the chance of closure in advance of the January meeting, so 
that meeting can be devoted to operationalizing arrangements. 
 We also recommend Geneva seek commitment from UNHCR to 
complete their information package before the January 
meeting, so that it is ready for distribution immediately 
following.   End summary and recommendations. 
 
 
3. (SBU) On Nov. 19 in Ankara, PRM A/S Dewey accompanied by 
Charge met with GOT MFA U/S Nabi Sensoy, UNHCR Assistant 
Commissioner Morjane, CPA Advisor to the Ministry of 
Displacement and Migration Larry Bartlett, and Iraqi Embassy 
officer Khalil Afar to discuss next steps on return of 
Turkish refugees in Iraq.  The meeting was constructive and 
positive in tone.  By the end of the meeting, all 
participants were on the same page about next steps, timing 
and who was responsible for what.  Sensoy noted that the GOT 
had provided UNHCR with forms it wished to be used to learn 
which refugees wanted to return and where they wanted to 
return to.  He hoped the UN would finalize the forms as soon 
as possible.  He also said the GOT is prepared to send 
interagency teams to Makhmour camp to provide information 
about conditions in Turkey and to answer specific questions 
the refugees would likely have, e.g., would young men be 
required to complete compulsory military service (yes, but 
there may be some flexibility on when they would have to 
serve), and whether or not refugees could return to their 
places of origin (in principle yes, but if administratively 
impossible, they would need to provide a second choice). 
Sensoy noted that the current process is slow and that once 
the Turks see how many want to return, they will decide how 
far they can streamline their system.  He guessed that the 
repatriations would take longer than a few months but less 
than a few years. 
 
 
4. (SBU) A/S Dewey agreed that it was urgent to maintain 
momentum in efforts to provide a durable solution to Turkish 
refugees in Iraq, and noted that his presence demonstrated 
the importance the USG attaches to reaching a solution.  He 
said he hoped the "Dohuk 25" could be returned soon, noted 
that the US agreed on the need to eliminate the influence of 
political elements in the camp from those who might choose to 
return, and sought a discussion of how best to go about that. 
 He suggested the first step should be confidence building by 
the UNHCR via a general information campaign about conditions 
in Turkey.  A/S Dewey then proposed that the UNHCR draft an 
agreement for tripartite consideration on principles and 
modalities no later than mid-December, and that the group 
present have a follow-up meeting in early January.  He also 
pressed the Turks to facilitate senior-level face-to-face 
contact in Ankara between the UNHCR and the Turkish Ministry 
of Interior and military as needed.  Sensoy agreed to do so. 
He said the MFA was and would remain the GOT's coordinating 
body for this issue, but that when we got to the 
implementation phase, direct contacts with the MOI and 
military would be required. 
 
 
5. (SBU) Morjane noted that UNHCR and the GOT had four months 
of good cooperation behind them on this issue and urged a 
holistic approach to the question.  He said that before 
sending teams to Makhmour, the participants must agree on 
what Turkey will be offering and what the UN will say and 
provide.  He sought a comprehensive agreement at the January 
meeting on forms, visits, and minimum acceptable conditions 
and principles for the repatriations.  He accepted the task 
of preparing a draft tripartite agreement by mid-December. 
 
 
6. (SBU) CPA rep Bartlett pointed to ongoing repatriations to 
Iraq as examples of CPA/Iraqi commitment to cooperate with 
UNHCR and neighboring governments, and said the same 
protections and services provided to returning Iraqis would 
be made available to Turkish refugees in Iraq seeking 
voluntary repatriation.  CPA and the Iraqi Ministry, he said, 
would continue to provide protection to refugees in Iraq, 
including those who may choose not to repatriate.  Bartlett 
assured that CPA and Iraqi officials would play a role in the 
information campaign. 
 
 
7. (C) Sensoy said the main issue was ensuring the refugees 
could express their free will.  He noted that we all had an 
obligation to ensure this, but wondered how that would be 
guaranteed.  He admitted that no one really knows how much 
influence the PKK/KADEK wields over the refugees, and 
stressed that Turkey had all along asserted that for 
repatriation forms to be filled out to reflect people's free 
will, the shadow of PKK intimidation needed to be removed 
from Makhmour.  CPA and the Iraqi authorities were, he said, 
authorized to rid the camp of its PKK presence, and that this 
was related to the larger question of PKK presence in Iraq in 
general.  He asked what the US was thinking of doing to 
remove the PKK from the camp or, if that were not possible, 
to ensure that residents were not pressured by the PKK in 
making their decisions about repatriation. 
 
