US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT5104

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 005104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA, NEA/EX, NEA/FO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2013 
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, MARR, EAID, AMGT, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE 
 
 
Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) Mister Secretary, the backup itinerary for your 
upcoming visit to the Mideast involves overnighting in 
Kuwait.  We therefore take the opportunity to provide you 
with this scenesetter emphasizing the GOK's role -- and this 
embassy's -- in support of the Iraq effort. 
 
(U) KUWAIT:  THE ONE INDISPENSABLE ALLY 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Kuwait was the one indispensable ally for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.  It is unique in the Arab world:  the only 
Arab state where both the government and public opinion 
openly supported us on Iraq.  The Kuwaitis understand that 
they need us to succeed 
in Iraq, and they are eager to help.  They have given a warm 
welcome to visiting members of the Iraqi Governing Council 
and to Iraqi ministers, and provided strong political support 
in multilateral fora.  The Government and private sector are 
working together on a creative vision of an Iraq integrated 
into the Gulf region and beyond.  Kuwait's total pledge at 
the Madrid Conference, $1.5 billion, encompasses about $1 
billion already spent in support of the liberation of Iraq, 
including some $120 million for humanitarian operations.  The 
GOK says it will consult with the Iraqis on how best to spend 
the remaining half-billion dollars. 
 
3.  (C) The GOK continues to view the US as its long-term 
partner and protector, but the Kuwaitis also want their 
contributions acknowledged.  Given the scale of ongoing 
military operations in Iraq which are supported out of 
Kuwait, we cannot afford to allow the Kuwaitis to feel taken 
for granted.  With the fall of Saddam's regime, Kuwait is in 
the process of reviewing its security and defense 
requirements. The Ministry of Defense is increasingly 
concerned with its budget, and is beginning to evaluate the 
costs associated with support to U.S. and Coalition Forces. 
We expect exercises, Foreign Military 
Sales, Assistance in Kind, and Burden-sharing costs to 
receive close scrutiny.  Kuwait has already scaled back 
participation in bilateral military exercises, for budgetary 
reasons. 
 
4.  (C) Our estimate of Kuwait's financial support to the 
US-led coalition follows for the period 1 November 2002 - 31 
October 2003: 
 
- Kuwait MOD Budget: $2.145 billion. 
 
- Burden-sharing  $207 million. Includes costs for base 
operations, supplies, personnel support and military 
exercises. 
 
- Assistance in Kind (AIK). Cost Sharing $73 million. 
Includes fuel, food, TELECOM, laundry, and utilities for 
20,000-40,000 military personnel. 
 
- Camp Arifjan upgrades $55.42 million, through Military 
Engineering Projects of the Kuwaiti MOD. 
 
- Total Requested Burden-sharing, AIK, and MEP Support: 
$336 million. 
 
- Kuwait also pays $308 million FMS payment to the U.S. 
Treasury. 
 
- Total paid to the U.S.: $644 million or 30 percent of MOD 
budget. 
 
- In addition to all the above, Kuwait continues to provide 
as AIK fuel for US forces associated with Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM operating in/from Kuwait:  est. 407 million gallons 
worth $342 million to date (rate:  $0.84/gal.), currently 
avergaing 42 million gallons per month. 
 
5.  (C) Fuels for Iraq:  The Kuwaitis have gone out of their 
way to be good suppliers of mogas and LPG to Iraq, both 
because it is an attractive commercial proposition and 
because it can improve the quality of life of their northern 
neighbors.  They are acutely aware that the hardships endured 
by ordinary Iraqis have inflamed hostile feelings towards 
Kuwait. 
 
(U) EMBASSY KUWAIT:  THE VITAL LINK 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (U) Since before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Embassy Kuwait has been a vital link in support of the 
liberation effort.  We negotiated with the host nation to 
facilitate the military build-up which at one point entailed 
placing over half of Kuwait's landmass off-limits to its own 
civilians.  We introduced the Garner Group to valuable 
sources of information on Iraq and facilitated their 
communications.  To this day, this Embassy is truly an 
extension of the CPA, which could not be fully functional 
without us. 
 
7.  (U) Official visits have increased dramatically.  We 
hosted the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in 
successive weeks.  We understand that the White House has 
urged all Cabinet members to visit Iraq, and we have been 
told to expect six CODELS per month.  Kuwait is the preferred 
gateway to Iraq and/or Afghanistan, with many official 
visitors using it as their base for multiple day-trips.  Many 
of our staff are already reaching 'burn-out' level:  one 
officer logged 44 hours of overtime for CODEL support during 
an eight-day period.  The amount of overtime is costly 
financially and emotionally, with no leeway for leave without 
undue burdens on others.  Our local guard force has been 
denied official Ramadhan Leave, to which they had a 
contractual right, due to the pace and volume of security 
requirements. 
 
8.  (U) Our support to the Iraq effort is substantive as well 
as administrative/logistical.  We have been directly involved 
in: 
 
- investigating smuggling allegations against U.S. 
contractors; 
 
- organizing humanitarian fuel supply for CPA, Project RIO 
(Restore Iraqi Oil) and Iraq's State Oil Management 
Organization with the GOK-sponsored supply company Al-Tanmia; 
 
- facilitating a multi-agency, multi-national border 
agreement for all coalition cross-border traffic; 
 
- encouraging the Kuwaiti private sector to invest some of 
its vast resources in Iraq's reconstruction; 
 
- facilitating Status Of Forces agreements between Kuwait and 
over 30 coalition partner countries, with more in the works; 
 
- interceding with the GOK to facilitate transit for CPA 
staff and many others, to include achieving a simple 
procedure to avoid a $33/day fine for "overstaying" that was 
being levied against personnel who had transited to Iraq 
improperly. 
 
9.  (U) We expect our contribution to the Iraq effort will 
increase in the coming months as the State Department beefs 
up its contingent in Iraq and as Kuwaiti involvement in 
Iraq's reconstruction ramps up. 
 
10. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
JONES