US embassy cable - 03AMMAN7401

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JORDAN: IRAQI ASSETS TEAM

Identifier: 03AMMAN7401
Wikileaks: View 03AMMAN7401 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2003-11-13 16:38:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: EFIN ETTC IZ JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

131638Z Nov 03
S E C R E T AMMAN 007401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2008 
TAGS: EFIN, ETTC, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDAN: IRAQI ASSETS TEAM 
 
REF: STATE 269804 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reason 1.6. 
 
1.  (S)  Post understands that Washington and CPA may be 
preparing to send a team to Jordan over the coming weekend to 
follow-up on the various issues related to Iraqi assets 
frozen in Jordan.  We fully support this approach, which has 
been requested by the Jordanians and which we have argued for 
in order to sustain the important progress we have made in 
the past week on the frozen assets issues. 
 
2.  (S)  In order for the visit to be productive, the team 
should consist of U.S. and Iraqi/CPA officials with the 
breadth of experience and authority required to follow-up the 
issues discussed by former Prime Minister Abul Ragheb and 
Treasury GC Aufhauser, U/S Larson in Washington in September 
(reftel).  In addition to tracking Iraqi assets, these 
include how to assess and deal with claims presented by 
Jordanian banks and merchants for goods delivered to Iraq, 
but not paid for due to the interruption of the war, as well 
as with the accumulated Jordanian Central Bank claims on Iraq 
that amount to up to $1.5 billion.  The team should also be 
prepared to discuss the impact on the Jordanian banking 
sector of the transfer of large sums to the Development Fund 
for Iraq (DFI).  On the Iraqi side, the team should include 
officials knowledgeable about the history of the trade 
relationship with Jordan from the ministry of trade and the 
central bank.  U.S. team members would best be policy level 
officials who can speak with authority on the trade and 
financial issues. 
 
3.  (S)  The appropriate Jordanian interlocutors will likely 
be top Jordanian officials, including Prime Minister Fayez, 
Deputy Prime Minster and Minister of Trade Halaiqa, Finance 
Minister Abu Hammour, Planning Minister Awadallah, and 
Central Bank Governor Toukan.  It would help make a team's 
visit most productive if these ministers had more than 48 
hours warning before a team's arrival.  In fact, we cannot 
confirm at the start of the local Friday/Saturday weekend 
that these officials will be available early next week. 
 
4.  (S)  Ambassador's comment:  We have made considerable 
progress in recent days on Iraqi asset issues.  We have 
enormous equities in the bilateral relationship that remain 
vital to us, for example, Jordan's support for Iraqi police 
and military training, our anti-terrorism cooperation, 
Jordan's participation with us in Afghanistan and Liberia, 
humanitarian support for Iraq, and border security.  It is 
critically important that we deal with the Jordanians in a 
way that keeps in perspective the entire scope of our 
relationship. An approach that takes these equities into 
account, as well as one that demonstrates an understanding of 
Jordan's interests, will have the best chance of succeeding 
in terms of maximizing Jordanian cooperation in returning 
Iraqi assets to Iraqi control.  I am convinced that this can 
come out right; we just need to do it the right way. 
GNEHM 

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