 
8. (C) A/S Dewey thought a surgical removal from the camp 
would be difficult if not impossible, and an attempt at one 
could be counter-productive in terms of encouraging residents 
to repatriate.  He suggested taking advantage of the UNHCR 
presence in the camp to evaluate the influence the PKK 
exerted and propose a series of measures to counter that 
influence.  UNHCR, Dewey noted, has experience doing this in 
other places, and would get assistance from others, including 
the USG.  He suggested that one step in building confidence 
would be to focus first on the 2-3,000 refugees in and around 
Dohuk as a sign to those in Makhmour that returns can be 
successful and safe.  Morjane agreed and suggested drawing up 
a CPA/UNHCR/Iraqi plan to free refugees from PKK pressure. 
One step in such a plan, he said, should be providing 
objective information about improved conditions in Turkey to 
counter propaganda to the contrary.  He agreed Dohuk would be 
a good place to start but noted that the UNHCR would not 
begin an information campaign or take other steps inside Iraq 
until we had a tripartite agreement on the overall process. 
Any misunderstanding or faux pas, he said, could scuttle the 
whole effort. 
 
 
9. (C) Sensoy welcomed the idea of a UNHCR-drafted agreement 
and a meeting in early January in Ankara, and agreed that the 
full framework should be resolved before steps are taken. 
However, that did not exclude the possibility of continuing 
talks in the meantime.  Sensoy said Turkey was not saying the 
PKK needed to be surgically eliminated from Makhmour, but to 
succeed, the PKK should get the message that it will not be 
permitted to exert pressure on the refugees.  How this is 
done, he said, was up to CPA and the Iraqi authorities, and 
added, "if, at the end of the day, the best you can do is 
just distribute the forms, we're OK with that.  But, if you 
do so prematurely or with the residents under PKK pressure, 
there will be many fewer who choose to come home."  He said 
he hoped the UNHCR would convince many camp residents to 
return to their country of origin.  Information on conditions 
in Turkey would be more credible if it initially came from 
the UNHCR as opposed to the GOT, Sensoy noted.  Turkey, he 
said, agreed that the UN should take the initiative and 
provide as much information as possible on the situation and 
preparations in Turkey to the refugees.  Turkey would then 
follow-up by sending a team of GOT officials together with UN 
reps to confirm the UNHCR information and answer specific 
questions.  Sensoy asked that the UN information contain 
details of the Reintegration Law, something Turkey did not 
want to raise with the residents because the GOT did not want 
the residents to feel suspected of being PKK members or 
accomplices, but coming from the UN, the information would 
not have the same stigma. 
 
 
10. (SBU) Morjane asked if the GOT would make a public 
statement welcoming the return of any refugees who chose to 
come back, and noting, as Sensoy had in his remarks, that the 
GOT viewed them as innocent victims.  This would encourage 
them to choose to return by showing goodwill.  Sensoy agreed 
and said he would talk with his superiors about getting such 
a statement made.  Morjane also asked that the information 
campaign be sequenced to take place in advance of the 
distribution of forms. 
 
 
11. (SBU) Sensoy summarized the agreed points as follows: 1) 
by mid-December UNHCR would provide a draft tripartite 
agreement; 2) there would be a follow-up meeting in Ankara in 
the first half of January (with the forms to be completed 
before that meeting); 3) Sensoy would try to get a public GOT 
statement along the lines described in para 9; 4) after the 
January meeting, UNHCR would go to Makhmour to begin the 
information campaign; 5) the GOT team would then visit the 
camp to reinforce the UN information and answer questions; 6) 
the UN would then conduct the repatriation survey using the 
agreed forms; and 7) the UN would share the results with the 
GOT which would begin processing for expedited return to 
Turkey.  Morjane asked for confirmation that the discussion 
was about all Turkish refugees in Iraq, not only those in 
Makhmour.  Sensoy confirmed that was the case. 
 
 
12. (C) Sensoy said the only piece missing was how to deal 
with the PKK influence.  He said the issue was a political 
headache for Turkey and one the Turks were eager to put 
behind them.  Turkish public opinion will wonder if the US 
cannot remove 200 PKK members from Makhmour, how can they be 
trusted to eliminate the threat of 4,500 PKK members in the 
mountains.  Camp closure, he said, was a top priority for 
Turkey.  Turkey did not want a transit camp in Dohuk, which 
would be seen as a return to the pre-Makhmour Atrush camp 
situation, moving the population closer to the Turkish border 
without returning them.  He repeated, "Our objective is to 
dissolve that camp and to maximize the number of Turkish 
citizens who return."  He said even if half of Makhmour did 
not want to return, Turkey hoped they would be distributed 
around Iraq and not left as a block in Makhmour. 
 
 
13. (SBU) Morjane thanked the Turks for deciding to implement 
an expedited process for the refugees, and urged them to use 
that process now for the "Dohuk 25."  This, he said, would be 
an important confidence building measure.  Sensoy replied 
that the GOT hoped to have an answer on the Dohuk 25 within 
10 days and that those cases were being viewed favorably. 
 
 
14. (U) Assistant Secretary Dewey has cleared this message. 
 
 
15. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
DEUTSCH