US embassy cable - 03ROME4841

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 004841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, IT, NATO, EUN 
SUBJECT: ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY: OCTOBER 16-17 COUNCIL 
READOUT; WAY AHEAD ON ESDP, IGC 
 
Classified By: A/DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The Italian EU Presidency is, in general, 
pleased with the results of the October 16-17 European 
Council Meeting and with progress thus far on the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).  Italy remains confident 
that any new EU agreements on European security architecture 
will not jeopardize the transatlantic alliance.  Italian 
officials were sanguine that eventual structured cooperation 
on defense would be compatible with NATO; Italy will insist 
that its operational parameters be agreed "at 25".  They 
reassured us that the idea for an autonomous EU planning cell 
at Tervuren is dead.  While FM Frattini is optimistic that a 
political agreement to close the IGC will be ready by 
December, PM Berlusconi is less sure the Italian Presidency 
will complete the process, and one key player at the MFA 
would consider closure by December "a miracle."  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On October 21 Embassy officers fanned out to pulse 
officials at the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's 
office on the October 16-17 European Council meeting and the 
EU's evolving defense and security architecture.  A/DCM Tom 
Countryman and Polmiloff consulted Deputy Diplomatic Advisor 
to PM Berlusconi Gianpaolo Scarante and Assistant Diplomatic 
Advisor Francesco Talo.  Poloff met with the MFA's EU 
European Correspondent and ESDP coordinator Sandro De 
Bernadin as well as Giuseppe Buccino-Grimaldi from the MFA's 
office of EU Institutional Affairs.  Two polmil officers 
engaged the MFA's NATO Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi. 
 
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EU DEFENSE IDENTITY WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH NATO 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (C) A/DCM Countryman began the discussion with the PM's 
diplomatic advisors by underscoring that the USG is well 
aware of Italy's efforts to defend the principle that the 
EU's defense identity must be fully compatible with NATO. 
Nevertheless, he said, there is concern about how the EU may 
operationalize it. A/DCM explained that concern about the 
EU's approach is driven by several factors, including some EU 
member states' apparent willingness to modify Berlin-Plus so 
soon after it was agreed; the possibility that during the 
course of intra-EU horsetrading on the IGC, a country or set 
of countries could bend on security matters to get something 
else in return; and lack of clarity about the operational 
modalities of structured cooperation. 
 
4. (C) Scarante said he was aware of the USG's general 
concern, but was puzzled by the timing of the Embassy's 
interest in consultations.  He did not think that the dynamic 
on security cooperation within the EU was one that should 
particularly trouble us.  Scarante claimed there is an 
understanding within the EU that steps to build an EU defense 
identity must be compatible with NATO.   Berlusconi, he 
pointed out, made a strong public statement to this effect at 
the conclusion of the October 16-17 EU Council meeting. 
Italy's position is that whatever the EU does on defense and 
security matters must add value to the Alliance. 
 
5. (C) De Bernadin thought that "reproducing" language 
already agreed to in WEU documents could serve to defuse any 
conflict with NATO article 5 commitments.  He explained that 
details on defense arrangements and structured cooperation 
criteria would be spelled out in a protocol or annex to the 
main document (as noted in Article III-213 of the current 
draft treaty), which the Presidency would also write.  De 
Bernadin hoped to have a draft text of the protocol ready to 
share with EU FMs at the November 17 GAERC. 
 
6. (C) Brauzzi acknowledged that if the French idea for a 
European Security and Defense Union had found its way into 
the Convention's constitutional draft, Italy would have been 
concerned -- even frightened.  That eventuality could have 
led toward the development of a multipolar world.  Now, we 
are on much firmer ground, he affirmed, adding that the 
elements are in place to move forward with an EU-NATO 
relationship grounded in cooperation.  He rebuffed any 
suggestion that the EU had not been fully transparent with 
NATO in its pursuit of a more robust ESDP. 
 
 
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EU FM NAPLES "CONCLAVE" 
----------------------- 
 
7. (C) De Bernadin told poloff that for all the cacophony in 
the press over the Council's discussion on European Security, 
there was little movement on national positions and no formal 
agreements on key issues such as structured cooperation and 
the form that a European planning operation might assume. 
What was achieved was an airing of national positions, 
setting the stage for progress at the November 17-18 GAERC, 
followed by a special meeting of heads of state proposed for 
November 24 (location tbd), and at a November 27-28 FM 
"conclave" in Naples. 
 
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STRUCTURED COOPERATION - BUT AGREED AT 25 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) De Bernadin underlined the Presidency's view that any 
structured cooperation must be "inclusive and transparent" 
with membership criteria and operational parameters 
"established and agreed to at 25".  Above all, for the 
Presidency, the relationship with NATO is "essential" 
insisted De Bernadin.  He underlined that Article 40-2 of the 
current draft treaty states that EU common security "...shall 
respect the obligations of certain member states, which see 
their common defense realized in NATO, under the North 
Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security 
and defense policy established within that framework." 
 
