US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1971

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, INR/NESA; NSC FOR 
E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL: 11-14-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, PTER, PINR, KPAO, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Norwegian DFM Helgesen says Prabhakaran ready 
to negotiate when GSL solves its problems 
 
Refs:  Colombo 1963, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador attended a November 14 
briefing for key local diplomats given by Norwegian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen regarding his visit to 
Sri Lanka.  Helgesen said V. Prabhakaran was relaxed 
during their November 13 meeting, with the LTTE leader 
underscoring support for the peace process, but 
expressing concerns about the situation in the south. 
In meetings with Helgesen, President Kumaratunga seemed 
to want to lower temperatures, stressing support for the 
ceasefire and the monitoring mission.  Wrapping up, 
Helgesen emphasized the need for clarity in the south in 
order for real progress in the peace track.  We fully 
agree with Helgesen on this point.  Later on 
November 14, the Norwegians issued a statement that has 
been misconstrued by some in the press as indicating 
that the GoN has pulled out of its facilitation effort. 
See Septel regarding Helgesen's plans to call the Deputy 
Secretary next week.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
----------------------------------- 
Helgesen briefs Key Local Diplomats 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) The Ambassador attended a November 14 briefing 
for key local diplomats given by Norwegian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen regarding his 
November 10-14 visit to Sri Lanka.  After this briefing, 
Helgesen gave another one to a wider selection of 
diplomats, which poloff attended.  This latter briefing 
covered similar themes, but in less detail than that 
attended by the Ambassador.  Before departing later 
today, Helgesen plans to give a press briefing, too (see 
Para 9). 
 
------------------------ 
Meeting with Prabhakaran 
------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) Helgesen began by reviewing his November 13 
meeting with V. Prabhakaran, the reclusive Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader.  Helgesen said 
Prabhakaran was quite relaxed and upbeat during the 
meeting -- "He was acting like a politician."  The Tiger 
leader underscored the LTTE's continued support for the 
peace process.  He expressed deep concerns about the 
situation in the south, however.  In the aftermath of 
President Kumaratunga's sudden November 4-5 political 
moves (see Reftels), Prabhakaran went on to underline 
three specific LTTE concerns:  overall security; the 
safety of LTTE political cadre in government-controlled 
areas; and the situation at sea between the Sri Lanka 
Navy (SLN) and the LTTE's Sea Tigers.  While not 
expressing any explicit favoritism for the President or 
the PM, Helgesen noted that the Tiger leader conveyed 
the positive experience of the prior two years compared 
to earlier experiences and also noted the contradictory 
statements given in recent weeks by the President's 
People's Alliance (PA) party.  Prabhakaran commented, 
however, that "political issues in the south are for the 
south." 
 
4.  (C) Continuing, Helgesen said Prabhakaran stressed 
that he was willing to engage in talks with the GSL and 
that the Tigers would negotiate based on their recent 
proposal.  Helgesen continued that he thought 
Prabhakaran recognized that both the GSL proposal and 
the LTTE counterproposals re power-sharing in a 
northeast setup would figure in the talks -- and not the 
LTTE ideas alone.  The Tiger leader, however, gave no 
indication of where he might compromise once 
negotiations resumed.  Prabhakaran spoke of his 
willingness to have a Muslim delegation at future talks, 
but did not discuss any specific modalities for this. 
Before going ahead with talks, Prabhakaran further said 
the LTTE needed to have confidence in who was in charge 
on the government side. 
 
5.  (C) Helgesen added that he had raised the issue of 
the LTTE's killings of opponents and reports of 
continued child recruitment.  While Prabhakaran had no 
comment on the killings, he reiterated his commitment to 
refrain from child recruitment.  In a separate matter, 
Prabhakaran told Helgesen of his concern regarding 
recent security and defense cooperation with India, and 
to a lesser extent, the U.S.  Prabhakaran wondered about 
the timing of such military cooperation.  The Ambassador 
indicated to Helgesen that U.S.-Sri Lanka military 
exercises had been scheduled long ago and were not 
related to the current political situation in any way. 
 
