US embassy cable - 03SANTODOMINGO6302

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANTO DOMINGO 006302 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CAR (MCISAAC), PM (LIKENS); SECDEF FOR 
OSD; NSC FOR SHANNON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2013 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, MCAP, PREL, PGOV, DR 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MEJIA PROMISES DOMINICAN TROOPS WILL 
STAY IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A) WARSAW 03803 B) DERHAM-KUBISKE TELCON 11/4/03 
 
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  President Mejia told the Ambassador of his 
deep concern for Dominican soldiers at risk in Iraq. After 
closely listening to the Ambassador's emphatic presentation 
on the need for continuing Dominican engagement, Mejia said 
that the Dominican battalion Iraq will remain in place as 
planned.  He will host the Ambassador, DATT, MAAG chief and 
emboffs for in-depth discussions with the senior military on 
Friday, November 7.  End summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.  (C)  The battalion of 302 Dominican soldiers serving with 
coalition forces arrived in Iraq in August 2003 and is 
scheduled to rotate out on February 15, to be replaced by 
another battalion for an additional six months.  Dominican 
officers visiting Warsaw announced the intention to withdraw 
Dominican troops (reftel). 
 
3. (C)  Secretary of the Armed Forces Soto Jimenez told MAAG 
chief today that Mejia had decided two weeks earlier to 
repatriate the troops "as soon as possible."  He and his 
staff indicated that they had met with the President in the 
morning and had obtained his assent to leaving behind a 
contingent of liaison officers and a platoon of military 
police.  The issue, they said, was primarily pay; they said 
that Mejia had been expecting the United States to cover 
salary and allowances for the batallion, a cost for the full 
year of almost USD 1 million.  The Dominican officers also 
complained that supplies were inadequate, particularly 
including parkas, boots, and transportation. 
 
4. (C) Under Dominican law, the GODR is required to pay an 
overseas allowance to troops serving outside the Dominican 
Republic.  The current financial situation in the Dominican 
Republic has left the Military foraging for funds and unable 
to meet its legal obligations.  To date, two allowance 
payments have been made to the individual soldiers.  The 
first, approximately USD 250, was made when the soldiers 
departed the Dominican Republic in August (funded through a 
loan from a local firm regularly doing business with the 
military).  The second, approximately USD 200, was made in 
mid-October when Soto Jimenez, visited his troops in Iraq. 
The Secretary and accompanying officers funded their own 
travel. 
 
MEJIA LISTENS 
 
5. (C)Despite a busy schedule, President Mejia agreed to 
receive the Ambassador and and emboffs on short notice, 
giving us priority over other waiting visitors. The 
Ambassador emphasized to the President the extent of USG 
support for the Dominican Republic, noting his own recent 
contacts with the Department, Treasury, and the White House, 
all of whom want to help the Dominican Republic.  He stressed 
that the President had to reconsider his decision to bring 
Dominican troops back early from Iraq.  There would be strong 
consequences if Mejia were to reconsider his pledge to 
support coalition rebuilding of Iraq.  The Dominican presence 
is important to the United States and to the rest of the 
coalition; it is the nation's clear rejection of terrorism 
and a sign of support for liberty. 
 
6.  (C)  Mejia said he worried that something might happen to 
the troops.  The situation was volatile and unpredictable. 
The killing of even a single Dominican would be disastrous, 
socially and politically.  The opponents in Iraq were "crazy" 
and targeted those trying to help the country.  They were ill 
in spirit, like the Taliban, and thought nothing of sending 
suicide bombers against civilian targets. 
 
7. (C)  The Ambassador stressed the historic nature of the 
mission and the prestige that the Dominicans' extraordinary 
work was bringing to them.  He appealed to the President's 
duty and leadership. The word of a possible withdrawal had 
brought immediate, strong reaction from high levels in 
Washington. 
 
8. (C) After a pause, Mejia replied, "They will stay." His 
expression was serious.  "But think of their families. . . ." 
and then, "but we must assume our responsibilities." He 
repeated the need to assume the DR's global responsibilities. 
 Mejia said he would so instruct the military, citing the 
Ambassador, and then he decided to invite the Ambassador and 
four staff to a working lunch with the armed forces on 
Friday, November 7. 
 
9.  (C)  Mejia wound up with some acerbic remarks about the 
international financial institutions ("economists working in 
air conditioned offices have no understanding of the real 
conditions here"), expressed his dismay at the deterioration 
of the exchange rate (now 40 pesos to the dollar), and said 
he was very satisfied at the seizure of nearly a ton of 
cocaine aboard a ship from Colombia ("destroy it, I told 
them, get rid of it"). 
 
10.  (C) Comment.  We note that the Dominnican military 
read-out appears to have been misleading.  If one takes him 
at his word -- and in this instance we do -- Mejia's concern 
is for the exposure of the troops, and certainly for the 
political consequences if any are killed or wounded.  Even 
so, financing for their operations is unsecured and of 
fundamental concern to the Dominican military.  When the 
Ambassador brought the argument back to the fundamental 
principles -- the standing of the country within the 
international community and its solidarity with the war 
against terrorism -- Mejia did the right thing. 
HERTELL