9. (C) Brauzzi, from his NATO perspective, also argued 
energetically--and defensively--that Article 40 of the EU's 
draft constitution guarantees defense of NATO's interests; 
Brauzzi did not expect the core principles contained therein 
to be altered in the final document. Scarante added that 
structured cooperation presupposes EU and NATO compatibility; 
nothing the EU is currently considering cuts against the 
interests of NATO, he asserted. 
 
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STRUCTURED COOPERATION A PLUS FOR THE ALLIANCE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
10. (C) Talo and Brauzzi both argued that the creation of a 
core group in the EU willing to take on more military 
responsibility will be to NATO's advantage, not least because 
it will in all probability be composed exclusively of 
Alliance members (Brauzzi could not imagine Ireland or Sweden 
joining, for example).  Italy, Talo reasoned, would have even 
more influence in such a group than in a future EU of 25 
members.  The added pressure of EU military spending targets 
and capabilities criteria, Brauzzi believed, would result in 
a synergistic effect and contribute to transatlantic 
security. 
 
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TERVUREN (STILL) DEAD 
--------------------- 
 
11. (C) Talo confirmed that EU leaders meeting in Brussels 
touched only lightly on the issue of where to house/how to 
structure an eventual EU planning cell.  He said emphatically 
that Tervuren is dead.  While other ideas are being studied, 
including the Italian proposal to set up a virtual planning 
cell (which Talo indicated was a Defense Ministry 
initiative), the issue is not ripe for a full Council-level 
discussion.  Asked to explain Berlusconi's October 17 public 
comment that the EU would need a "dedicated command", Talo 
said the PM meant that to manage an autonomous operation the 
EU would require some sort of planning cell.  He clarified 
that Berlusconi was not calling for a fixed and permanent 
cell, but one that could conceivably even be created on an ad 
hoc basis. 
 
12. (C) Brauzzi, pressed on why Italy hasn't been more 
forthcoming in support of the UK proposal to set up an EU 
planning cell at SHAPE, said that Italy has nothing against 
such a notion.  "What we cannot accept," he said, "is a 
prescription that mandates its establishment there." 
Berlin-Plus doesn't dictate where a cell should be located, 
he noted.  SHAPE is an option, as is the idea to create a 
 
 
virtual planning cell.  Regardless of the modalities for 
establishing a planning capacity, Brauzzi argued, planners 
seconded to any EU cell will remain national resources and 
available to NATO.  He viewed the development of an 
autonomous EU planning capability as adding flexibility to 
the system of transatlantic security and fully in keeping 
with the interests of the Alliance. 
 
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TREATY OF ROME WON'T BE ANOTHER TREATY OF NICE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
13. (C) Buccino-Grimaldi said that the overall IGC 
discussions on the Council margins were positive.  He said 
that FM Frattini is very optimistic that the IGC will finish 
during the Italian Presidency.  PM Berlusconi is also 
hopeful, but "more prudent" than Frattini.  Grimaldi, who's 
office is responsible for drafting treaty elements dealing 
with reforming the EU's institutions, told poloff that it 
would be "a miracle" if there is a document ready for the 
final Council meeting of the Italian Presidency on December 
12.  He said that the Presidency would only prepare the 
overall package for heads of state to sign after the late 
November FM's conclave, based on their input and ongoing 
discussions.  "Italy will not make the same mistake France 
did with the Nice Treaty."  The package, if presented, will 
be "complete, tight" and not contain every amendment and 
revision desired by member states, which according to 
Grimaldi was the case with Nice.  Italy has red lines in this 
regard, one of which is to change the voting structure 
enshrined in Nice so that a small minority of the 25 cannot 
block decisions. 
 
14. (C) Grimaldi said that his cynicism over completing the 
treaty by December is based on the number and weight of 
negotiations pending.  He predicted that decision areas 
subject to qualified majority voting (QMV) will remain more 
or less unchanged, but only after much debate.  Two areas he 
sees as critical to completing the treaty on time are 
agreement on numbers of commissioners and the role of and 
control over the proposed EU foreign minister position. 
Compromise will not be easy on either. 
 
15. (C) Comment:  Our Italian colleagues did their level best 
to reassure us that modalities for implementing ESDP will be 
compatible with NATO.    Berlusconi's strong 
pronouncements--and the unity of top government officials-- 
have reinforced this fundamental principle and suggest that 
Italy, while likely to be less forceful than the UK, will not 
go wobbly.  We were struck by the apparent calm of our 
interlocutors, who evidently believe that an eventual EU 
Constitution will prevent some member states from straying 
from their Atlanticist brethren in pursuit of a more robust 
EU defense identity.  We respect their view, but with the 
operational details of ESDP still in flux, we will continue 
to press them to ensure that it complements NATO.  End 
Comment. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2003ROME04841 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL