US embassy cable - 03GUATEMALA2850

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GUATEMALA 002850 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, EAID, PHUM, GT 
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR GUATEMALA'S ELECTIONS: A GROWING 
EXPECTATION OF CHANGE 
 
Classified By: PolCouns David Lindwall for reason 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: The November 9 elections will pit Guatemala's 
past (represented by General Rios Montt and his authoritarian 
vision of Guatemala rooted in the armed internal conflict) 
against the region's future (represented by Oscar Berger and 
Alvaro Colom, and their vision of private sector-driven 
economic growth, free trade and social justice).  All 
indications are that Guatemalans are rejecting Rios Montt's 
vision of Guatemala, and will turn out in large numbers on 
November 9 to vote for change.  The ruling FRG's attempts to 
manipulate the vote do not appear to have made much of an 
impact, though many in the opposition continue to believe 
Rios Montt's candidacy taints the legitimacy of the 
elections.  Fears of election day fraud have largely 
vanished, and violence is expected to be limited to a small 
number of rural locations.  There continue to be problems 
with the voter registration list ("padron") which could have 
the impact of confusing some voters on election day, but no 
one at this time expects these problems to be significant. 
No candidate is likely to get 50% of the vote, forcing a 
runoff election on December 28.  Guatemalans are becoming 
more enthusiastic about the election process as the prospect 
for change is growing, and turn-out is expected to be high. 
The prospect for change also offers opportunities to advance 
key U.S. objectives, and we should be prepared to engage 
quickly with the two finalists that emerge from Sunday's 
election.  End summary. 
 
Putting the War Behind Them Once and For All 
-------------------------------------------- 
2. (C) Former General and patriarch of the ruling FRG Efrain 
Rios Montt has been a polarizing force in Guatemala politics 
for much of the past thirty years.  His authoritarian 
populism, sprinkled with moral injunctions and liberal 
references to class struggle, has always had a following in 
Guatemala, especially among the rural poor.  While viewed by 
the international community as the perpetrator of some of the 
worst human rights violations committed during the internal 
conflict, he is viewed by many Guatemalans as having restored 
order during a convulsive period in their history.  In 1974 
it is widely believed that he was deprived of the presidency 
by fraud, and at least during the initial months of his 19 
month presidency in 1982-1983 his government was very 
popular.  Polls showed that he would have won the presidency 
by a large majority had he been allowed to run in 1990, when 
the courts first struck down his candidacy.  In the last 
three elections, Rios Montt was the polarizing force.  His 
candidates won in 1990 and 1999, and lost by the smallest of 
margins in 1995.  At 76 years of age, this is almost 
certainly the final battle of his political career, and he 
continues to define the political debate in Guatemala. 
 
3. (C) But times have changed for the General.  The FRG's 
four years in power have left many voters believing that Rios 
Montt could not and cannot deliver the promised land of 
better security, more jobs and improved social justice he 
offered in 1999.  Indeed, violent crime and corruption have 
spiraled during the FRG's time in office, and most 
Guatemalans have not seen the benefits of anemic economic 
growth.  Surveys conducted in July and again in October by 
the Embassy in the most remote corners of the heartland of 
Rios Montt's support revealed an overwhelming rejection of 
the ruling party, and made no distinction between President 
Portillo and the General.  Voter preference polls show him 
running a distant third, 16 points behind second place 
candidate Alvaro Colom.  While the Embassy's sample was not 
scientific, and the professional polls are frequently accused 
of having an urban bias, it is clear from every measure that 
Rios Montt is fighting an uphill battle to make it into the 
second round of the election.  We do not discount the 
possibility that the FRG's superior organizational ability on 
election day and their payoffs to the ex-PAC's and other 
election spending could get them over the hump into the 
second round, but at this point it looks like a long-shot. 
 
4. (C) The vision Rios Montt has tried to sell Guatemalans 
during the election campaign is one of providing law and 
order, and confronting the oligarchy that, in his words, has 
long run Guatemala like their own farm.  While security and 
social justice are issues of importance to a large majority 
of Guatemalan voters, Rios Montt's appeal to confrontation is 
increasingly viewed as a legacy of the civil war, a vision 
drawn from Guatemala's past, and not the choice of 
Guatemalans for their future. 
 
