US embassy cable - 03SANAA2700

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002700 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, IZ, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: FBI DIRECTOR'S 11/5/03 MEETING WITH YEMENI 
PRESIDENT SALEH 
 
REF: SANAA 1256 
 
Classified By: CTC AUSTIN G. GILREATH, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S/NF) Summary:  On 5 November 2003, FBI Director 
Mueller, accompanied by Ambassador,  met with ROYG President 
Saleh in Sanaa.  The Director pressed Saleh on the urgent 
need to arrest al-Qa'ida members at large in Yemen; expressed 
concerns over the ROYG's release of arrestees who may be 
associated with terrorism; and cautioned Saleh of the 
apparent financing and recruitment of Yemenis to go and fight 
against coalition forces in Iraq.  Saleh told the Director 
that ROYG security forces were committed to the Global War On 
Terrorism and were doing everything possible to be good 
partners with America.  Saleh further complained that the USG 
was putting undue pressure on him without providing the 
necessary tools (financing and technical support) to 
accomplish the mission.  The Director was firm in his 
insistence that Yemen's CT performance must improve, 
particularly in regards to the sharing of intelligence.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (C)  On the evening of 5 November 2003, the FBI Director, 
the Ambassador, FBI CT Director John Pistol, Staff Assistant 
Jonothan Soloman, and Embassy FBI representative Carlos 
Fernandez attended a 40-minute meeting with President Saleh 
at the Presidential Palace.  Minister of Interior Rashad 
al-Alimi, and Political Security Organization Director BG 
Ghalib Qamish also attended the meeting, as well as a sidebar 
meeting with the American contingent before President Saleh's 
entrance.  Qamish and Alimi provided the Director a written 
request for future CT support. 
 
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YEMEN'S CT PERFORMANCE MUST IMPROVE 
 
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3.  (S/NF)  After initial pleasantries, the Director raised 
three issues:  that the USG wanted to assist the ROYG in 
pursuing and arresting al-Qa,ida members at large in Yemen; 
that there were serious concerns in Washington surrounding 
the reported impending release of detained radicals who had 
supposedly promised not to conduct operations in or against 
Yemen; and that the USG had information indicating an effort 
by some elements in Yemen to recruit or conduct fund-raising 
for Yemenis to travel to Iraq to conduct terrorist operations 
against coalition forces.  The Director said that he was 
concerned and desired increased cooperation to jointly 
develop intelligence on terrorists located in Yemen and 
elsewhere. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  The Director told Saleh that he saw many 
similarities in the current conditions of USG-ROYG CT 
cooperation and conditions between the USG and Saudi Arabia 
prior to the 12 May 2003 terrorist attacks in the Kingdom. 
He went on to describe the significant improvement in 
cooperation (for example, the capture of Swift Sword) that 
followed the attacks and stated that he wanted to see that 
same level of cooperation and partnership in Yemen. 
 
5.  (C)  President Saleh responded that he and his government 
shared common concerns in the CT arena with the USG, but that 
it was placing pressure on the ROYG without providing 
necessary financial and technical support.  He stated that 
the ROYG was fully committed to the GWOT, but that the ROYG 
would not take orders from the USG.  Saleh said that the ROYG 
was not afraid of the USG like other countries in the region 
were, and would not be &intimidated into8 participating as 
a partner in the GWOT.  Saleh criticized the anti-Yemen 
position held in Washington, and said that those 
decision-makers were relying on false information delivered 
by the Embassy and various agencies. 
 
6.  (S/NF)  President Saleh said that the Embassy was relying 
on weak intelligence and that this would harm the joint 
relationship.  As an example, Saleh cited the reported 
release of Hadi Dulqam.  Saleh said that there was no truth 
to this and that the Director needed to trust him and his 
security apparatus in this matter. In this way, by the 
Director trusting what Saleh (or one of his representatives) 
directly said and not what the Embassy said, the relationship 
could improve.  Saleh said that he wanted to be a partner 
like Pakistan or Egypt, with commensurate support and trust. 
The Director countered that such trust only comes with time 
and positive experience. 
 
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THE RELEASE ISSUE 
 
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7.  (C)  Saleh said that the Ramadan 2003 release of 
detainees was a very contentious issue and that no conclusion 
had yet been reached regarding its implementation due to 
lingering security concerns.  Saleh said that the number of 
candidates for release had been pared down from an initial 
152 last month to the current figure of 92, and that the 
number would likely further be reduced.  Saleh said that of 
the group of 34 who were released during Ramadan in 2002, 
some had returned to the Hitat Camp and were re-arrested -- 
but he added that all releasees were subject to continual 
surveillance by ROYG security forces to ensure they did not 
carry out any further attacks. 
 
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KHALID ABDUL NABI 
 
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8.  (S/NF)  Saleh said that during June 2003, while he was in 
Germany, Khalid Abdul Nabi was involved in an attack on a 
Yemeni medical team deployed in the Abyan region.  Saleh said 
that following the attack Abdul Nabi surrendered himself, and 
his 40 soldiers, to the Presidential  Diwan and that Saleh 
had personal discussions with Abdul Nabi.  Based on Abdul 
Nabi,s promise not to conduct another attack in Yemen, Saleh 
released him and told the Director that he (Saleh) could 
offer a 75% guarantee that Abdul Nabi would not conduct 
another attack. 
 
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ABU  ASIM AL-MAKKI 
 
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9.  (S/NF)  The Director told Saleh that many senior 
officials in Washington are frustrated with the ROYG,s 
continuing failure to capture al-Makki.  Saleh responded 
vigorously that he was prepared to use tanks if necessary to 
destroy al-Makki.  Saleh insisted that the ROYG did not know 
al-Makki,s current location and that if the USG had any 
targeting data (even partial information) the ROYG was 
prepared to conduct operation to kill al-Makki.  Saleh said 
that circa 2 November 2003 he had dispatched an emissary to 
negotiate the surrender of al-Makki (no further information). 
 Saleh further criticized the USG by stating that it had 
failed over a period of years to capture Usama bin Laden, but 
still raised inappropriate expectations for the ROYG in its 
pursuit of al-Makki.  Saleh said he believed the last known 
location for al-Makki was in the al-Jouf region.  The 
Ambassador corrected Saleh and said the embassy had reason to 
believe he was in the Hadda District of Sanaa.  BG Qamish 
concurred with this assessment. 
 
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HOW TO IMPROVE FBI/ROYG COOPERATION 
 
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10.  (C)  The Director finished the meeting by requesting 
ROYG commitment to expand existing FBI-Yemeni cooperation in 
three issues.  First, to extend the sharing of fingerprinting 
and DNA-mapping information to detainees currently in Yemeni 
custody.  Second, to allow for the participating of FBI 
specialists in the ROYG,s efforts to hunt down fugitives. 
Lastly, to expand the exchange of intelligence and to allow 
FBI officials to participate in the interrogation of 
terrorist suspects.  Saleh deferred on these issues, but 
nominally accepted FBI assistance in cases of the USS COLE 
escapees Fadl al-Quso and Jamal al-Badawi.  He added the ROYG 
security forces had arrested hundreds of suspects who 
remained in Yemeni jails, but that many of these individuals 
were merely suspects and had not committed a crime. 
Accordingly, Embassy requests for personal data on them (and 
grouping them in with proven criminals/terrorists) were 
inappropriate and there would be no sharing of such data 
because merely planning to commit a crime was no the same 
thing as actually committing it. 
MISENHEIMER