US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1463

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KACHIN STATE: AN UNEASY "PEACE"

Identifier: 03RANGOON1463
Wikileaks: View 03RANGOON1463 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2003-11-17 00:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV MOPS PHUM BM Ethnics
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV; USPACOM FOR FPA 
BEIJING PASS TO CHENGDU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PHUM, BM, Ethnics 
SUBJECT: KACHIN STATE: AN UNEASY "PEACE" 
 
REF: A. 02 RANGOON 1684 
 
     B. 02 RANGOON 1585 
     C. 02 RANGOON 1571 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: An Embassy trip to Burma's Kachin State 
secured additional support for our WWII remains recovery 
operations, but also revealed that the Government's ten-year 
old cease-fire agreement with the region's former insurgents 
masks deep suspicion of the SPDC and an active desire for 
self autonomy.  Drug use and HIV/AIDS are on the rise in 
Kachin State, but there are few signs of GOB attention to the 
development of Burma's northernmost region and the regime's 
primary focus is on securing a full surrender of the 
independence movement.  Much to the chagrin of the SPDC, the 
local population retains a close affinity for the United 
States, a legacy of American missionaries and close 
cooperation between Kachin Rangers and U.S. soldiers during 
WWII.  End Summary. 
 
Kachin State: A Remote Mixing Pot 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The DCM and the Defense Attache (DATT), joined by 
several other Embassy officers, traveled on October 1-3 to 
Kachin State, Burma's northernmost territory, wedged between 
China and India.  The main objective of the mission was to 
secure additional support for ongoing operations to recover 
the remains of World War II servicemen, but the trip also 
afforded Emboffs an opportunity to meet with a broad range of 
groups and ethnic minorities who reside in a region of Burma 
rich with a history of conflict and intrigue. 
 
3. (U) Most natives of Kachin State are of Tibeto-Burman 
origin and many of the local ethnic groups, as a result of 
19th and early 20th century American missionaries, are 
nominally Christian.  However, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, and 
animist practices are also influential and the Kachin State 
capital city of Myitkyina is a mixing pot of Burma's many 
ethnic and religious groups.  Until the early 1990s, the 
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its military arm, 
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), controlled most of the 
state.  The Burmese regime reached a cease-fire agreement in 
1993 with the KIA, ending an active insurgency.  However, 
until just a couple of years ago the SPDC continued to treat 
Kachin State as a sensitive area and restricted the movement 
of foreigners and many Burmese.  The SPDC continues to 
designate some remote areas of Kachin State as off limits to 
U.S. Embassy personnel, including the jade-mining center of 
Hpakan. 
 
Cooperation for Remains Recovery 
-------------------------------- 
 
4. (U) Thousands of U.S. soldiers were killed along the 
"Burma Road" in Kachin State during WWII, aiding efforts to 
repel the Japanese invasion of Burma and supplying the China 
front with flights over "The Hump."  The remains of several 
hundred airmen are missing in Kachin State and the Department 
of Defense and the U.S. Embassy began recovery efforts in 
2002.  U.S.-trained Kachin Rangers played an important combat 
and intelligence role in defeating the Japanese in the region 
and local sentiment remains overwhelmingly pro-American, even 
to this day. 
 
5. (C) In Myitkyina, the Embassy delegation met with SPDC 
Deputy Northern Commander, Brigadier General San Htun, to 
discuss plans for an upcoming investigative mission and a 
follow-on site excavation planned for February 2004.  BG San 
Htun informed the DCM and DATT that he was under strict 
instructions from his commanding officers in Rangoon to 
support fully the humanitarian/military operation, and added 
that he intended to provide complete security for all U.S. 
personnel participating in recovery efforts.  Regional 
military intelligence chief, Lt Col Tin Aung Gyi, said he was 
concerned that some of the proposed excavation sites were 
remote and inaccessible by helicopter, observing that snakes 
could pose problems for the American recovery teams (Note: 
LtC Tin Aung Gyi, speaking in Burmese, clarified to the 
Deputy Commander that he had referred to the reptile, not the 
"other kind of snakes," a thinly veiled reference to KIA 
insurgents.  End note.) 
 
The Baptists 
------------ 
 
6. (SBU) Also in Myitkyina, the Embassy delegation held a 
lengthy meeting with the leadership of the Kachin Baptist 
Convention (KBC), a powerful association of church groups 
founded in 1910 by American Baptist missionaries.  With over 
300,000 members, the KBC plays an important role in Kachin 
politics and social development (former Secretary General 
Rev. Saboi Jum helped broker the 1993 cease-fire agreement). 
 
7. (C) KBC leaders were pessimistic about the state of 
affairs in Kachin State, criticizing the SPDC for morally 
corrupt governance and chastising the KIO for shady 
practices.  According to the KBC leaders, Kachin State is 
experiencing a disturbing growth in prostitution, opium 
cultivation and trafficking, and HIV/AIDS.  KBC youth leaders 
claimed that up to 60 percent of male teenagers in the state 
had used heroin or amphetamines, and that many young Kachin 
women were entering the sex industry in Rangoon or Thailand. 
As a result, the KBC remains closely engaged in the provision 
of basic services throughout the State. 
 
8. (C) The KBC leadership reserved its harshest criticism for 
human rights abuses attributed to the SPDC.  They claimed 
that most involuntary portering for military troops had ended 
with the 1993 cease-fire agreement, but said the regime 
continued to force local populations to provide labor for 
infrastructure projects and to participate in the SPDC's new 
people's militia.  The leaders also noted that government 
authorities had forced over 30,000 local residents, including 
all students and civil servants, to attend recent mass 
rallies in support of PM Khin Nyunt's road map for democracy. 
 
9. (C) According to the KBC leaders, NLD leader Aung San Suu 
Kyi's visit to Kachin State in May had many repercussions for 
local party members and supporters.  Military intelligence 
agents arrested NLD partisans and the USDA intimidated 
locals, threatening punishment for those who supported the 
NLD delegation or even stood on the streets to observe ASSK's 
passing convoy.  The wife of a homeowner who lodged ASSK in 
Myitkyina was arrested shortly after the visit and, over five 
months later, remains in detention.  USDA officials paid 
local unemployed youth and thugs with cash and booze to 
harass the NLD convoy and hit vehicles with sticks, and one 
bystander who saluted ASSK was severely beaten. 
 
The Catholics 
------------- 
 
10. (C) Catholic Church leaders of the diocese of Myitkyina 
hosted the Embassy delegation and, much like the Baptist 
leadership, expressed deep concern over dramatic increases in 
the use of illicit drugs and rising HIV/AIDS infection rates 
throughout Kachin State.  Senior priests, who represent a 
state-wide congregation of over 48 priests and 100,000 active 
Catholics, were sharply critical of the SPDC.  They expressed 
embarrassment, as one priest put it, "for appearing to be 
deaf and dumb shepherds" unable to lead their people out from 
under the heavy rule of an authoritarian regime. 
 
11. (C) In a formal speech to the U.S. delegation, a senior 
priest spoke on behalf of archdiocese Bishop Francis Tang, 
who was out of the country during our visit.  The speech, 
risky by Burmese standards in its political overtones, 
recalled cooperation between Americans and the 
"temperamentally war-like" Kachins to free the region from 
Japanese occupation.  The priest said that the Kachin people 
have a great desire and drive for self-autonomy, and their 
support for allied troops during WWII was symbolic of their 
ongoing aspirations for freedom.  Privately, the priests and 
nuns who met with us were even more fiery in their political 
views, with several inquiring as to when the U.S. would send 
troops into Burma to oust the SPDC. 
 
Big Brother is Watching 
----------------------- 
 
12. (C) The day after our meeting with the Catholic leaders, 
military intelligence (MI) agents descended on the parish 
compound and interrogated the priests and nuns about their 
hosting of the Embassy delegation.  Indeed, MI maintained a 
visible presence during our three days in Kachin State, 
tailing our small motorcade, staking out our hotel, pressing 
all of our interlocutors for details on our meetings, and, in 
several cases, discouraging local organizations from meeting 
with us altogether.  The KIO and a local OSS 101 veterans 
group both scrapped scheduled meetings with us due to 
heavy-handed pressure by MI officers. 
 
13. (C) Our visit to Myitkyina also included meetings with 
several international and local NGOs, including MSF-Holland 
(AZD), Metta Development Foundation, and the Shalom 
Foundation (the latter two created by Rev. Saboi Jum).  While 
these organizations are focused on separate priorities--such 
as health, agriculture, and conflict resolution--we heard a 
common theme about the resolve of the Kachin people to embark 
on self-help initiatives in the absence of resources from the 
SPDC.  While the NGOs muted their criticism of the regime, it 
was evident from our visit that the SPDC has done little 
since the cease-fire agreement to improve basic needs in 
Kachin State. 
 
North of North 
-------------- 
 
14. (C) The trip to Kachin State concluded with a half-day 
visit to Putao, a former British military post (Ft. Hertz) 
and Burma's northernmost town.  According to DAO records, 
this was the first visit to Putao by a U.S. military aircraft 
in at least 20 years.  The SPDC only recently opened Putao to 
foreign visitors and, with the town located in a pristine 
Himalayan zone, is beginning to encourage ecotourism in the 
region.  Our stay was too short to talk politics with the 
locals, but we were struck by the diversity of hill tribes 
and other ethnic groups, each with their own distinct housing 
architecture.  Although former dictator Ne Win expelled 
foreign missionaries from Burma in the 1960s, American 
Baptist and Assembly of God missionaries had also extended 
their reach to Putao and one of their legacies is thriving 
citrus fruit production. 
 
Comment:  Jade for Bridges 
-------------------------- 
 
15. (C) The SPDC continues to support our joint humanitarian 
remains recovery operations, but the regime is keen to limit 
U.S. influence in Kachin State over fears of rekindling an 
active insurgency.  The upcoming 10th anniversary of the 
cease-fire agreement between the GOB and the KIA, coming in 
close proximity to the KIO's revolutionary day on February 5, 
provides the SPDC with a pretext to seek a full surrender of 
the Kachin independence movement.  Although the Kachin people 
welcome the cessation of open hostilities, a desire for self 
autonomy remains strong and there is widespread 
disappointment that the cease-fire has not resulted in 
greater prosperity and government assistance in such sectors 
as health and education.  To the contrary, the SPDC is 
closely involved in the extraction of wealth from the State's 
natural resources such as timber and precious stones, 
primarily gold and the world's highest quality jade, which 
enriches only a select few locals.  In return, the SPDC has 
delivered little more than a few token infrastructure 
projects. 
Martinez 

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