US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1927

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001927 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA, EUR/NB 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  11-06-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SOCI, CE, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  Amid tentative signs that the President may 
have miscalculated, questions arise about her motives 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 1918  (E) Colombo 1902 
 
-      (B) Colombo 1917  (F) Colombo 1893 
-      (C) Colombo 1916  (G) Colombo 1867 
-      (D) Oslo 2293     (H) Colombo 1684 
 
(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  As the dust begins to settle after 
President Kumaratunga's rapid-fire November 4-5 moves 
against the UNP government, speculation abounds as to 
what her true motives are.  She and her supporters say 
she only wants to protect Sri Lanka's "national 
interest."  There are strong indications, however, that 
she is acting out of spite toward the PM because he is 
getting all of the credit for the peace process. 
Whatever the mix of reasons for her moves, there are 
very tentative signs that the President may have 
miscalculated, including:  the PM's coalition seems to 
be holding together; the international community is 
expressing concern about the possible impact on the 
peace process; and there are worries about the effect on 
the economy.  Despite the bad reviews, the President -- 
a fiercely proud person with a volatile personality -- 
does not appear set to back down anytime soon and she 
may hit out some more.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Defending the President's Actions 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) As the dust begins to settle after President 
Kumaratunga's rapid-fire November 4-5 decisions to fire 
ministers, suspend Parliament, and declare an emergency, 
speculation abounds as to what her true motives are.  In 
answering this question, she and her supporters have 
been unwavering that the President's only focus has been 
to protect Sri Lanka's "national interest."  Elaborating 
on this theme in her nationally televised speech on 
November 4, the President stated: 
 
"The disturbing developments of the past few months 
culminating in the events of the last days and the 
ineffective steps taken by the administration to ensure 
national security have led me to take the view that firm 
and steadfast action is necessary to remedy this 
situation." 
 
3.  (C) In comments made at a press conference on 
November 5, Lakshman Kadirgamar, a key adviser, made a 
similar claim that the president was only interested in 
protecting Sri Lanka's "national security."   The 
President made the same point to the Charge' in their 
meeting late November 5 (see Ref A).  While their public 
comments have been somewhat vague as to what exactly 
they are protecting the country against, most observers 
believe that the President and her supporters are 
referring to concerns about the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  The President and her Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) have made clear, for example, that 
they are bitterly opposed to the Tigers' October 31 
proposal regarding the possible formation of an interim 
administration in the north/east (see Ref F).  In 
explaining her steps during her meeting with the 
Charge', the President directly stated that she thought 
that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's government had 
turned a "blind eye" to Tiger activities and 
transgressions of the ceasefire accord.  These views are 
not new:  the President and her supporters have been 
skeptical about the PM's peace initiative virtually 
since its inception in December 2001 and have on 
numerous occasions made these views public (see Ref G). 
 
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Indications that it is Personal 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) While underscoring these concerns about the 
security situation, the President and her supporters 
have vociferously denied that she might have any selfish 
or narrowly partisan reasons for her actions.  In her 
November 4 speech, the president stated, for example: 
"This is not an effort against any party or individual 
but done only in the exercise of the duties and 
responsibilities bestowed on me under the Constitution." 
There are strong indications, however, that she is 
acting out of spite toward the PM.  The President has 
had a bitter relationship with Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe for years.  They do not get along for 
many reasons:  their personal chemistry is awful; they 
are of different political persuasions; they each come 
from political dynasties that have opposed each other 
since even before the country gained independence in 
1948, etc. 
 
