US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1421

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JAPANESE ON RAZALI ADVISOR DE RIEDMATTEN

Identifier: 03RANGOON1421
Wikileaks: View 03RANGOON1421 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2003-11-06 05:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001421 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM 
SUBJECT: JAPANESE ON RAZALI ADVISOR DE RIEDMATTEN 
 
REF: A. STATE 306270 
     B. TOKYO 7202 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.5(B & D). 
 
1.  (C) Japanese DCM Hiroshi Kawamura called on DCM November 
5 to clarify his ambassador's position regarding Swiss 
citizen Leon de Riedmatten, Razali advisor and head of 
Humanitarian Dialogue in Rangoon. 
 
2.  (C) Kawamura stated that his Ambassador, Yuji Miyamoto, 
had not demarched or suggested to Razali in their October 27 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur that de Riedmatten be removed as 
Razali's facilitator or advisor, nor would he make such a 
suggestion in the future.  The Japanese DCM said that Razali 
heard directly from the GOB that it has lost confidence in de 
Riedmatten, adding that the Japanese embassy had heard the 
same thing from the GOB.  Kawamura added that de Riedmatten, 
seen by the SPDC as being too close to Aung San Suu Kyi, has 
lost his heretofore excellent access to ASSK and senior 
regime leaders. 
 
3.  (C) Comment: The Japanese DCM said he was providing the 
above clarification on specific instructions from his 
ambassador.  Could be that reftels prompted Tokyo to once 
again rein in the Japanese ambassador, an avid advocate of 
engagement with the SPDC, who has been way out ahead of Tokyo 
several times over the past year. 
 
4.  (C) Comment, Continued:  Prior to May 30, de Riedmatten 
was just as close to ASSK as he is now (but then had regular 
access).  Further, Khin Nyunt agreed on May 28 to allow Leon 
to function as ILO ombudsman for labor issues and abuses, 
indicating a high degree of trust in de Riedmatten for this 
sensitive position.  What has happened since then is not that 
Leon de Riedmatten has changed, but that the SPDC regime has 
been bolstered by what it sees as a vote of confidence from 
ASEAN and continued high-level courting from India and China. 
 It has decided to bull its way forward with its self-imposed 
solution while ignoring input from anyone else.  End Comment. 
Martinez 

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