US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1375

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JAPAN ENCOURAGES RAZALI TO UNDERTAKE SECRET SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY

Identifier: 03RANGOON1375
Wikileaks: View 03RANGOON1375 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2003-10-31 00:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV BM JA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001375 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV; TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL; 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM, JA 
SUBJECT: JAPAN ENCOURAGES RAZALI TO UNDERTAKE SECRET 
SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY 
 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Yuji 
Miyamoto, is urging U.N. Special Envoy Razali to conduct his 
dialogue efforts "in secret" and to replace his pro-ASSK 
liaison officer in Rangoon, two points the Japanese believe 
might lead the SPDC to be more cooperative.  The Japanese 
also want Razali to establish an office in Rangoon in support 
of his efforts.  Meanwhile, the Japanese Embassy in Rangoon 
is keen to smooth feathers of SPDC generals who are miffed 
over PM Koizumi's public criticism of Burma at the ASEAN Bali 
Summit.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Japanese Embassy political counselor Ichiro Maruyama 
told us on October 29 that his Ambassador, Yuji Miyamoto, had 
departed on a brief mission to Kuala Lumpur to meet with U.N. 
Special Envoy Razali.  According to the political counselor, 
Ambassador Miyamoto planned to encourage Razali to continue 
his efforts aimed at achieving a political dialogue between 
the SPDC and ASSK, but to conduct his dialogue efforts 
"quietly, if not secretly."  Maruyama said that the SPDC 
trusted Razali, but would never respond positively to his 
"arrogant" public diplomacy and high-profile visits. 
 
3. (C) Counselor Maruyama also said his Ambassador would tell 
Razali that the SPDC has lost total faith in Leon de 
Riedmatten, the former ICRC chief who serves as Razali's 
liaison in Rangoon.  According to the Japanese Embassy, in 
the aftermath of the May 30 attack the SPDC believes that de 
Riedmatten is too close to ASSK and cannot represent the 
neutrality required of a U.N. envoy.  The Japanese Ambassador 
was also prepared to appeal to Razali to establish an office 
in Rangoon that would allow the U.N. envoy to be better 
prepared and informed for his infrequent visits to Burma. 
 
4. (C) Maruyama was quick to point out that Ambassador 
Miyamoto was not a "messenger" for the SPDC in reaching out 
to Razali.  However, he acknowledged that regime contacts had 
intimated to the Japanese Embassy that it would be "helpful 
if Razali was made aware" he needed to dump de Riedmatten and 
to be more discreet in his handling of dialogue efforts. 
Maruyama added that the idea for Razali to establish a 
permanent office in Rangoon was hatched by the Japanese 
Embassy, but that the SPDC was receptive to the concept. 
 
5. (C) Counselor Maruyama also noted that Japan would be 
hosting an ASEAN Summit in December to commemorate 30 years 
of Japan-ASEAN cooperation.  He said that his Embassy was 
"worried" that Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt would not 
attend the summit due to SPDC ire over Japanese PM Koizumi's 
public airing in Bali of concerns regarding Burma.  As a 
result, the Japanese Embassy will advocate to headquarters in 
Tokyo that the GOJ refrain from criticizing Burma for the 
next month or so and send the Japanese Foreign Minister or 
Deputy Foreign Minister to Rangoon in November to 
hand-deliver an invitation to PM Khin Nyunt for the December 
summit. 
 
6. (C) Comment:  The Japanese tell us here that they believe 
Razali has little hope of succeeding with his dialogue 
efforts.  However, they support the U.N. process and want to 
keep Razali engaged for lack of better alternatives. 
Contrary to assertions that Ambassador Miyamoto is not a 
"messenger" for the SPDC, the Japanese here continue to 
maintain close contacts with military intelligence and seem 
inclined to push Razali in a direction that might elicit 
better cooperation from the regime.  The Japanese believe 
that they played a helpful role in supporting secret talks in 
1993 that secured a presence in Rahkine State for the UNHCR 
(using their influence with then-High Commissioner Ogata), 
and would like Razali to take the same approach.  As for 
efforts to get PM Khin Nyunt to attend the Japan-ASEAN 
Summit, the Japanese Embassy in Rangoon is known for its 
pro-engagement stance, often getting ahead of the Japanese 
MOFA on Burma policy.  Counselor Maruyama did not respond to 
our observation that PM Koizumi's remarks in Bali regarding 
Burma were right on the mark.  End Summary. 
Martinez 

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