5.  (C) Given their horrific relationship, many neutral 
observers believe that the President is deeply jealous 
that the PM is getting the credit for the peace process, 
and, through her recent moves, is trying to put him in 
his place.  In choosing to take her actions at this 
time, for example, the President may well have been 
trying to embarrass the Prime Minister right before his 
November 5 meeting with President Bush.  The depth of 
her anger toward the PM was also evident during her 
meeting with the Ambassador in late September (see 
Ref H) and in her November 5 meeting with the Charge'. 
In both of these meetings, the President launched into 
harangues about the PM's alleged perfidy over the years. 
All of these indicators tend to flag that the 
President's motives are very personal, in addition to 
being policy-related as she and her supporters claim. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Tentative Signs of Miscalculation 
--------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Whatever her true motives are, there are early 
signs that the President may have miscalculated if she 
thought that she would easily win in a confrontation 
with the PM.  Although the signs are still very 
tentative, the domestic and international political 
landscape for the President appears to be growing less 
favorable to her position in the following ways: 
 
-- A Resilient PM:  Although initially caught flatfooted 
by the President's moves, Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe's coalition government seems to be 
holding together for now.  As reported in Septel, the 
PM's supporters have reportedly collected the signatures 
of up to 130 MPs who state that they support his 
government.  This figure is significantly above the 113 
MPs needed to form a majority in the 225-seat 
Parliament.  While there continue to be strong 
indications that the President is working to encourage 
defectors, there is little indication as of yet that she 
has had any success.  At the same time, based on most 
reports, the Prime Minister, who was quite popular 
before this crisis began, appears to be picking up 
sympathy from the public over what is seen as the 
President's overbearing ways.  In addition, there are 
signs the public is worried that the President may be 
placing the nearly two-year old ceasefire at risk 
through her actions.  The PM's apparent reservoir of 
popular strength bodes well if there are parliamentary 
elections soon, which is where events appear to be 
headed.  Moreover, the Prime Minister has managed all of 
this so far while being out of the country (he will be 
returning from the U.S. the morning of November 7).  It 
is quite possible that when he returns to Sri Lanka on 
November 7 he and his supporters may be able to take the 
offensive against the President through press 
conferences and rallies, etc. 
 
-- Unfavorable International Climate:  The President 
also may not have counted on the generally unfavorable 
international reaction she has faced.  The U.S., the EU, 
Japan, and India have all expressed concern over the 
situation and the possible harm that might result to the 
peace process.  If she was planning to disrupt the PM's 
meeting with President Bush, Kumaratunga also failed; 
the Oval Office meeting went off without a hitch.  The 
statement by the Indian government, the regional 
"superpower," was particularly damaging to Kumaratunga: 
"We are surprised at the sudden political developments 
in Sri Lanka.  We hope that the situation does not 
provoke a constitutional crisis, which would impact on 
political stability and the ongoing peace process." 
 
-- Economic Concerns:  Though presidential spokesmen 
have been vocal in trying to reassure the private sector 
and investors, the President seems oblivious to the 
notion that implementing a state of emergency on 
national security grounds will have an impact on how Sri 
Lanka is viewed by potential customers and investors. 
Sri Lanka has worked hard for the past two years to 
focus attention on the peace process and the absence of 
war.  It is possible that many potential sources of 
capital will link the last 48 hours with pre-peace 
process Sri Lanka, thus reinforcing perceptions of the 
country as a volatile, violent, politically unstable 
place. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) All in all, the President is earning some pretty 
bad reviews for her actions.  In taking the steps she 
has and assessing the ramifications, however, it is 
questionable whether the President is receiving accurate 
information.  Kumaratunga is in a bit of a cocoon, which 
is partly due to very real security concerns and partly 
of her own choosing.  One aspect of this is that she is 
not out and about meeting new people and seeing things 
first hand.  Rather, she appears highly reliant on a 
small network of supporters who basically seem to tell 
her only what she wants to hear.  Her supporters, for 
example, may be telling her that her party can win 
elections, a proposition that most observers see as 
doubtful.  Armed with information that she thinks is 
reliable, but may well be flawed, Kumaratunga -- a 
fiercely proud person with a volatile personality -- 
does not appear set to back down anytime soon.  In fact, 
she may well hit out some more.  END COMMENT. 
 
8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
ENTWISTLE