------------------------------ 
Discussions with President, PM 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) During the course of his visit, Helgesen also 
held multiple meetings with cohabitation antagonists, 
President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. 
Kumaratunga seemed to use her two meetings with Helgesen 
to lower temperatures, stressing her support for the 
February 2002 ceasefire accord.  Helgesen noted 
ironically that the President voiced her clear, specific 
support, more than at any time in the past two years, 
for the ceasefire agreement and the role of the Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).  She also gave the 
Norwegians her assurances on the safety of LTTE cadre in 
government-controlled areas.  Commenting on the PM's 
insistence that she take the lead in the peace process 
given her recent actions, the President told Helgesen 
she did not want to take the lead.  At the same time, 
she stuck to her insistence on retaining the Defense 
Ministry, a key bone of contention with the PM.  She 
stated that, while she found the LTTE's October 31 
counterproposals acceptable as one of the bases for 
negotiations (contrary to some comments made by members 
of her party), there was a third proposal on the table: 
the draft August 2000 "devolved powers" Constitution 
developed by her PA party. 
 
7.  (C) Speaking specifically about the role of the 
monitors, the President commented to Helgesen that there 
was no truth to reports that the SLN chief would no 
longer allow SLMM personnel to board SLN ships.  The 
President did, however, invite further development of 
rules of engagement governing the sea in light of the 
fact that the issue was not dealt with in the ceasefire 
accord.  (See Septel report from DATT on Ambassador's 
meeting with the Chief of Defense Staff General 
Balagalle for further details.) 
 
8.  (C) In his briefing, Helgesen did not refer as much 
to his three meetings with the Prime Minister.  Helgesen 
noted that the PM was clearly peeved at the president, 
indicating that he continued to offer to hand over 
control of the peace process to her.  The PM noted to 
him, for example, that he was not in a position to offer 
assurances to the LTTE on its cadres' safety. 
 
------------------------- 
Norwegian Press Statement 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (U) Later on November 14, the Norwegians issued a 
press statement that has been sent to SA and SA/INS. 
The statement reviewed the Norwegian effort, noting the 
problems that have cropped up in the past week with 
respect to the southern political scene and the need for 
"clarity" in order for the peace process to progress. 
The last line of the statement says:  "Until such 
clarity is re-established, there is no space for further 
efforts by the Norwegian government to assist the 
parties."  Based on some of the media coverage we have 
seen, this last line has been misconstrued as indicating 
that the GoN has pulled out or suspended its 
facilitation efforts, when the GoN is actually only 
adopting a "wait-and-see" posture in regard to the 
situation per its comments above. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (C) Based on the general thread of his briefing, 
Helgesen appeared to have received strong votes of 
support for the peace process from all sides.  That is a 
very positive development -- President Kumaratunga's 
sudden moves last week appeared for a time to threaten 
to loosen the gains that have been made in almost two 
years of hard slogging.  In this regard, two points 
stand out:  (1) Kumaratunga has climbed down rapidly 
from her "shock and awe" campaign last week, evidently 
realizing that it was self-defeating; and, (2) In a 
possible sign of a maturing organization, the Tigers 
appear to have decided, at least for the moment, not to 
use the instability in the south to edge out of the 
process. 
 
11.   (C) All that said, Helgesen emphasized that there 
needs to be clarity in the south in order for real 
progress in the peace track.  He is right.  Simply put, 
if the President and the PM fail to get their act 
together, progress will be delayed, raising the risks of 
misunderstandings involving the unpredictable, volatile 
LTTE.  Helgesen noted, correctly in our estimation, that 
the Norwegians also need clarity in order to continue 
their efforts in an effective manner.  He also said the 
President needed to realize she could not give the 
Norwegians new instructions every week.  "Even 
Norwegians have some pride," he said.  END COMMENT. 
 
12.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD