US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1963

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  11-13-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, PHUM, CE, NO 
SUBJECT:  In readouts of President-PM meeting, key 
advisers note tentative glint of a possible compromise 
 
Refs:  Colombo 1956, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (C) The Ambassador met late November 12 with 
Minister Moragoda, a key adviser to the PM.  Based on 
what he had heard from the PM and his secretary, 
Moragoda provided a readout of the PM's meeting earlier 
that day with the President.  The PM urged her to take 
over the peace process, but she made no commitments. 
The President indicated (according to the PM's 
secretary) that she might compromise by allowing the UNF 
 
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government to name a deputy to help run the defense 
ministry.  Moragoda also thought she might be willing to 
give back the interior and mass communications 
ministries.  The PM is mulling over next steps, 
including pressing for elections.  On November 13, the 
DCM met Presidential Senior Advisor Mano Tittawella, who 
sat in on the President-PM meeting, and whose comments 
largely paralleled the Ambassador's discussion with 
Moragoda.  The tentative glint of a possible compromise 
over the ministries is a positive development.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Moragoda Provides Readout on President-PM Meeting 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador Lunstead met late November 12 with 
Milinda Moragoda, a key adviser to Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe and the Minister of Economic Reform. 
Moragoda related that he had received separate briefings 
from the PM and his secretary, Bradman Weerakoon, 
regarding the PM's meeting earlier that day with 
President Kumaratunga.  The meeting between the two was 
the first since Kumaratunga's sudden November 4 take- 
over of three ministries and suspension of Parliament 
(see Reftels). 
 
3.  (C) Moragoda began by noting that the Prime Minister 
had been somewhat annoyed going into the meeting by what 
he saw as a snub by President Kumaratunga.  The 
President, Moragoda noted, had issued invitations to the 
meeting to all leaders of parties within the United 
National Front (UNF) coalition government.  The PM felt 
that in doing this Kumaratunga was trying to undercut 
his leadership role.  In the event, the members of the 
UNF coalition agreed that the PM would represent the 
group and he was accompanied to the meeting only by 
Weerakoon. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Pressing President to take over Peace Process 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Based on a prior understanding reached with his 
UNF coalition partners, Moragoda said the major point 
the PM had made to the President was that she should run 
the peace process.  The PM noted that the UNF government 
could no longer effectively run the peace process in 
light of the President's takeover of the defense 
ministry last week, which created "split" 
responsibilities.  In response, the President made no 
commitments on the matter. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Tentative glint of a Possible Compromise? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Moragoda then highlighted the first tentative 
glint of a possible compromise since the cohabitation 
crisis began last week.  He said Weerakoon had told him 
that the President had indicated to Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe that she might compromise by allowing the 
UNP government to name a deputy to join in the running 
of the defense ministry.  She did not provide further 
details on how such an arrangement might work, though 
there was some vague reference to forming some sort of 
defense council or committee (see Para 9 for more on 
this matter).  Moragoda noted, however, that he only 
heard this reference from Weerakoon; the Prime Minister 
did not mention it to him.  Moragoda said that the 
President discussed only the Defense Ministry, and not 
the interior and mass communication ministries.  He 
inferred from this that she might be willing to give the 
UNF government back control of the interior and mass 
communications ministries. 
 
------------------------- 
The Question of Elections 
------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Moragoda said the President had made clear to 
the PM that she did not want to call fresh elections. 
On this question, Moragoda noted that the PM seems to be 
tentatively leaning toward pressing for elections as a 
way to achieve some clarity in the murky political 
situation.  Some others in the UNF government are also 
pushing for elections.  Moragoda told the Ambassador 
that he did not think that elections would solve much 
and should "only be a last resort." 
 
