US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7016

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007016 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
OSD/ISA FOR A/ASD RICARDEL, DASD BRZEZINSKI AND L. HEALD; 
DSCA FOR LT. GEN. WALTERS, J. FARMER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, TU, IZ, AF, ASEC 
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 18-19 US-TURKEY HIGH-LEVEL DEFENSE GROUP 
(HLDG) MEETING:  SCENESETTER 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 6734 
 
 
(u) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons:  1.5 
(B and D). 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) The November 18-19 meeting of the U.S.-Turkey 
High-Level Defense Group (HLDG) represents an opportunity to 
achieve a number of important objectives:  to solidify 
dialogue between the US and Turkish militaries; to begin to 
reshape our security relationship to the 21st century; and, 
to emphasize how our cooperation is much broader than just 
Iraq, despite Iraq,s enormous importance to both our 
countries.  This will not be an easy task, given the current 
state of play on Turkey,s offer to contribute troops to the 
stabilization force in Iraq.  The GOT has expressed a desire 
to enhance regional cooperation with the U.S. and sees the 
HLDG as a key venue to begin doing so.  During the HLDG 
meeting and during TGS D/CHOD,s bilateral meetings in 
Washington before and after the HLDG (septel), it will be 
useful to share our vision of the way ahead in Iraq and 
identify possible areas of security/military cooperation with 
Turkey to help ensure that Turkey supports our larger policy 
objectives.  At the same time, we need to offer areas of 
cooperation outside of Iraq (i.e., the Caucasus, Central Asia 
and Afghanistan) that could serve as a useful basis to 
rebuild mil-to-mil relations and help work toward a 
successful NATO summit in Istanbul. While the Turks will have 
to decide for themselves where and when it is in their 
interest to support us, we have an interest in maintaining 
strong bilateral ties with this key NATO ally. 
 
 
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OBJECTIVES 
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2. (C) Our primary objectives during this year,s HLDG should 
be three-fold:  (1) renew the strong cooperation between the 
U.S. and Turkish militaries and get military relations back 
on track; (2) begin to reshape the US-Turkish security 
relationship to the realities of the 21st century; and, (3) 
to emphasize how our bilateral relationship is much broader 
than just Iraq, despite Iraq,s enormous importance to both 
our countries. 
 
 
3. (C) Senior GOT officials across the board -- from FM Gul 
and U/S Ziyal to TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok and D/CHOD GEN Basbug -- 
have expressed a desire to improve US-Turkish military 
relations in the wake of military operations in Iraq, and see 
the HLDG as a key venue for doing so.  This will not be an 
easy task.  One of the leading advocates behind a Turkish 
contribution to the stabilization force before the October 7 
Parliamentary vote, the Turkish military saw Turkey,s 
participation in Iraq as a way to protect Turkey,s national 
interests and get back into the good graces of its key ally, 
the United States.  Our decision not to accept Turkey,s 
offer at this time will be seen by many Turkish officials -) 
the Turkish military in particular -) as further evidence 
that the US places a greater priority on its relationship 
with the Kurdish groups in the north than with a NATO ally of 
more than 50 years.  Our decision will also be interpreted as 
a move by the US (and the Kurds) to keep the Turks out of 
Iraq and therefore limit their influence there.  Even the 
most American-oriented officers regret they will not have the 
opportunity to operate with us in the major palliative manner 
they envisage in Iraq.  Turkish CHOD GEN Ozkok has given 
public vent to some of these feelings in an unusual public 
interview in the newspaper RADIKAL. 
 
 
4. (C) In this light, the HLDG can be a useful venue for 
dialogue and an exchange of ideas between our two militaries. 
We should engage the Turks on their plans for transformation 
and help them see the advantages of developing more 
deployable forces to participate in peacekeeping and 
engagement activities.  We should also use the HLDG to 
identify future areas of cooperation that will help re-build 
the trust and confidence that was shaken by events on March 1 
and July 4.  While areas where the Turkish military can 
support our larger efforts in Iraq will be key to our ability 
to mend fences and soften the blow of a &no thanks8 to the 
Turkish offer of troops for Iraq, we should also propose 
areas for cooperation outside of Iraq, including the 
Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan.  In the end, it will 
be up the TGS and the rest of the GOT to decide where and 
when cooperation with the US furthers Turkey,s national 
interests.  But it is in our interest to be transparent about 
our intentions, outline where we are going, follow through on 
commitments, and identify areas where Turkey can support our 
larger objectives in the region. 
 
