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| Identifier: | 03AMMAN7401 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03AMMAN7401 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2003-11-13 16:38:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | EFIN ETTC IZ JO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 131638Z Nov 03
S E C R E T AMMAN 007401 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2008 TAGS: EFIN, ETTC, IZ, JO SUBJECT: JORDAN: IRAQI ASSETS TEAM REF: STATE 269804 Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reason 1.6. 1. (S) Post understands that Washington and CPA may be preparing to send a team to Jordan over the coming weekend to follow-up on the various issues related to Iraqi assets frozen in Jordan. We fully support this approach, which has been requested by the Jordanians and which we have argued for in order to sustain the important progress we have made in the past week on the frozen assets issues. 2. (S) In order for the visit to be productive, the team should consist of U.S. and Iraqi/CPA officials with the breadth of experience and authority required to follow-up the issues discussed by former Prime Minister Abul Ragheb and Treasury GC Aufhauser, U/S Larson in Washington in September (reftel). In addition to tracking Iraqi assets, these include how to assess and deal with claims presented by Jordanian banks and merchants for goods delivered to Iraq, but not paid for due to the interruption of the war, as well as with the accumulated Jordanian Central Bank claims on Iraq that amount to up to $1.5 billion. The team should also be prepared to discuss the impact on the Jordanian banking sector of the transfer of large sums to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). On the Iraqi side, the team should include officials knowledgeable about the history of the trade relationship with Jordan from the ministry of trade and the central bank. U.S. team members would best be policy level officials who can speak with authority on the trade and financial issues. 3. (S) The appropriate Jordanian interlocutors will likely be top Jordanian officials, including Prime Minister Fayez, Deputy Prime Minster and Minister of Trade Halaiqa, Finance Minister Abu Hammour, Planning Minister Awadallah, and Central Bank Governor Toukan. It would help make a team's visit most productive if these ministers had more than 48 hours warning before a team's arrival. In fact, we cannot confirm at the start of the local Friday/Saturday weekend that these officials will be available early next week. 4. (S) Ambassador's comment: We have made considerable progress in recent days on Iraqi asset issues. We have enormous equities in the bilateral relationship that remain vital to us, for example, Jordan's support for Iraqi police and military training, our anti-terrorism cooperation, Jordan's participation with us in Afghanistan and Liberia, humanitarian support for Iraq, and border security. It is critically important that we deal with the Jordanians in a way that keeps in perspective the entire scope of our relationship. An approach that takes these equities into account, as well as one that demonstrates an understanding of Jordan's interests, will have the best chance of succeeding in terms of maximizing Jordanian cooperation in returning Iraqi assets to Iraqi control. I am convinced that this can come out right; we just need to do it the right way. GNEHM
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