US embassy cable - 03HARARE2256

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002256 
 
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AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2008 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI 
SUBJECT: MUGABE'S CHOGM ATTENDANCE IN AIR FOLLOWING 
OBASANJO VISIT 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Nigerian President Obasanjo met with 
opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai twice and President 
Mugabe once during his visit to Zimbabwe on November 17. 
According to MDC sources, Tsvangirai told Obasanjo during the 
first meeting that the MDC would be willing to participate in 
a transition government but that a face-to-face meeting 
between the leaders themselves would be required to break the 
impasse.  Obasanjo told Tsvangirai during a second meeting 
that Mugabe had agreed to meet the MDC leader face-to-face 
but not before he could consult with his constituencies. 
Obasanjo was non-committal to Tsvangirai privately and in his 
public comments on the implications of his visit for 
Zimbabwe's possible participation in next month's 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Abuja. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) MDC Director for Presidential Affairs Gandi Mudzingwa 
on November 18 recounted to poloff details of opposition 
leader Tsvangirai's two meetings with visiting Nigerian 
President Obasanjo on November 17.  Mudzingwa said Obasanjo's 
first call revolved around three inquiries: (1) what was the 
status of inter-party talks, (2) would the MDC be willing to 
participate in a transition government, and (3) what was the 
best way forward? 
 
3.  (C) Tsvangirai underscored to Obasanjo that there had 
been occasional informal exchanges between the parties but no 
substantial progress and no formal talks.  He said that the 
MDC would be willing to consider a transition government 
under two scenarios: a transition government in which the MDC 
did not participate but which would lead to internationally 
monitored elections, or a transition in which the MDC played 
a role without regard to subsequent internationally monitored 
elections.  The transition government would last for no fewer 
than six months and no more than twelve months.  As for a way 
forward, Tsvangirai asserted that no meaningful progress 
would be possible without a face-to-face meeting between 
Mugabe and himself and a framework endorsed by the leaders 
for subsequent negotiation.  Countless other good faith 
initiatives had all foundered for one reason -- the lack of 
mandate from Mugabe himself. 
 
4.  (C) According to Mudzingwa, after meeting Mugabe Obasanjo 
reported to Tsvangirai that Mugabe had agreed to meet 
Tsvangirai, but only after consulting with his ZANU-PF 
 
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constituents.  (MDC Secretary for Economic Affairs Tendai 
Biti told the DCM separately that Mugabe told Obasanjo only 
that he would think about a face-to-face meeting.)  Mugabe 
had not indicated when the meeting could be scheduled. 
Tsvangirai asked Obasanjo whether Mugabe was to be invited to 
 
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the CHOGM, to which the Nigerian replied only "what do you 
think?"  Obasanjo added that he would have to consult further 
with his Commonwealth counterparts.  (Biti reported that he 
said he would consult South African President Mbeki, and 
together they would press Mugabe for movement forward.) 
Mudzingwa asserted that Obasanjo left Zimbabwe with a more 
positive impression of the MDC and frustrated with ZANU-PF. 
He said that the MDC had no faith in Mugabe's professed 
interest in a face-to-face but had no choice but to keep 
"giving him rope with which to hang himself" in the 
international community's eyes. 
 
5.  (C) Embassy was unable to reach the Nigerian High 
Commission for comment and Australian High Commissioner 
Jonathan Brown told the DCM that the Acting Nigerian High 
Commissioner had been evasive during their conversation after 
the visit.  Brown reported that Obasanjo had met separately 
with Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 
Patrick Chinamasa and Minister for National Security Nicholas 
Goche, both of whom had been involved in secret 
constitutional talks with the MDC.  Commenting on the visit's 
potential implications for CHOGM, Brown said that Obasanjo 
would report the lack of progress to Mbeki and the issue 
would likely be referred to the CMAG, which would not disturb 
the status quo.  He commented that the troika had run its 
course and, with Malta likely to replace South Africa in the 
next term, probably would not receive a renewed mandate on 
Zimbabwe.  Canadian DCM Terrence Mooney told DCM that the 
Commonwealth might constitute an eminent persons group 
composed of the troika and others -- principally a 
composition that would de-emphasize racial lines -- to 
address the Zimbabwean conundrum. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENT: Obasanjo, Tsvangirai, and Mugabe all came 
away from these meetings with less than they had hoped for. 
Mugabe appears not to have received an invitation, 
notwithstanding his comment to the press that he was looking 
forward to attending.  Tsvangirai appears no closer to 
meaningful inter-party talks and remains suspicious of 
Obasanjo and Mbeki.  And Obasanjo has no evidence of progress 
with which he can argue for Zimbabwe's readmission.  At best, 
he and Mbeki have a difficult homework assignment in getting 
the parties together quickly, which would require a credible 
commitment to talks by Mugabe.  Indeed, Mugabe's credibility 
gap will be an obstacle even if he publicly projects 
commitment to talks, as his track record and current 
posturing continue to evince apparent disingenuousness. 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): Although the lead story on the 
ZBTC's November 17 nightly newscast was about gold mining, 
the government continues to give the CHOGM story prominent 
media play, underscoring its belief that an invitation 
remains possible.  Mugabe's priority in attending testifies 
to his ego and a general inability to accept rejection.  His 
government consistently portrays the issue to domestic 
audiences entirely in racial terms, with "racist" UK, 
Australia and New Zealand thwarting the will of all other 
members.  If he cannot prevail, Mugabe likely hopes that his 
racial wedge will prove as disruptive to the Commonwealth as 
it has for his own country. 
SULLIVAN