 
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HLDG: AGENDA AND PRESENTATIONS 
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5. (C) It is important to the outcome to show that we take 
the HLDG seriously.  In terms of substance, we offer the 
following comments on the main agenda items: 
 
 
--Turkish Concept Paper on U.S.-Turkish Defense Relationship: 
 This is one of the most important agenda items for TGS and 
GEN Basbug personally has requested that it be included on 
the agenda.  At an earlier meeting of the HLDG, the U.S. 
requested that the GOT provide a concept paper outlining 
Turkey's vision of the future of the U.S.-Turkish defense 
relationship.  One of the main reasons why the U.S. side 
requested the paper was to deflect the TGS's repeated 
requests to re-negotiate the DECA, which we believe would be 
a contentious and fruitless exercise.  The paper, which was 
presented to the US in January 2001, was drafted by the MFA 
and cleared by TGS after almost two years of Turkish 
interagency debate.  During the 2002 HLDG working group 
meetings in Germany, the US side agreed to respond to the 
Turkish paper and TGS expects us to do so during this year,s 
HLDG.  TGS recently advised us that they intend to focus 
their presentation on what they perceive to be the 
shortcomings of the USG,s adherence to the Defense and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA).  The Turkish concept 
paper will play prominently into this discussion. 
 
 
We recognize the paper is dated and in many ways reflects the 
same stale &business as usual8 approach advocated by the 
Turks prior to March 1.  However, we believe we should 
formally respond.  It would be useful for us to take the 
opportunity to outline for GEN Basbug our vision of where we 
want to take our defense relationship.  Rather than 
responding to the Turkish paper on a point-by-point basis, we 
could outline our own vision of where we want the U.S.-Turkey 
bilateral defense relationship to go, our expectations of 
Turkey as an important ally, and what we are (and are not) 
prepared to do in the way of assistance for Turkey.  In this 
context, we might encourage the Turks to think more deeply 
about how to modernize their forces in ways that make them 
more capable for peacekeeping and regional engagement 
activities.  While TGS may not be entirely pleased with our 
response, we believe it preferable to be frank and honest 
with the Turkish military at this stage of our relationship 
and right-size Turkish expectations. 
 
 
--Global War on Terrorism (GWOT):  DASD Brzezinski,s 
briefing on this subject during the December 2002 HLDG 
working group meetings was well-received by TGS, and TGS is 
looking forward to an update at this year,s HLDG.  In our 
view, the U.S. presentation should focus on our 
accomplishments to date, what we are doing now, and where we 
are heading in the future in the two key theaters of interest 
for Turkey:  Afghanistan and Iraq.  When discussing 
Afghanistan, we recommend that Washington outline where we 
are on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), including 
what offers we have from other nations.  However, we 
recommend against soliciting contributions from Turkey for 
either ISAF or the PRTs, given TGS,s preoccupation with Iraq 
and their September 2003 letter to CENTCOM stating they could 
not provide additional forces to Afghanistan at this time. 
 
 
--Cooperation in Iraq: Given the GOT,s desire to 
rehabilitate its relations with us through cooperation in 
Iraq and our decision to not accept their most significant 
offer to date, we should identify areas where Turkey -- and 
the Turkish military in particular )- can play a 
constructive and meaningful role in stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including but not limited to 
the training of Iraqi military officers and expansion of 
capacity at the Turkish-Iraqi border.  Our ability to make 
good on the President,s commitment to rid Iraq of the 
PKK/Kadek terrorist threat (through concrete actions and a 
convincing game-plan that we can share with the Turks) is now 
even more important to our efforts to secure Turkish support 
for our overall Iraq policy.  During the HLDG, TGS may press 
for quicker, more concrete action on PKK/Kadek as a sign of 
the President,s commitment to ridding the terrorist threat 
from northern Iraq.  They may also ask when/if they can 
review U.S. military courses of action that have been 
developed for addressing the PKK/KADEK threat. 
 