5. (C) His primary competitors for the presidency are 
center-right GANA candidate Oscar Berger, closely allied to 
the private sector, and center-left UNE candidate Alvaro 
Colom, with closer ties to grass roots civil society. 
Berger's message of job creation through investment and free 
trade appeals to Guatemalans (especially in urban areas) who 
believe the country's future lies in a stronger relationship 
with the U.S. and regional economic integration.  Colom's 
message of combating corruption and increasing social 
spending resonates in rural areas and with the urban poor. 
The Embassy surveys (in rural areas) found that most voters 
identified with Berger and Colom mainly as alternatives 
capable of defeating Rios Montt, and showed less enthusiasm 
for the candidates themselves. 
 
And the Dead Shall Rise 
----------------------- 
6. (C) All the major candidates have told us privately that 
they do not expect significant fraud on election day. 
However, past misbehavior by the FRG (especially their 
violent protests that shut down parts of the capital in July) 
has fueled popular perceptions that fraud is possible. 
Stories of missing voter registration cards, dead people, 
minors and Salvadoran nationals appearing on voter 
registration lists, allegations that the FRG contracted all 
public transportation on election day, and problems with 
voters finding their names double registered or eliminated 
from the voter registration lists are part of every 
conversation on the elections.  The political parties and 
international observers agree, however, that adequate 
safeguards are in place to ensure free and fair elections, 
and all acknowledge that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) 
is above partisan manipulation.  There will be over 300 
international and thousands of domestic observers spread out 
all over the country, making this the most observed election 
in Guatemala's history.  International observers has been 
deployed in rural areas for over a month now, visiting 
potential flash-points, meeting with local leaders and making 
it clear that fraud and violence will not go unreported. 
 
7. (C) The voter registration list ("padron electoral") has 
problems resulting, among other things, from the incomplete 
incorporation of a new registry for urban areas, which was 
designed to allow voters to vote closer to their homes. 
Problems have been detected which will affect some voters on 
election day, and the TSE will be opening special "observed 
vote" tables at each voting site to address many of these 
problems.  The indelible ink should also ensure that double 
registrations do not result in double voting.  We recognize, 
however, that some voters will encounter difficulties voting, 
and many will view this erroneously as a deliberate attempt 
to manipulate the vote. 
 
8. (C) The decision by the Constitutional Court in July to 
allow General Rios Montt to be a candidate, in apparent 
violation of a constitutional prohibition against those who 
had participated in unconstitutional governments, was for 
many Guatemalans the original sin that fatally flawed the 
2003 election.  Unable to stop a legal process that was 
carefully manipulated by the FRG, many in civil society, the 
media and the opposition have raised alarms publicly about 
every subsequent issue that could potentially be an FRG 
attempt to influence the elections, in order to have a well 
documented basis for crying fraud if the General makes it 
into the second round.  Many of their complaints are valid. 
The compensation package for the ex-PAC's was clearly used to 
try to build support for the FRG in the elections (note: When 
the GOG came through with actual cash payments for less than 
half of those who claimed to be ex-PACs, however, protests 
broke out around the country, ultimately working against the 
FRG candidate. End note).  The school breakfast and 
fertilizer programs were also augmented during the election 
year in a thinly-veiled attempt to earn largely rural 
support.  Public works programs, while admittedly less than 
the election year binge of the former Arzu government, have 
also targeted areas where the FRG hoped to strengthen its 
support.  An independent NGO investigating election year 
public spending, working under a USAID grant, concluded that 
while the Portillo government has used public spending to try 
to influence the outcome of the election, the volume of 
spending was not significantly different from previous 
election years and beneficiaries were not selected for their 
partisan preferences. 
 
