US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1433

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001433 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2013 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, BM 
SUBJECT: "COME BACK TO REALITY" 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1431 
 
     B. RANGOON 1432 
     C. BANGKOK 7280 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Former ICRC Head and assistant to UN 
Special Envoy Razali, Leon de Reidmatten, briefed COM on his 
November 7 Bangkok meeting with Thai Foreign Minister 
Surakiat. De Reidmatten said that from the discussion that 
took place between SE Razali and FM Surakiat, it is clear the 
SPDC aim is to have an elected government in place by 2006, 
the year of the ASEAN summit in Rangoon.  SE Razali's 
position is that sanctions don't work, engagement doesn't 
work, so now it is time for the UN to be more active by 
putting forward a "plan" similar to the SPDC road map.  It is 
becoming ever more clear that the SPDC had an end state, and 
an end date, in mind when they announced the road map back in 
August - the end state is a sitting "elected" government, and 
the end date is the ASEAN Summit 2006. De Reidmatten 
expressed alarm at ASSK's continued isolation - coupled with 
the regime's increasing confidence in the aftermath of the 
Bali summit. Observations from both de Reidmatten and UNSR 
Pinheiro (Ref A) underscore the need for more pressure on the 
regime to include the opposition in the road map - pressure 
that must be exerted by ASEAN countries (Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malysia), India, China, and Japan, in conjunction with 
ongoing UN efforts. END SUMMARY. 
 
Special Envoy Razali meets with FM Surakiat 
 
2.  (C) Leon de Reidmatten, former ICRC Head of Delegation to 
Burma and currently the Assistant to UN Special Envoy Razali, 
told the COM that in the November 7 meeting with SE Razali 
and the Thai Foreign Minister, SE Razali was told that the 
Thais are concerned that Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD will be 
left out of the whole political process now unfolding in 
Burma.  De Reidmatten said the Thais have discussed the 
Burmese roadmap with Khin Nyunt, but that the Thais are not 
very clear on "what the road map really means," that Than 
Shwe wants to pursue the road map without any detours, and 
that PM Khin Nyunt and General Maung Aye think it is 
important to include the opposition in the process, but "not 
at any cost."  De Reidmatten said that from the discussion 
that took place between SE Razali and FM Surakiat, it is 
clear the SPDC aim is to have an elected government in place 
by 2006, the year of the ASEAN summit in Rangoon. De 
Reidmatten said that SE Razali's  position is that sanctions 
don't work, engagement doesn't work, so now it is time for 
the UN to be more active by putting forward a "plan" similar 
to the SPDC road map. 
 
3.  (C) Reidmatten said that Thai DepPermSec Virasakdi 
Futakul told him during the meeting (and later at dinner on 
November 7) that at the December 10-11 ASEAN summit in Tokyo, 
PM Khin Nyunt will answer ASEAN's questions on the SPDC's 
road map and will explain the implementation plan. De 
Reidmatten said Futrakul thinks the SPDC will then relax 
their restrictions on the NLD and will release Aung San Suu 
Kyi from confinement. 
 
 
Pinheiro Visit to Rangoon 
 
4.  (C) De Reidmatten described Pinheiro's latest visit to 
Rangoon (Nov. 3-8) as a chance for the SPDC to test the 
waters and find out how much it can get away with by not 
improving human rights and keeping the NLD locked up and out 
of the political process. In de Reidmatten's opinion, the 
SPDC didn't give Pinheiro anything on this visit (refs A and 
B), and the SPDC is waiting for the world's reaction to 
Pinheiro's speech to the UN on November 12 to see if it can 
keep plowing straight ahead with their road map.  De 
Reidmatten thinks the SPDC hasn't quite decided how to go 
about taking the next step in the road map, but it is 
definitely getting bolder about moving forward without the 
NLD. 
 
ASSK in Isolation 
 
5. (C) Echoing SR Pinheiro's observations (see ref A) 
Reidmatten expressed great concern at how ASSK is being 
"isolated" and increasingly left out of the political process 
in Burma.  Reidmatten commented that "the NLD has to come 
back to reality" and realize the SPDC is moving ahead without 
it.  He was concerned, just like SR Pinheiro, that ASSK and 
the NLD "uncles" were being unrealistic in thinking that 
their refusal to accept the possibility of participating in a 
road map developed by the SPDC was a show of strength that 
would be supported by UNSC action. De Reidmatten pointed out 
to COM that in order to have an elected government in place 
in 2006, the SPDC will have to hold elections in 2005.  That 
requires a referendum on the constitution in 2004.  So there 
will have to be a constitutional convention in early 2004, 
probably January. De Reidmatten said he was so worried about 
the momentum the SPDC was gathering that he would try to 
convince ASSK to write a letter directly to Gen. Than Shwe 
stating that the NLD was willing, and should be allowed  to 
participate in the road map.  De Reidmatten said that unless 
ASSK and the NLD are more realistic re the need for 
participation in the political process NOW, he feared ASSK 
and the "uncles" would be released to face an new 
constitution and an elected government that excluded them 
completely. 
 
6.  C) COMMENT: It is becoming ever more clear that the SPDC 
had an end state, and an end date, in mind when they 
announced the road map back in August - the end state is a 
sitting "elected" government, and the end date is the ASEAN 
Summit 2006. Pinheiro and de Reidmatten's emphasis on ASSK 
and the NLD's increasing isolation, coupled with the regime's 
increasing confidence in the aftermath of the Bali summit, 
underscores the need for continuing pressure on the regime to 
include the opposition  - pressure that must be exerted by 
ASEAN countries (Thailand, Indonesia) and India, China, and 
Japan in conjunction with ongoing UN efforts. 
Martinez