US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7134

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AMBASSADOR'S NOV. 14 MEETING WITH P.M. ERDOGAN

Identifier: 03ANKARA7134
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA7134 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-11-17 13:51:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV EFIN TU IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EFIN, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S NOV. 14 MEETING WITH P.M. ERDOGAN 
 
 
(U) Classified by CDA a.i. Robert Deutsch; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: USG's tougher language and steps against 
PKK/KADEK/KHK in Iraq has made strong impression on P.M. 
Erdogan and he responded positively to Ambassador's statement 
that Washington has put its unhappiness with Turkey behind 
us.  Erdogan sees back-to-back defense and economic 
partnership meetings in Washington as important steps to 
reestablish a strategic partnership.  Highest on Erdogan's 
immediate agenda is removal of political conditions from the 
financial agreement implementing the $8.5B loan offer.  End 
summary. 
 
 
2. (U) Owing to Erdogan's delayed return to Ankara, 
Ambassador's previously-scheduled meeting took place at 0130 
Nov. 15. 
 
 
3. (C) Reiterating Vice President Cheney's telephone message 
to Erdogan, Ambassador underscored Washington's gratitude for 
the statesmanlike way Erdogan and the GOT handled the 
decision not to send troops to Iraq.  GOT actions during the 
past six weeks have deepened the sense in the USG that the 
uncertainty generated by Turkey's March 1 refusal to allow 
deployment of U.S. troops through a northern front is behind 
us. 
 
 
4. (C) Handing over the text of Department deputy spokesman's 
Nov. 14 statement on the PKK, Ambassador drew Erdogan's 
attention to the clear USG stance against the PKK/KADEK, 
including under its new guise as KHK.  A name change does not 
change our classification of the PKK as a terrorist 
organization.  Moreover, the CPA in Baghdad has new 
instructions to try to prevent a rumored PKK/KHK press 
conference from taking place in Iraq. 
 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador noted he had reiterated to MFA U/S 
Ziyal Nov. 13 that, given Congress' attachment of political 
conditions to the $8.5B loan which we are offering Turkey, it 
will be very difficult to modify these conditions.  However, 
the USG will take another look at possible ways to meet 
Turkey's needs; the Ambassador undertook to work with Ziyal 
to review possible adjustments.  Regarding an official visit 
for Erdogan, late January or February are more likely 
possibilities than December and Washington is reviewing 
Erdogan's request for an official visit by President Bush at 
the time of the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul. 
 
 
6. (C) In affirming that Turkey remains ready to contribute 
to stability in Iraq any way it can, Erdogan expressed strong 
appreciation for the new USG language and more decisive steps 
against the PKK in Iraq.  The EU should demonstrate the same 
attitude.  The back-to-back High Level Defense Group (HLDG) 
meeting Nov. 18-19 and Economic Partnership Council (EPC) 
meeting in early December demonstrate that bilateral 
relations are back on course, Erdogan added; it will be 
important to build on the meetings to show that the strategic 
partnership is functioning again.  Erdogan declared that a 
strong bilateral dialogue is also key to stymie those in 
Turkey who aim to corral the AK government and put Turkish 
politics back into a confined space. 
 
 
7. (C) Concerning the two meetings, Erdogan sees the HLDG as 
re-cementing good mil-mil relations.  The GOT would like to 
use the EPC to revive consideration of QIZs.  Responding to 
the Ambassador's remarks on the $8.5B loan, Erdogan said the 
political opposition is trying to misuse the political 
conditionality, making it too risky to take advantage of the 
loan in the run-up to crucial country-wide local elections in 
March 2004.  However, the financial markets have included the 
$8.5B in their analyses, and the uncertainty troubles the 
markets.  The GOT wants to preserve the loan offer as an 
important positive reference point.  The GOT does not want to 
change the financial conditions, but Erdogan will expect 
Ziyal to negotiate a successful change in the political 
conditions on the margins of the EPC. 
 
 
8. (C) Comment: Cordial atmosphere despite the late hour and 
Erdogan's obvious exhaustion after a long day carrying the 
government's message to his family's homeland in Rize.  USG's 
statement on the PKK made a strong impression on Erdogan. 
His explicit linkage of the importance of a strong dialogue 
with the U.S. to his ability to overcome resistance to his 
government's reform program underlines his desire to be seen 
to work with us as he struggles to shape Turkey's future. 
End comment. 
 
 
9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
DEUTSCH 

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