US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1431

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AN EVENING WITH PINHEIRO: NO PROGRESS IN BURMA

Identifier: 03RANGOON1431
Wikileaks: View 03RANGOON1431 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2003-11-07 12:02:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PHUM BM Human Rights ASSK NLD
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BM, Human Rights, ASSK, NLD 
SUBJECT: AN EVENING WITH PINHEIRO: NO PROGRESS IN BURMA 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1429 
 
     B. RANGOON 1410 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Pinheiro summarized to COM on November 6 
that his present visit was a bust and he sees regression in 
the human rights situation since his last trip to Burma.  The 
SPDC did not concede to him any of the outcomes he'd hoped 
for during this visit, including releasing the May 30 
prisoners, reopening political offices, allowing an 
assessment of the Shan State rapes, and agreeing to an 
assessment of the May 30 attack.  Though he found ASSK in 
good health and in a very good mood when he met her earlier 
on November 6, he also found her isolated and out of touch 
with the political situation.  He felt that the NLD "uncles" 
are under "illusions" of having influence they don't possess 
with their assessment that the roadmap is a "fake" and will 
be overturned at the UNSC.  ASSK is open to having visitors, 
but will not herself initiate any requests for such to the 
SPDC.  She feels the regime treats her courteously; however, 
before any dialogue or compromise she still insists the GOB 
or the UN must conduct a credible assessment of the May 30 
attack.  In a meeting with PM Gen Khin Nyunt, Pinheiro heard 
a clear intent by the regime to unilaterally execute their 
roadmap for democracy.  Pinheiro is leaving for Bangkok on 
Saturday, November 8 after briefing the Rangoon press and 
diplomatic corps.  He will fly to New York on November 11 to 
make his report to the United Nations on the 12th.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
AN ISOLATED ASSK 
 
2.  (C)  On the evening of November 6, UN Special Rapporteur 
for Human Rights, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, joined UNDP Res Rep 
Charles Petrie, former ICRC head Leon de Reidmatten, and the 
British Ambassador at the COM's residence to review a newly 
acquired videotape of ASSK's last few days on the road before 
the Depeyin attack (reftel A).  After the viewing, Pinheiro 
recounted his meeting with ASSK a few hours earlier in the 
afternoon, and said he found her to be in good health, 
lively, and full of humor.  He said it is "scary" that ASSK 
is so isolated and he believes her confinement is not good 
for her grasp of political realities. 
 
3.  (C) When Pinheiro asked her if she would initiate 
requests to have visitors, ASSK specifically stated that she 
will not do so.  According to UNDP's Petrie, who joined 
Pinheiro in his meeting with ASSK, the NLD leader wants to 
avoid any special treatment not afforded to her detained NLD 
colleagues.  Though she will meet with anyone who requests 
and succeeds in getting SPDC authorization for a visit, she 
will not initiate any requests on her own.  ASSK added that 
she would be angry with Pinheiro if he does not comply with 
her wishes on this issue, a position with which the Special 
Rapporteur told COM he disagreed. 
 
4.  (C) At the request of U Tin Oo's wife, Pinheiro had asked 
the Minister of Home Affairs to move U Tin Oo from his 
isolated prison in northern Burma and bring him back to 
Rangoon and under house arrest where he would be safer. 
However, ASSK rejected this too, saying that there should be 
no special treatment for NLD prisoners until all were 
released. 
 
5.  (C) Pinheiro related how ASSK portrayed firm control and 
conviction in her political position.  She said she had won 
several important "victories" since Depeyin, including her 
dictating to the SPDC the decision and the timing for her 
recent surgery, and her telling the SPDC she would not return 
to Insein Prison but would go into house arrest instead.  She 
told Pinheiro she is very pleased with the recently expanded 
U.S. sanctions on the regime.  She also feels that the SPDC 
treats her courteously, singling out Brig Gen Than Tun for 
special praise as being a gentleman and easy to negotiate 
with.  She admitted that she had made a "mutually agreed 
security arrangement" with the SPDC, as stated recently in 
the press by Brig Gen Than Tun, but asked Pinheiro not to 
question the regime about it as it might prove embarrassing 
to them. 
6.  (C) When asked what she thought about the SPDC roadmap, 
ASSK simply said that "it doesn't exist" and that the SPDC 
has no right to develop a roadmap.  She said the only 
possible roadmap is one that is negotiated between the SPDC 
and NLD.  Regarding Depeyin, ASSK still insists the GOB or 
the UN conduct a credible investigation or assessment. 
According to Pinheiro, she said she doesn't want a pound of 
flesh, she just wants people held accountable for the deaths. 
 ASSK pointed out that there are hard-liners and there are 
the less-hardliners, but that the international community 
doesn't want to weaken the hand of the moderates by pressing 
too hard on the investigation.  She also said she is ready 
for dialogue and compromise, but not until the regime tells 
everything about what happened at Depeyin. 
 
"UNCLES UNDER ILLUSION" 
 
7.  (C) Pinheiro met with NLD Central Executive Committee 
members Aung Shwe, Nyunt Wei, and with the oldest of the 
"uncles," Lun Tin.  He characterized the uncles as being 
completely isolated.  Though they have no visitors and no 
phones, they do receive some newspapers and are somewhat 
informed about the current political situation.  However, 
they are under an "illusion" that they are very powerful 
within Burma, and that pressure will come from the UNSC, or 
in the form of a "Foreign Ministers' Troika."  As further 
proof of their isolation, Pinheiro cited how they told him 
the SPDC roadmap was a "fake," that it will be discussed in 
the Security Council, and then will finally be decided by 
negotiation between the SPDC and the NLD. 
 
SPDC REGRESSION 
 
8.  (C) From his meetings with the Minister of Home Affairs, 
the Foreign and Deputy Foreign Ministers, and the Prime 
Minister, Pinheiro concluded the SPDC showed no signs of 
interest in consultation or dialogue with ASSK, but will 
consult with the ethnic groups.  Pinheiro advised the regime 
leaders that the Depeyin attack presented both a "regression 
and an opportunity," and that this can be the moment of 
healing and forward movement.  Khin Nyunt pointed to the 
extensive mass rallies around the country as proof that the 
people support the roadmap.  The Minister of Home Affairs 
told Pinheiro he didn't like Pinheiro's proposed methodology 
for the Shan State rape investigation.  Brig Gen Than Tun 
told Pinheiro a Shan rapes assessment would be very 
"intrusive." 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT:  Pinheiro, as his latest visit drew near to 
a close, seemed dissatisfied and displeased with the lack of 
progress on his mandate.  He was also concerned about the 
growing isolation of ASSK and the CEC.  While the SPDC moves 
forward with its forced-march down the road to its version of 
democracy, there are fears that ASSK will still be under 
house arrest and the NLD totally neutralized when the forced 
march is completed.  END COMMENT. 
Martinez 

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