US embassy cable - 03AMMAN7227

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM:BODINE, NEA FOR NEA/ARN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2103 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, KTIA, IS, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDAN COMMITTED TO REACHING ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT, 
BUT BALKS AT SUGGESTION OF LINK TO ESF 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher reiterated 
to the Ambassador that Jordan is committed to negotiate and 
sign an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. and should have a 
counter-draft ready soon.  Muasher expressed great 
disappointment that the USG might have thought to link such 
an agreement to U.S. economic assistance, specifically the 
additional $100 million in FY 2004 ESF.  Jordan does not want 
to sign an Article 98 agreement that might impair its ability 
to pursue possible legal action in case of an Israeli 
transfer of Palestinians into Jordan -- a possibility which, 
however remote from reality, looms large on the conscience of 
Jordan's leadership and public.  End Summary. 
 
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WE'RE READY WHEN YOU ARE 
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2.  (C) During a wide-ranging discussion November 3, 
Jordanian FM Muasher told the Ambassador that the GOJ is 
ready and willing to conclude an Article 98 agreement with 
the U.S.  Muasher said that he was confident that any 
obstacles could be overcome and that together the two 
countries can "make this happen."  He further stated that the 
GOJ would have a new counter-proposal ready as early as 
November 4. 
 
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DON'T TREAD ON US! 
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3.  (C) Muasher expressed great disappointment that the USG 
might have considered conditioning an FY 2004 ESF earmark of 
$100 million to conclusion of an Article 98 agreement. 
According to Muasher, Jordanian Minister of Planning Bassem 
Awadallah had felt "very pressured" during his recent trip to 
Washington about an Article 98 agreement, as well as the 
release of Iraqi funds frozen in Jordanian banks.  Some U.S. 
officials had even implied that the Administration might 
withhold the $100 million if an Article 98 agreement was not 
reached.  This attitude was inconsistent with the close 
U.S.-Jordanian relationship. 
 
4.  (C) The Ambassador replied that despite what Muasher and 
Awadallah might have heard, the U.S. Administration had 
attached no such conditionality.  In accordance with 
established procedures, USAID will follow its "normal 
process" and sit down with the Ministry of Planning to 
jointly establish reasonable conditions for the ESF directly 
related to economic reform/progress.  The Ambassador was very 
firm, however, that the U.S. was concerned that the GOJ was 
not taking seriously two issue of considerable importance to 
the U.S.  We wanted to see real action on an Article 98 
agreement (and the assets transfer) prior to King Abdullah's 
visit to Washington December 4-5.  We saw no reason why this 
could not happen. 
 
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TRANSFER ISSUE "VITAL" TO JORDAN 
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5.  (C) Saying that he had "no problem" with protecting 
Americans from prosecution, Muasher focused his concern on 
the transfer of civilians by an occupying power as prohibited 
by Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute.  Jordan had to 
protect its national interests.  Muasher insisted that the 
GOJ could never sign any agreement that might prejudice its 
ability to take legal action in case of an Israeli transfer 
of Palestinians into Jordan.  He said that the transfer issue 
was "vital" to Jordan's future security.  While conceding 
that Israel was probably not contemplating the involuntary 
transfer of Palestinians at the present time, Muasher opined 
that such a transfer could become a serious option for Israel 
in the future. 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador noted Muasher's concern, but said that 
this could undoubtedly be addressed and resolved in 
negotiations.  The Ambassador pointed out that the U.S. had 
reached Article 98 agreements with over 70 different 
countries, with agreements tailored to account for a 
country's unique circumstances. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) Senior GOJ officials have clearly heard and 
understood our message on Article 98.  If Washington 
maintains a full court press on Prince Zaid at Jordan's UN 
mission on this issue, post will do the same on this end to 
reach an agreed text.  Muasher's concerns about the 
agreement's impact on Jordan's ability to act against a 
potential transfer of Palestinians may strike some as 
hypothetical at best, or disingenuous at worst.  However, 
fear of a large scale transfer runs rampant throughout 
Jordan, right up to senior leadership levels, and cannot 
easily be dispelled, regardless of logic.  We are sure a way 
can be found to resolve specific concerns about the text of 
the agreement. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
 
GNEHM