-------------------------- 
PM mulling over Next Steps 
-------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Moragoda said the PM is mulling over next steps. 
He plans to travel out of Colombo over the coming 
November 15-16 weekend.  He is slated to meet again with 
the President on November 17, this time in the company 
of other party leaders.  Moragoda said the PM is 
wrestling with possibly pressing for elections or 
perhaps taking a low-key, flexible approach to the 
situation.  At least some UNP MPs are pushing to impeach 
the President, which would require votes the party 
currently does not control. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Readout from Presidential Adviser 
--------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) In a November 13 discussion with the DCM (which 
largely paralleled the Ambassador's discussion with 
Moragoda), Presidential Senior Adviser Mano Tittawella, 
who sat in on the President-Prime Minister meeting the 
day before, described the atmosphere as "lighthearted 
and joking" between "two people who've known each other 
since they were children."  Tittawella described the 
first forty-five minutes as "both sides venting" about 
how they saw each other's actions.  Once the President 
and the Prime Minister got down to business, however, 
each quickly addressed the other's greatest fear:  the 
PM assured the President that he had no intention of 
trying to impeach her, and the President assured the 
Prime Minister that she had no intention of dissolving 
Parliament and going for elections.  (Tittawella told 
the DCM that one factor in this was that Kumaratunga had 
"finally gotten some good advice" and now realized she 
would probably not improve her position at all in an 
election and very likely would lose ground.)  The 
President, according to Tittawella, made a strong pitch 
for a "national unity government."  She told the PM that 
the LTTE counterproposals, whatever flaws they may 
contain, offer an historic opportunity for Sri Lanka 
which a national government can best address.  She told 
the PM that all parties must be brought along in the 
process, even the radical JVP (Janantha Vimukthi 
Peramuna) party, as all "parties who want peace" figure 
out how best to respond to the counterproposals. 
 
9.  (C) The President made clear to the Prime Minister 
that she would not give up the Defense Ministry, but was 
willing to surrender Interior and Mass Communications as 
part of a national government.  Tittawella told the DCM 
that the President (who had met Norwegian Deputy FM 
Helgesen the night before and would again after he 
returned from seeing the LTTE later today) understood 
the Norwegian position that they couldn't facilitate a 
peace process "that had two heads in Colombo."  To 
assuage those concerns, she proposed to the PM that a 
"joint defense consultative mechanism" of some sort be 
set up, possibly between Tittawella or someone of 
similar stature in the presidency and perhaps the PM's 
secretary Bradman Weerakoon.  This informal mechanism 
 
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would meet whenever a defense issue arose that had 
implications for the peace process and the ceasefire, 
and quickly work out a common position.  The PM had 
found the idea interesting.  Tittawella said he would 
work up a paper on the subject over the weekend that the 
PM and President could consider when they meet again on 
Monday. 
 
10.  (C) Tittawella said the PM told the President that 
he would consider the national government possibility 
over the weekend in consultation with his alliance 
members.  In return, she promised him that she would use 
the weekend to consider ways to enhance collaboration 
and "make this work."  Tittawella said he now sees a 
"glimmer of hope" where a week ago "it was completely 
dark."  He cautioned, however, that despite the 
constructive nature of the meeting, an agreement between 
the President and the PM on how to resolve the current 
impasse is far from certain.  "Right now, it's fifty- 
fifty." 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
11.  (C) The tentative glint of a possible compromise 
over the ministries is a positive development.  Giving 
the UNF back control of the interior and mass 
communications ministries, and a UNF representative 
deputy status in the defense ministry, might afford the 
two sides a way to climb down from their hard-line 
stands and thus ease tensions.  That said, Moragoda 
noted that he had only heard about the idea re the 
defense ministry from Weerakoon, who said he had heard 
the President say it.  The PM did not mention it to 
Moragoda at all, which is interesting.  Tittawella's 
comments backed up Weerakoon's recollection. 
 
12.  (C) Regarding some of the other alternatives being 
discussed, we tend to agree with Moragoda that elections 
would probably not solve much.  Even if the UNF did 
well, it would only win several more seats given the 
country's complex proportional representation system. 
In the meantime, the elections would no doubt be very 
violent.  The PM, even if the UNF achieved a fresh 
"mandate," would still have to find a way to work with a 
president who would be in place until late 2005.  The 
option of impeaching the President is the worst idea of 
all.  Any such attempt would be based on exceedingly 
flimsy abuse of power and corruption charges, and would 
roil the political waters for months on end.  If 
Tittawella is right that he said it, the PM's preclusion 
of the impeachment option is a positive development. 
 
13.  (C) In the meantime, Norwegian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Helgesen is meeting Tamil Tiger leader 
Prabhakaran on Thursday, November 13, and we understand 
the Tigers will hold a press conference after that 
meeting.  Tiger comments may well influence which 
direction the PM goes. 
 
14.  (C) The Ambassador has an appointment with the 
President on Monday, November 17 at 1:00 P.M.  Moragoda 
suggested the Ambassador meet with the PM before that 
meeting, and said he would try to set something up for 
either Friday or Monday.  The Ambassador will also meet 
Chief of Defense Staff Balagalle on Friday.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
15.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD