US embassy cable - 03THEHAGUE2846

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002846 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013 
TAGS: KNNP, PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, NL, IAEA 
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN:  DUTCH MFA NONPRO CHIEF ON ELBARADEI 
REPORT 
 
REF: A. STATE 315022 
 
     B. STATE 313454 
     C. STATE 302819 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B AND D) 
 
 1. (C) Poloffs delivered ref A nonpaper to MFA 
Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on November 13.  Wilke 
(protect throughout) said the GONL shared the U.S. conclusion 
that the latest ElBaradei report confirms Iran has been 
pursuing capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program. 
In the Dutch view, the report provides "every reason to 
conclude that there has been non-compliance."  As to next 
steps, the GONL places a premium on maintaining a common EU 
position on the issue but also wants to uphold transatlantic 
unity.  Wilke said the EU3 was keeping its discussions on the 
issue from other members.  That said, he thought it possible 
FM Fischer might have briefed FM de Hoop Scheffer on the 
issue; if so details had not reached his (DAS) level.  He 
also noted there has been no leaking either in Teheran or in 
EU3 capitals, and the EU3 embassies in Teheran did not seem 
to be well-informed on the issue.  Wilke shares U.S. concerns 
about Iran trying to split the U.S. from the EU on this issue 
(ref B).  In terms of pursuing a noncompliance resolution at 
the November 20 Board of Governors (BOG) meeting, the key for 
the GONL was the British.  It was not likely the GONL could 
go along if the UK were not onboard. 
 
2. (C) Wilke raised the issue of the desired end-state, i.e,. 
if the goal is elimination of the Iranian weapons program, 
now that the Iranians are providing some measure of 
cooperation it will be difficult to agree on which elements 
of the fuel cycle are peaceful and which support a weapons 
program.  Concerning a technical finding of noncompliance, 
such as the Romanian example detailed ref C, Wilke thought it 
might be possible but said it could be disadvantageous for 
follow-on actions because it would take the initiative away 
from the BOG.  Wilke said that given that an additional 
report was possible owing to the need to confirm details such 
as the source of HEU and LEU contamination the results of 
this might provide even more diplomatic leverage for a 
noncompliance finding. 
RUSSEL