US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7020

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HABUR GATE/IBRAHIM KAHLIL

Identifier: 03ANKARA7020
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA7020 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-11-07 21:04:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MARR MOPS ETRD ETTC TU IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

072104Z Nov 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 007020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, ETRD, ETTC, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: HABUR GATE/IBRAHIM KAHLIL 
 
 
REF: DTG 072104Z NOV 03 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons:  1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) In reftel CPA reacts to proposals for discussions 
with Turkey on transit capacity on the Iraqi border.  The 
message rejects the Turkish proposal for a second gate 
because it is "politically" motivated.  As we view the issue, 
the U.S. has a significant interest in improving the flow of 
goods across the Turkish border into Iraq because:  we are 
using it to supply ourselves, we are using it to supply 
necessary humanitarian supplies, and we want trade with Iraq 
to grow as a contribution to normality.  Furthermore there is 
a prospect that we will want to use a line of communication 
through Turkey to rotate troops and equipment, that would put 
additional strain on this border crossing. 
 
 
2.  (C) It is clear to us that the only way to address this 
continuing bottleneck is by engaging with the GOT in Ankara, 
including but not uniquely on their preferred solution.  A 
joint effort among Turkey, Iraq and CPA/U.S. parties could 
elaborate other solutions that would be more expeditious or 
effective in the near term avoiding a misquided Turkish 
political approach to the problem.  However, engagement needs 
to include the Turkish approach.  Furthermore if we don't 
push the Iraqi Ministries to engage and participate 
aggressively ourselves, we can be sure that this problem will 
only fester and limit our options and Iraq's future relations 
with its northern neighbors. 
 
 
3.  (C) We therefore reiterate our recommendation that a 
CPA/CJTF-7/Iraqi Ministry group engage with Ankara on 
operations on the Iraq/Turkish border.  We understand the 
Iraqi Foreign and Interior Minister will accompany IGC 
President Talibani to Turkey on November 19 and suggest that 
is an appropriate target to opportunity to initiate a policy 
review of this problem by all relevant actors. 
 
 
4.  (U) Baghdad minize considered. 
EDELMAN 

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