US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1452

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV; TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL; 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM, IN, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: INDIAN VP VISIT TO BURMA: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS TAKE A BACK SEAT 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 6235 
 
     B. RANGOON 1117 
     C. RANGOON 889 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Indian Vice President Shekhawat's November 
2-5 visit to Burma was the most senior mission by an Indian 
leader in 16 years and the latest in a string of high-profile 
visits from India and other neighboring countries.  The 
Burmese regime pulled out all the stops for the visit, though 
concrete results were limited.  However, from a public 
relations perspective, the SPDC scored a major victory and 
demonstrated its ability to draw in regional leaders who are 
keen to pursue bilateral objectives, but willing to overlook 
Burma's deplorable political situation.  Notably absent from 
Shekhawat's proceedings was a human rights agenda and 
anything more than a passing reference to democratization. 
End Summary. 
 
A "Special Place" for Burma 
 
2. (C) On November 5 Indian Vice President Bhairon Singh 
Shekhawat concluded a 4-day visit to Burma that included 
stops in Rangoon, Mandalay, and Bagan.  The visit, the 
highest-level mission by an Indian leader in 16 years, 
received extensive and laudatory official press coverage. 
The Vice President met with numerous SPDC officials, 
including Chairman Senior General Than Shwe and Shekhawat's 
counterpart and host, SPDC Vice Chairman Vice-Senior General 
Maung Aye.  The official government newspaper, the New Light 
of Myanmar, gave daily coverage to Shekhawat's schedule and 
published a lengthy joint statement on the visit. 
 
3. (U) Vice President Shekhawat announced publicly that Burma 
has a "special place" in India's "Look East" policy and that 
India is seeking to double bilateral trade to $1 billion in 
the next three years.  However, concrete results of the trip 
were limited to a $57 million "credit line" to upgrade a rail 
link between Rangoon and Mandalay; a bilateral agreement on 
visa exemptions for official and diplomatic passports; and an 
unspecified MOU between the Burmese Ministry of Education and 
India's Ministry of Human Resource Development.  In late 
October, prior to the visit, the two sides also signed an 
agreement extending a $25 million credit line to Burma for 
importing Indian capital goods and "consultancy" services.  A 
glossy 50-page magazine issued by the Indian Embassy in 
commemoration of the Shekhawat visit extolled "age old ties, 
new age relations" between the two countries. 
 
Concern Over China Outweighs All 
 
4. (C) Indian Embassy officials characterized the trip 
primarily as a "goodwill visit," and acknowledged that India 
might face criticism from the West for sending such a 
high-level official to exchange pleasantries with Burma's 
totalitarian regime, particularly in the wake of a massive 
crackdown on the democratic opposition.  However, our Indian 
contacts were quick to point out that India had numerous 
bilateral objectives that outweighed any trepidation about 
international reaction.  India, they said, had experienced 
decades of frosty relations with Burma, exacerbated by a 
thorny insurgency along the border between Manipur and Chin 
States.  The current warming between New Delhi and Rangoon 
created an opportunity to seek progress in resolving mutual 
border concerns and to secure Burma's support for India's 
aspirations to join the UN Security Council.  Most 
importantly, according to our Indian interlocutors, India 
intends to seize every opportunity to counter growing Chinese 
influence in Burma, even if this requires cozying up to the 
SPDC. 
 
5. (C) Contrary to the GOI's assertions that Shekhawat 
underscored the importance of democratization during his trip 
to Burma (ref A), our GOB contacts indicate that the Indians 
raised few political issues and "nothing that was 
objectionable" to the SPDC.  The regime gave Shekhawat a 
standard presentation on its seven-point road map for 
democracy, a plan notable for its glaring omission of Burma's 
pro-democracy parties and a timeline for a transition to a 
democratic government.  In the November 5 joint statement, 
the Indian Vice-President "expressed support for the national 
reconciliation process and progress in the transition to 
democracy," a position that echoed the recent endorsement by 
ASEAN of Burma's road map. 
 
Comment:  A Missed Opportunity 
 
6.  (C) Vice President Shekhawat's visit was a domestic 
public relations success for the Burmese regime and reflects 
an emerging SPDC strategy to host senior-level leaders and 
regional meetings to increase its legitimacy and bolster its 
international image.  The Indian Embassy here will likely 
maintain a veneer of support for democratization, but will 
actively pursue trade promotion and other exchanges to 
counterbalance what India perceives as unchecked (by the 
U.S.) Chinese influence in Burma.  Ironically, Shekhawat's 
visit coincided with that of UN Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights Pinheiro and the Indians thus missed an easy 
opportunity to address serious democracy and human rights 
issues with the SPDC.  Indian Embassy officials told us that 
Shekhawat put no pressure on the regime behind the scenes and 
his symbolic unveiling of a statue of Mahatma Gandhi at the 
University of Rangoon received scant press coverage. 
Meanwhile, democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, inspired by the 
non-violence tactics of Gandhi, remains under house arrest on 
University Boulevard, less than a mile from the University of 
Rangoon and the new statue.  End Comment. 
Martinez