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| Identifier: | 03RANGOON1375 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03RANGOON1375 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rangoon |
| Created: | 2003-10-31 00:47:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV BM JA |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001375 SIPDIS STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV; TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL; USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2013 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM, JA SUBJECT: JAPAN ENCOURAGES RAZALI TO UNDERTAKE SECRET SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 1. (C) Summary: The Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Yuji Miyamoto, is urging U.N. Special Envoy Razali to conduct his dialogue efforts "in secret" and to replace his pro-ASSK liaison officer in Rangoon, two points the Japanese believe might lead the SPDC to be more cooperative. The Japanese also want Razali to establish an office in Rangoon in support of his efforts. Meanwhile, the Japanese Embassy in Rangoon is keen to smooth feathers of SPDC generals who are miffed over PM Koizumi's public criticism of Burma at the ASEAN Bali Summit. End Summary. 2. (C) Japanese Embassy political counselor Ichiro Maruyama told us on October 29 that his Ambassador, Yuji Miyamoto, had departed on a brief mission to Kuala Lumpur to meet with U.N. Special Envoy Razali. According to the political counselor, Ambassador Miyamoto planned to encourage Razali to continue his efforts aimed at achieving a political dialogue between the SPDC and ASSK, but to conduct his dialogue efforts "quietly, if not secretly." Maruyama said that the SPDC trusted Razali, but would never respond positively to his "arrogant" public diplomacy and high-profile visits. 3. (C) Counselor Maruyama also said his Ambassador would tell Razali that the SPDC has lost total faith in Leon de Riedmatten, the former ICRC chief who serves as Razali's liaison in Rangoon. According to the Japanese Embassy, in the aftermath of the May 30 attack the SPDC believes that de Riedmatten is too close to ASSK and cannot represent the neutrality required of a U.N. envoy. The Japanese Ambassador was also prepared to appeal to Razali to establish an office in Rangoon that would allow the U.N. envoy to be better prepared and informed for his infrequent visits to Burma. 4. (C) Maruyama was quick to point out that Ambassador Miyamoto was not a "messenger" for the SPDC in reaching out to Razali. However, he acknowledged that regime contacts had intimated to the Japanese Embassy that it would be "helpful if Razali was made aware" he needed to dump de Riedmatten and to be more discreet in his handling of dialogue efforts. Maruyama added that the idea for Razali to establish a permanent office in Rangoon was hatched by the Japanese Embassy, but that the SPDC was receptive to the concept. 5. (C) Counselor Maruyama also noted that Japan would be hosting an ASEAN Summit in December to commemorate 30 years of Japan-ASEAN cooperation. He said that his Embassy was "worried" that Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt would not attend the summit due to SPDC ire over Japanese PM Koizumi's public airing in Bali of concerns regarding Burma. As a result, the Japanese Embassy will advocate to headquarters in Tokyo that the GOJ refrain from criticizing Burma for the next month or so and send the Japanese Foreign Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister to Rangoon in November to hand-deliver an invitation to PM Khin Nyunt for the December summit. 6. (C) Comment: The Japanese tell us here that they believe Razali has little hope of succeeding with his dialogue efforts. However, they support the U.N. process and want to keep Razali engaged for lack of better alternatives. Contrary to assertions that Ambassador Miyamoto is not a "messenger" for the SPDC, the Japanese here continue to maintain close contacts with military intelligence and seem inclined to push Razali in a direction that might elicit better cooperation from the regime. The Japanese believe that they played a helpful role in supporting secret talks in 1993 that secured a presence in Rahkine State for the UNHCR (using their influence with then-High Commissioner Ogata), and would like Razali to take the same approach. As for efforts to get PM Khin Nyunt to attend the Japan-ASEAN Summit, the Japanese Embassy in Rangoon is known for its pro-engagement stance, often getting ahead of the Japanese MOFA on Burma policy. Counselor Maruyama did not respond to our observation that PM Koizumi's remarks in Bali regarding Burma were right on the mark. End Summary. Martinez
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