US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT5129

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 005129 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA, INR/NESA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, IZ, IR, SA, SY, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) SAYED BAHR AL-OLOUM TELLS AMBASSADOR IRAQIS 
MUST BE OUT FRONT, COALITION "BEHIND THE CURTAINS" 
 
Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  IGC member Sayed Mohammed Bahr al-Oloum 
told the Ambassador November 5 that our success in Iraq is 
very important to him, but that it requires changing policy 
so as to give the impression that Iraqis are ruling 
themselves, with the Coalition providing strong but discreet 
support from "behind the curtains."   He praised CPA 
Administrator Bremer as a friend whom he respects, but said 
the Coalition must show greater understanding of the Iraqi 
mentality.  He also urged that pressure on Iran, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia be relaxed until Iraq is stabilized.  He argued 
that it is unrealistic to draft a constitution by mid-2004 
given the prevailing insecurity.  He favored full nationwide 
election of delegates to the constitutional convention, but 
acknowledged that others disagree, and he affirmed the need 
to ensure adequate representation of all religious and ethnic 
groups.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C)  At the latter's request, the Ambassador met on 
November 5 with Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) member Sayed 
Mohammed Bahr al-Oloum (MBO), who was visiting Kuwait to take 
part in a series of Ramadan festivities.  Mohammed Hussein 
Bahr al-Oloum served as interpreter.  Pol Chief sat in as 
Notetaker.  MBO began by saying that Kuwaiti Prime Minister 
Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed had repeatedly urged him to speak 
openly with the Ambassador, both because of his knowledge and 
perspective and because he would soon be going to Iraq.  He 
stressed "it is very important to us that America succeed in 
Iraq" and praised CPA Administrator Bremer as a good friend 
whom he respects.  He said personal security in Iraq has 
improved "75 percent":  five months ago, all shops were 
closed and the streets deserted by 6 p.m.; now, shops are 
open and the streets busy until after midnight.  Political 
security is the big problem, he went on, and "it targets us 
and you together."  He summarized the situation as follows: 
various groups are behind these attacks -- Saddam loyalists, 
Al-Qaeda, and neighboring states that feel threatened by the 
US presence in Iraq, namely Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. 
Moqtada Sadr "is nothing" and cannot be considered a 
religious authority, but he is being used by people who want 
to undermine the Coalition.  The population will not accept 
the return of Saddam.  The great danger is Al-Qaeda, which 
"threatens us all."  The South, "as we promised," is being 
kept under control by religious authorities, who will not 
accept civil war or sectarian conflict.  Sunni extremists are 
trying to provoke conflict, as in the assassination of 
Ayatollah Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim, an act that "is not in the 
Iraqi nature" and required capabilities that point to 
external involvement. 
 
3.  (C) MBO stressed that he did not want the US to hasten 
its departure from Iraq -- that would "leave us in the middle 
of the sea without a boat.  He said he had long believed that 
only the US could rid Iraq of Saddam, and had told the 
Iranians this.  He vowed "we must teach our children" that 
America liberated Iraq.  However, the urgent need now is to 
restore security, and for that "you must change your policy." 
 He said it had been a big mistake to dissolve the army and 
security forces.  A new army cannot be built in one year.  He 
urged a "reduction of US pressure" on Iran, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia, which he implied were interfering in Iraq to keep US 
forces busy there, until Iraq is stabilized.  Above all, 
"give the impression that Iraqis are ruling themselves"; keep 
the US presence "behind the curtains."  Pay Iraqi security 
forces more (now, he said, an Iraqi policeman makes 
$150/month whereas an American makes $3 - 4,000).  Give the 
IGC responsibility for security, and the capacity to carry it 
out.  Treat Iraqis with respect and be sensitive to their 
feelings -- for instance, keep the newsmedia away from 
retirees waiting in line to receive their pensions; try not 
to kick the door in when searching a house. Recognize that 
Iraqis are experiencing freedom for the first time in 35 
years; it is only natural that they protest because they can. 
 
4.  (C) MBO complained that the IGC still has no budget: he 
found it demeaning to have to go hat in hand to the CPA for 
everything -- and often not get it.  He recalled that the CPA 
had promised to provide IGC members with armored vehicles, 
but this promise had not been implemented. 
 
5.  (C) Constitutional Timetable:  MBO noted that UNSCR 1511 
called for the IGC to submit a timetable for the 
constitutional process.  He argued that it was unrealistic to 
draft a new constitution by mid-2004:  political leaders need 
to consult their constituents, and this is difficult to 
impossible given the prevailing insecurity.  "We want a 
permanent constitution, with democracy, federalism and 
freedom," not another temporary constitution as has been the 
case since 1958.  The constitution "must respect our Arab, 
Muslim and distinctly Iraqi identity," he said.  Iraqi 
democracy cannot be a slavish copy of a Western model; it 
must be tailored to Iraq's unique history and culture.  "We 
need Arab and Muslim support, but of all our neighbors, only 
Kuwait is with us.  Iran and Turkey never will be."  MBO said 
that he, like the Shia majority, favored choosing the 
delegates to the constitutional convention by a full 
nationwide election; that said, he affirmed the need to 
ensure adequate representation of all religious and ethnic 
groups, and acknowledged that others disagreed on how to 
ensure this:  the Kurds wanted regional elections, and Iyad 
Allawi wanted the delegates to be appointed.  MBO wished the 
IGC had comprised 50 members instead of 25, in order to be 
more broadly representative:  at present, Samawa and Nasiriya 
are not represented on the IGC, for instance.  He wished 
there had been 10 women named to the Council instead of 3. 
6.  (C) Summing up, MBO said: 
 
-- the CPA must understand the Iraqi mentality; 
 
-- Iraqis must be seen to be ruling themselves, with the 
Coalition discreetly (but strongly) behind them; 
 
-- pressure on Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia should be relaxed 
until Iraq is stabilized. 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador told MBO that he expected to be 
joining Amb. Bremer in Baghdad before the end of Ramadhan. 
He pledged to try to listen to as many Iraqis as he could, 
and to reassure everyone that we respect the Iraqi people, 
want to be friends and do the right thing, and have no 
long-term desire to stay in Iraq.  (MBO interjected "don't 
talk about this point.")  He said America can contribute much 
knowledge gained from its experience at finding fair 
compromises; MBO agreed. 
 
8.  (C) Bio Note:  MBO spoke almost entirely in Arabic, 
except for a few courtesy phrases.  He came across as a 
kindly grandfatherly figure, but also as a dignified and 
gracious eminence accustomed to being venerated, and to being 
heeded. 
 
9.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
JONES