US embassy cable - 03ABUJA1868

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001868 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, NI 
SUBJECT: BABANGIDA POSITIONING FOR 2007 ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. A) ABUJA 1496 
     B. B) ABUJA 1636 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B & D). 
 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  While he had been seen by some as a 
potential challenger for the 2003 elections, former military 
Head-of-State Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) faded during the party 
conventions.  Apparently he is now maneuvering for a 
political comeback in 2007, and "IBB For President" 
organizations are springing up throughout the South-West. 
IBB will rely on his contacts in the military, political and 
business communities for support, and appears to be 
manipulating the political process by furthering the distrust 
between the President and the Vice President.  IBB's 
overarching concern, however, is protecting the billions of 
dollars he is believed to have salted away during his reign, 
and he remains concerned that President Obasanjo or others 
could attempt to confiscate the ill-gotten wealth.  For now, 
IBB remains content to allow others to labor for him in the 
public arena while supporting rumored candidates such as NSA 
Aliyu Mohammed Gusau and former Lagos Governor Buba Marwa 
behind the scenes.  IBB's tendency to take action only when 
certain to win, combined with his waning popularity and the 
emergence of competing interests among his followers, could 
trip up his efforts -- much as it did during the 2003 
political party conventions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2.  (C)  While seen by some as a potential challenger for the 
2003 elections, former military Head-of-State Ibrahim 
Babangida faded during the party conventions.  One of his 
assistants, however, told Poloff in March that his real plan 
had been to ensure a weak presidency in 2003 and block 
potential successors.  By placing himself in position to 
stage a political comeback in 2007, IBB hoped to rehabilitate 
his image, tarnished by his failed transition program and 
Sani Abacha's ascension. 
 
 
3.  (C)  After the elections, many believe that IBB is 
actively promoting his own 2007 candidacy.  Citing "IBB For 
President" organizations springing up throughout the 
South-West (home of MKO Abiola, the "winner" of the 1993 
election annulled by IBB), some see the General's 
fingerprints.  The August 27 ceremony launching a book about 
IBB by one of his close associates was also viewed as a 
campaign tactic, at least by potential challenger Muhammadu 
Buhari (Ref A).  Buhari commented that it looked more like a 
campaign launch than a book launch and challenged IBB to 
"meet him" in 2007.  According to another IBB advisor, IBB 
will continue to rely on his wide range of contacts in the 
military, political and business communities to manipulate 
the political process.  The advisor claims IBB is behind 
ongoing problems between President Obasanjo and one of IBB's 
likely 2007 rivals, Vice President Atiku Abubakar.  The 
wedding of IBB's daughter attracted a who's who of Nigerian 
politics, with most current and former politicians and 
military officers paying calls on IBB's Minna residence, 
including representatives of the Abiola and Abacha families 
and of both the President and Vice-President (Ref B). 
 
 
4.  (C)  COMMENT:  While IBB consults with the President and 
is in frequent contact with the Vice-President, neither is 
his friend.  IBB's overarching concern is protecting the 
billions of dollars he is believed to have salted away during 
his reign.  IBB remains concerned that Obasanjo could attempt 
to confiscate the ill-gotten wealth, as the President has 
gone after the family of deceased former dictator Sani 
Abacha.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
FIGHT MANAGER 
 
 
5.  (C)  Vice President Atiku presents a challenge to IBB's 
desire to dominate the northern political arena.  Even though 
most believe Atiku was unable to lure popular support in 
northern Nigeria away from opposition ANPP presidential 
candidate Buhari, the Vice President was able to control the 
ruling PDP party machinery and the security forces well 
enough to secure a majority of the vote in the North-East 
region. 
 
 
6.  (C)  IBB has suffered further setbacks from his attempts 
to stage-manage both the ruling PDP party convention and the 
opposition ANPP convention.  Unlike his daughter's Minna 
fete, a crowd gathered for a wedding ceremony in Zaria 
physically assaulted IBB and National Security Advisor Aliyu 
Mohammed Gusau.  Eyewitnesses report that IBB was forced to 
voice support for ANPP presidential candidate Muhammadu 
Buhari and was lucky to be extracted without injury.  It is 
widely believed that IBB maintains some element of control 
over more than one of the other, considerably smaller 
opposition parties, but he is rumored to have recently joined 
the PDP in an effort to further his political ambitions. 
 
 
7.  (C)  For now, IBB remains content to allow others to 
labor for him in the public arena while remaining behind the 
scenes.  Along with a number of South-West politicians coming 
out to support him, he is said to be the source of rumors 
that NSA Gusau and former Lagos State Military Administrator 
Mohammed Buba Marwa are interested in contesting the 
Presidential ticket in 2007.  The two, both allies of IBB, 
have yet to confirm their intentions. 
 
 
8.  (C)  It appears that IBB's real political efforts are 
currently devoted to creating an environment of confusion and 
attempting to weaken Obasanjo.  While some think the 
President would support him in order to prevent Vice 
President Atiku from getting the 2007 nomination, IBB is not 
likely to depend solely on that support.  It is also reported 
by some observers that IBB is pulling strings within the 
Judiciary to enable Buhari's election challenge to proceed. 
By stringing the tribunal out over several months, IBB likely 
hopes to keep the clouds over Obasanjo's second-term mandate 
and pull the rug from under Buhari at the last possible 
minute.  (NOTE:  Buhari and IBB together appointed 11 of the 
fifteen present Supreme Court justices.  Abacha appointed one 
and Obasanjo has appointed three.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
BUT NOT A FIGHTER? 
 
 
9.  (C)  IBB's plans could be hampered by several factors. 
 
 
-- Buhari's strong and growing popularity will be difficult 
to derail.  By promoting the Tribunal hearings of electoral 
malpractices, IBB is contributing to Buhari's popularity. 
 
 
-- Money remains important in Nigerian politics, but Buhari's 
grassroots support is deep and not for sale.  And to the 
extent IBB is seen as associated with Obasanjo, the 
President's continued alienation of other elements of 
Nigerian society could put these sections out of reach of 
even IBB's deep pockets. 
 
 
-- While IBB retains a widespread loyalty (mostly from his 
largesse during and after his years as head of state), an 
increasing number of his acolytes are emerging as political 
players in their own right.  While they will go with him up 
to a point, with IBB's waning popularity among Nigerians, 
these "IBB Boys" will likely discover that as men they have 
ambitions separate from their one-time leader. 
 
 
IBB's tendencies to manipulate those already slugging it out 
in the ring, and to delay jumping in personally until certain 
of victory, could cause him to trip over the ropes much as he 
did during the 2003 political party conventions.  Newer 
leaders may vault over him, and the present generation could 
try to ring the bell on him early.  But given his political 
stamina and powerful financial punch, none of them should 
count him out. 
MEECE