Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 03ANKARA7134 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA7134 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-11-17 13:51:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV EFIN TU IZ |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007134 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2013 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EFIN, TU, IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S NOV. 14 MEETING WITH P.M. ERDOGAN (U) Classified by CDA a.i. Robert Deutsch; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 1. (C) Summary: USG's tougher language and steps against PKK/KADEK/KHK in Iraq has made strong impression on P.M. Erdogan and he responded positively to Ambassador's statement that Washington has put its unhappiness with Turkey behind us. Erdogan sees back-to-back defense and economic partnership meetings in Washington as important steps to reestablish a strategic partnership. Highest on Erdogan's immediate agenda is removal of political conditions from the financial agreement implementing the $8.5B loan offer. End summary. 2. (U) Owing to Erdogan's delayed return to Ankara, Ambassador's previously-scheduled meeting took place at 0130 Nov. 15. 3. (C) Reiterating Vice President Cheney's telephone message to Erdogan, Ambassador underscored Washington's gratitude for the statesmanlike way Erdogan and the GOT handled the decision not to send troops to Iraq. GOT actions during the past six weeks have deepened the sense in the USG that the uncertainty generated by Turkey's March 1 refusal to allow deployment of U.S. troops through a northern front is behind us. 4. (C) Handing over the text of Department deputy spokesman's Nov. 14 statement on the PKK, Ambassador drew Erdogan's attention to the clear USG stance against the PKK/KADEK, including under its new guise as KHK. A name change does not change our classification of the PKK as a terrorist organization. Moreover, the CPA in Baghdad has new instructions to try to prevent a rumored PKK/KHK press conference from taking place in Iraq. 5. (C) The Ambassador noted he had reiterated to MFA U/S Ziyal Nov. 13 that, given Congress' attachment of political conditions to the $8.5B loan which we are offering Turkey, it will be very difficult to modify these conditions. However, the USG will take another look at possible ways to meet Turkey's needs; the Ambassador undertook to work with Ziyal to review possible adjustments. Regarding an official visit for Erdogan, late January or February are more likely possibilities than December and Washington is reviewing Erdogan's request for an official visit by President Bush at the time of the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul. 6. (C) In affirming that Turkey remains ready to contribute to stability in Iraq any way it can, Erdogan expressed strong appreciation for the new USG language and more decisive steps against the PKK in Iraq. The EU should demonstrate the same attitude. The back-to-back High Level Defense Group (HLDG) meeting Nov. 18-19 and Economic Partnership Council (EPC) meeting in early December demonstrate that bilateral relations are back on course, Erdogan added; it will be important to build on the meetings to show that the strategic partnership is functioning again. Erdogan declared that a strong bilateral dialogue is also key to stymie those in Turkey who aim to corral the AK government and put Turkish politics back into a confined space. 7. (C) Concerning the two meetings, Erdogan sees the HLDG as re-cementing good mil-mil relations. The GOT would like to use the EPC to revive consideration of QIZs. Responding to the Ambassador's remarks on the $8.5B loan, Erdogan said the political opposition is trying to misuse the political conditionality, making it too risky to take advantage of the loan in the run-up to crucial country-wide local elections in March 2004. However, the financial markets have included the $8.5B in their analyses, and the uncertainty troubles the markets. The GOT wants to preserve the loan offer as an important positive reference point. The GOT does not want to change the financial conditions, but Erdogan will expect Ziyal to negotiate a successful change in the political conditions on the margins of the EPC. 8. (C) Comment: Cordial atmosphere despite the late hour and Erdogan's obvious exhaustion after a long day carrying the government's message to his family's homeland in Rize. USG's statement on the PKK made a strong impression on Erdogan. His explicit linkage of the importance of a strong dialogue with the U.S. to his ability to overcome resistance to his government's reform program underlines his desire to be seen to work with us as he struggles to shape Turkey's future. End comment. 9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. DEUTSCH
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04