US embassy cable - 03HARARE2204

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC LEGAL AFFAIRS SECRETARY ON RECENTLY CONCLUDED 
ELECTION PETITION HEARINGS, PARTY'S REGIONAL OUTREACH, 
INTER-PARTY TALKS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 2185 (B) HARARE 2141 (C) HARARE 2123 
 
     (D) HARARE 1792 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: MDC Secretary for Legal Affairs David 
Coltart on November 4 confirmed to the Embassy the party's 
expectation that the court would delay issuance of judgment 
on the election petition (hearings on which concluded 
November 4) before eventually rejecting it.  He outlined to 
Ambassador Sullivan efforts to engage Senegalese President 
Wade and other liberal African leaders to press South African 
President Mbeki to be more forceful with President Mugabe. 
Coltart recounted a recent meeting he had with Nelson 
Mandela, and was hopeful that Mandela would work behind the 
scenes to energize Mbeki on Zimbabwe.  He reconfirmed that 
the MDC and ZANU-PF had not reached agreement on transitional 
arrangements but advised that Chinamasa's office had drafted 
an instrument that may have been served to the South African 
government as a deal between the parties.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Upon the unexpectedly early conclusion November 4 of 
court hearings on the MDC's election challenge, Coltart told 
the Embassy that the government's courtroom presentation 
offered little beyond mostly political rather than legal 
arguments raised in its written submissions.  The only twist 
was a government request that the court defer decision on the 
legal arguments in phase one until after hearings had 
concluded on phase two.  (As suggested in refs A and C, the 
MDC wants the court to rule first on phase one; a ruling in 
its favor would obviate the need for phase 2.)  Coltart 
reaffirmed MDC expectations that, despite the petition's 
strong merits, the court would find for the government after 
considerable delay. 
 
3.  (C) Coltart related to the Ambassador separately on the 
same day an account of his recent contacts outside Zimbabwe. 
On the margins of his participation in a Liberal 
International Congress in Dakar last month, he had a lengthy 
meeting with Sengalese President Wade.  Coltart said that he 
had pitched Wade on the idea of "surrounding" Mbeki with more 
pressure on Zimbabwe.  Mbeki was caught between domestic 
priorities and his interest in being an African bridge to the 
West; positive pressure from liberal African leaders would 
enable him to take a more forceful position toward Mugabe. 
Kenyan President Kibaki, Ghanaian President Kufuor, and 
Malawian President Muluzi (who already displayed willingness 
to engage on Zimbabwe) were candidates to participate in such 
an effort.  MDC had positive relations with the Ghanaian and 
Kenyan ruling parties and hoped that Kibaki or Kufuor might 
be willing to join in such an effort.  According to Coltart, 
Wade was non-commital but "intrigued", and the meeting went 
longer than originally scheduled as he explored the idea. 
 
4.  (C) Coltart also recounted a meeting he had with Nelson 
Mandela while in South Africa last month.  Mandela generally 
was very negative toward Mugabe.  He was out of touch on the 
status of inter-party talks in Zimbabwe but was surprised to 
hear that so little actual progress had been made.  Mandela 
asserted that Mugabe would never leave without definitive 
resolution of the issue of his immunity from future 
prosecution -- an issue that had not been touched.  Coltart 
was encouraged by Mandela's interest and thought he could be 
useful behind the scenes, particularly in neutralizing some 
of the domestic and regional pressures hemming in Mbeki's 
potential forcefulness with Mugabe. 
 
5.  (C) Coltart denied that any meaningful progress on 
transitional arrangements had been made, as reported by South 
African High Commissioner Ndou (ref B).  Coltart added that a 
reliable source had reported to him that Justice Minister 
Chinamasa's office had prepared a paper detailing 
transitional arrangements but had yet to convey it to the 
MDC.  He hypothesized that ZANU-PF was passing off the 
material to the South Africans as a deal agreed to by the 
parties in an effort to mollify Mbeki and to dampen 
international pressure. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENT: Coltart's outreach to additional African 
countries appears to be a continuation of efforts already 
underway to stimulate SADC governments to engage Mbeki (ref 
D).  We would appreciate any feedback from Embassies Dakar, 
Nairobi, and Accra on potential resonance the MDC's pitch 
might have with host governments.  There remains a 
considerable disconnect between what we are getting from the 
MDC and what the South Africans reportedly are getting from 
ZANU-PF regarding progress on talks.  In any event, ZANU-PF's 
ongoing inward focus in the run-up to its annual party 
conference next month suggests that it will remain reluctant 
to move forward with meaningful inter-party talks for now. 
SULLIVAN