Throwing the First Stone 
------------------------ 
9. (C) Violence has also been a concern in the 2003 
elections.  By some counts, 29 political activists have been 
murdered since the May opening of the election campaign.  All 
of the international observer groups have investigated these 
murders, however, and agree that most are clearly not related 
to the elections.  MINUGUA believes that five could have been 
politically motivated, and the OAS lists two as being clearly 
politically motivated.  The Washington Office on Latin 
America (WOLA) in its report on the elections said, 
"relatively few have been proven to be directly related to 
the political campaign.  Many of the incidents involved 
"common" rather than "political" crime.  It is reassuring 
that there have been few documented incidents of politically 
motivated violence, and it is important to counter alarmist 
opinions and to emphasize the relatively peaceful nature of 
the process to date." 
 
10. (C) The violent protests of July 24-25, orchestrated by 
the leadership of the FRG, fed fears that the FRG is capable 
of putting gangs on the streets either on election day to 
discourage the vote, or to burn ballot boxes on the night of 
November 9 if they lose.  Many of our contacts believe, 
however, that the July protests hurt the FRG in the elections 
by making them look to voters like a band of thugs.  Since 
July, the FRG has been careful to convey an image of law 
abiding democrats.  Members of the Executive Committee of the 
FRG visited us and other members of the international 
community on November 3-4 in a gesture that showed that the 
FRG is concerned about its international image.  They assured 
all of us that they will respect the outcome of the election, 
whatever it is, and Zury Rios told us directly "we will 
behave" on election day.  While we do not discount the 
possibility of post-electoral violence in hotly disputed 
municipal elections in isolated areas, as has occurred in 
past elections, there are no indications at this point that 
the FRG is planning to dispute the November 9 results in the 
streets. 
 
The Inevitable Second Round 
--------------------------- 
11. (C) Poll results (and the Embassy's informal survey in 
rural areas) show the gap between front runner Oscar Berger 
and Alvaro Colom narrowing decidedly.  No candidate is 
expected to get the fifty percent of the vote necessary to 
win the election in one round.  The second round election 
would be held on December 28, less than three weeks before 
the January 14 inaugural.  If Rios Montt makes it into the 
second round, all indications are that the election will 
polarize, with an overwhelming majority voting for whichever 
candidate competes against the General.  If Colom and Berger 
make it into the second round, the election becomes an 
unpredictable contest with a totally new dynamic.  Polls show 
Berger beating Colom by a declining margin in a second round, 
but even Berger's closest advisors do not put much faith in 
the numbers.  A group of private sector and civil society 
members, who by and large had thrown their lot in with Berger 
as the only candidate capable of burying the FRG, told us on 
November 6 that they now believe Alvaro Colom would beat 
Berger handily in a runoff election. 
 
12. (U) Public opinion polls show that Guatemalans believe 
they can make a difference in their future by voting and that 
they plan to vote in record numbers in the upcoming 
elections.  While polls have historically overstated the 
actual voter turnout, trends suggest that voter turn out will 
be significantly higher that the average (around 45%) since 
the restoration of democracy.  An early November poll also 
shows an increase in public confidence in the electoral 
process.  Generating public confidence in the election 
process has been a key element in the Ambassador's public 
diplomacy strategy over the past 2-3 months. 
 
Comment 
------- 
13. (C) The participation of Rios Montt in the elections has 
created a climate of tension and distrust that has fed fears 
in many sectors of civil society and the population at large 
that elections would not be free and fair.  With polls 
showing the General pulling a distant third, many of those 
sectors are now convinced that Rios Montt will not make it 
into the second round, and if he does there is virtually no 
chance he could win it.  We believe leaders of the FRG may 
have reached the same conclusion and have adjusted their 
strategy to use their legislative strength in the new 
Congress to protect their interests, as we reported in 
September.  Fears that there will be significant fraud or 
violence on election day are subsiding. 
 
14. (C) Many Guatemalans believe the November 9 elections 
will put an end to 20 years of political polarization, and 
that the candidates that emerge will no longer reflect the 
authoritarian structures and policies evolved from the 
internal conflict, but rather will bring Guatemala into a 
closer relationship with the U.S. and their regional partners 
through free trade and a greater set of shared interests.  We 
are poised to meet early on with the transition teams of the 
two victors of the November 9 elections to engage them on 
CAFTA, human and labor rights, transnational crime and the 
full range of bilateral interests. 
HAMILTON