US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1858

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001858 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT, SA/PD; NSC FOR 
E. MILLARD 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  10-28-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, MARR, ETRD, CE, IN, External Relations 
SUBJECT:  Enthusiastic local reaction to the 
Prime Minister's recent visit to India 
 
Refs:  (A) New Delhi 5921 
 
-      (B) Colombo 1853, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
SUMMARY 
======= 
1.  (C) Local reaction to Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe's recent visit to India has been 
enthusiastic.  Press coverage trumpeted the visit as 
signaling that India had decided to back the GSL and its 
peace initiative fully.  Contacts also stressed that the 
visit had sent a strong message of support to the south. 
The Indian polcouns said he thought the visit had hit 
the right notes, but warned that too much should not be 
read into it.  While the local reaction was overblown, 
our sense is that the visit served to buck up the peace 
process at a critical moment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
================================ 
Sri Lanka Gushes over PM's Visit 
================================ 
 
2. (SBU) Local reaction to Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe's October 19-22 visit to India has been 
enthusiastic.  Press coverage trumpeted the visit as 
signaling that India had finally decided to back the Sri 
Lankan government and its peace initiative fully. 
Gushing headlines on the visit in English-language 
papers focused mainly on its defense and economic 
cooperation aspects (see Ref A), and included: 
 
-- "The Security Umbrella Unfurls" 
 
-- "India to the Defense" 
 
-- "India's New Regional Security Umbrella Plans" 
 
-- "Making Lanka the Gateway to India" 
 
-- "Enter India to Usher in Real Peace" 
 
========================================== 
Contacts:  "Visit Helped Process in South" 
========================================== 
 
3.  (C) In more restrained tones than the press 
coverage, contacts stressed that the visit had sent a 
strong message of support to the Sinhalese south from 
India, the major regional power.  Reaction included: 
 
-- Jehan Perera, media director for the National Peace 
Council, a local think-tank, told poloff on October 28 
that he thought the south was "very reassured" by the 
vocal support that India had given to the peace process. 
Perera noted that he felt this support was a signal on 
the part of the GoI that the peace process was now at a 
stage where India could safely re-engage in closer ties 
with Sri Lanka.  This, in turn, was a sign that India 
was finally getting over the failure of the Indian 
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) and Rajiv Gandhi's 
assassination by the Tigers. 
 
-- Rohan Edirisinghe, an analyst with the Center for 
Policy Alternatives, another local think-tank, agreed 
that the positive vibrations emanating from the PM's 
visit had "definitely" helped the peace process.  India 
had made clear to Sri Lankans that it was "very 
supportive" of the peace process and this message was 
"very reassuring to the south."  Edirisinghe noted that 
the visit -- coming as it did on the eve of the 
unveiling of the Tigers' response regarding power- 
sharing in the north/east -- was well-timed. 
 
-- M.L.A.M Hizbullah, a senior Opposition MP with the 
Muslim National Unity Alliance, said he thought the 
visit was definitely an indication that India wanted 
closer ties with the GSL after years of maintaining an 
arms-length relationship.  As also touched on by 
Edirisinghe, Hizbullah went on to state that the timing 
of the Indian support had helped the PM's standing in 
the south at the key moment just before the Tigers 
issued their counterproposals, which were potentially 
highly combustible in a political sense. 
 
=========================================== 
Indian Polcouns:  No Shift in Policy by GoI 
=========================================== 
 
4.  (C) In an October 28 discussion with polchief, 
Taranjit Sandhu, the Indian High Commission polcouns, 
said he thought that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's 
visit had been constructive and "made for good 
pictures."  In making this point, he stressed that: 
"All the key meetings -- with Vajpayee, Advani, Gandhi 
-- had gone smoothly, with no down notes."  Sandhu added 
that the two countries' joint announcement that they 
would proceed with plans to expand the bilateral free 
trade agreement and enhance defense cooperation had 
indicated the existence of a "robust, dynamic" 
relationship.  Since the United National Party (UNP) had 
taken over power in December 2001, the GoI felt that it 
had a developed solid rapport with both PM 
Wickremesinghe and key Minister Milinda Moragoda.  The 
success of the PM's recent visit was confirmation that 
"this chemistry continued to work." 
 
5.  (C) All that said, Sandhu emphasized that he thought 
the local reaction had gone too far and that too much 
should not be read into the visit.  Sandhu stated:  "I 
know that there is a bit of exuberance in Sri Lanka, but 
India has not changed its longtime substantive 
positioning regarding the ethnic conflict."  India, he 
said, would continue to support the GSL's peace 
initiative and urge ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka, 
but it still had no plans to involve itself directly in 
the process.  Moreover, despite much local press 
speculation, he noted that India had no plans to help 
the Sri Lankan government "bottle up" the LTTE.  On this 
point, Sandhu underlined that enhanced defense 
cooperation did not mean that there would be any sort of 
"mutual defense treaty" between the two countries. 
India also had "absolutely no plans to send armed forces 
to Sri Lanka" despite calls by some Sinhalese extremists 
for such intervention. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
6.  (C) As Sandhu noted, the local reaction to the visit 
was overblown.  Sri Lankans clearly wanted to receive a 
positive signal from India and they magnified the visit 
to the full extent.  Our sense, however, is that the 
visit indeed was important in that it served to buck up 
the peace process at a very critical moment.  The LTTE's 
counterproposals regarding the north/east -- which are 
due to be issued in the next several days -- are bound 
to be very controversial to some in the south.  In light 
of the probable turbulence, the GSL needs all the help 
it can get from the international community -- and the 
PM's visit to India was a sign that such support is 
there.  At the same time, the LTTE was sent a clear 
message that India is watching the process closely. 
What the volatile Tigers made of that message remains 
unclear, but the group has in the past murmured semi- 
threateningly about the GSL's trying to create an 
"international safety net."  Of course, the GoI warrant 
for LTTE leader V. Prabakharan's arrest for the murder 
of Rajiv Gandhi remains a core issue in how the Tigers 
view New Delhi.  END COMMENT. 
 
7.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
ENTWISTLE