 
--NATO Summit:  The Turks have yet to outline a vision for 
the Summit.  The GOT is also looking to the US to provide our 
ideas to help get them started (reftel).  Given Turkey,s 
current lack of a vision for the Summit and the fact that TGS 
is not the lead GOT agency for the issue, we recommend that 
we take the lead in discussing the issue and use the HLDG to 
outline our vision and goals for the Summit.  Such an 
approach will help our efforts to shape the Summit,s agenda, 
help the Turks with their preparations, and put the GOT on 
notice that we are expecting big things to come out of 
Istanbul. 
 
 
--Caucasus Working Group:  As part of our larger goal of 
reshaping the US-Turkish security relationship outside of 
Iraq, the HLDG could be a launching point to develop new 
areas for cooperation in the Caucasus along the lines of 
Georgia train and equip.  This would help Turkey,s military 
transform into a more deployable force for peacekeeping and 
participation in NATO,s rapid deployment force.  In 
preparation for the November 17 CWG meeting, we recommend 
that Washington identify concrete areas in the Caucasus where 
the US and Turkey can work together and try to secure TGS,s 
concurrence at the HLDG. Last year,s addition of Kazakstan 
to the region covered by the CWG might provide some 
opportunities for innovative cooperation that political 
problems (e.g., Nagorno-Karabagh) in the Caucasus. 
 
 
--Missile Defense:  The Missile Defense Technical Experts 
Group (TGS and MDA) last met in May in Colorado Springs.  At 
that meeting, Phase III of the joint architectural study was 
approved and new areas of research and cooperation were 
discussed, such as a sensor study, post attack damage 
scenarios, and the NATO study.  The GOT appears eager to hear 
how the US plans to coordinate its own missile defense, its 
efforts to have other countries buy in to a joint system, and 
the NATO study.  Because of the high cost of a missile 
defense system, Turkey is waiting to see how it can reap the 
benefits of a joint system before it commits to procuring its 
own MD system. 
 
 
--Technology Transfer:  Turkey believes it deserves the same 
status that we extend to Israel.  Despite our positive track 
record, there is a widespread and growing perception within 
the GOT that the US places unnecessary restrictions on 
technology transfer to Turkey, and that the US can and should 
be more forthcoming in its dealings with Turkey.  Rightly or 
wrongly, the GOT has used what it perceives to be rigid US 
policies to justify decisions to look elsewhere to meet their 
technology needs.  When the Turks raise this issue during the 
HLDG, we recommend that Washington defend our record (with 
facts), remind the military that there will be times when we 
will not release our technology to any other nation 
(including the UK and Israel), and illustrate how Turkey as a 
NATO ally receives preferential treatment in the area of 
technology transfer. 
 
 
--Third-Country Sales and Training: Turkey does not desire to 
be a country that simply purchases defense products from 
others.  Rather, it wants to supply other countries 
(especially in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle 
East) with defense-related products and services, including 
training.  Since the December 2002 HLDG working group 
meetings, State,s Political-Military Affairs Bureau, in 
conjunction with other agencies, has made progress in 
approving some of the outstanding Turkish requests.  We 
recommend that Washington close out as many of the remaining 
cases as possible before the HLDG as a sign of our continued 
commitment to facilitating the GOT,s requests in a timely 
manner. 
 
 
Space:   OSD/C3I initiated negotiations on a Space Agreement 
(vice MOU) on defense-based cooperation with the Turkish Air 
Force in Ankara September 23-24.  The Turks were expectedly 
disappointed that the agreement did not get into details such 
as what imagery, equipment and training they were to get, but 
eventually came to understand that this is the second step in 
a three-step process.  The Turks have committed to formally 
responding to the agreement negotiated this week by December 
1, after which Washington will decide if another round of 
negotiations is necessary.  The goal is to have a signing 
ceremony at the time of the ATC meeting next March.  We 
understand that OSD/C3I will be prepared to brief on this 
topic during the HLDG. 
 
 
EDELMAN