US embassy cable - 03ZAGREB2270

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 002270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE KABUMOTO AND WATSON 
USEU FOR HOLTZAPPLE 
USOSCE FOR HELWIG 
THE HAGUE FOR JOHNSON AND KAYE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, HR, KWCI, Political Parties/Elections 
SUBJECT: CROATIA'S PROGRESS ON REFORMS THREATENED BY 
RIGHT-WING GAINS IN POLLS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank for reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) New polls show that the reform-oriented parties which 
formed the Racan government are trailing Croatia's right-wing 
nationalist opposition in the race for November 23 
parliamentary elections.  Unless the current coalition turns 
it around -- and pollsters tell us they could still manage 
this -- Croatia could have a government led by the HDZ and 
including even more extreme nationalist parties before the 
end of the year.  While the HDZ is no longer the party of 
Franjo Tudjman and has been supportive of the U.S. position 
on Iraq, the return of a nationalist government now would 
mean less cooperation with ICTY, a slowdown in improving 
relations with Serbia and Montenegro, more hesitance in 
implementing refugee returns and would likely not deliver a 
deployment to Iraq. 
 
2.  (C) While Croatia has matured as a state beyond the point 
where it would be appropriate -- or helpful -- for the USG to 
back one political option or the other openly, there are some 
steps we could take to avoid adding to the largely 
self-inflicted misfortunes facing Racan's coalition.  We are 
already sponsoring a vigorous get-out-the vote campaign 
targeted at voters likely to support a reform agenda.  In 
addition, we should defer tough messages calling for stepping 
up the pace of reform until after elections.  We should also 
seek opportunities to show Croatia's voters that we recognize 
the achievements -- such as they are -- of the Racan 
government.  End Summary. 
 
Racan Coalition Trailing in Polls 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) A USAID-sponsored IRI poll released in early October 
shows that the coalition led by PM Racan's SDP is in real 
trouble as it begins the sprint for November 23 parliamentary 
elections.  The Racan coalition brought the trouble on 
itself; polls in late Summer showed progressive parties with 
a slim (but comfortable) lead and momentum behind them. 
Rather than building on their lead, coalition political 
leaders coasted, and have only recently begun campaigning in 
earnest.  To add insult to injury, the GoC continues to 
fumble politically-sensitive policy issues, like its recent 
mishandling of a unilateral declaration of an exclusive 
economic zone in the Adriatic. 
 
4.  (C) The IRI poll shows HDZ with a ten-point lead over 
Racan's SDP.  More alarming is that this gain is not being 
made at the expense of other, more extreme right-wing 
parties, but from the large pool of undecided voters.  IRI 
pollsters tell us that, if the election were held now, the 
HDZ and its ilk would win enough support to form a 
government.  If coalition parties take decisive action, they 
may be able to turn this trend around, particularly if they 
can show voters that a vote for the HDZ is a vote against 
Croatia's aspirations to join the EU. 
 
Reforms in Jeopardy 
------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Croatia's voters and the international community had 
high expectations of the Racan government.  While the 
government has not met many of these expectations, it has 
made progress on some important reforms.  This progress, 
which has transformed Croatia from a net consumer of security 
in the region to a net producer, is at risk if a right-wing 
government with revanchist elements comes to power. 
 
At Risk: ICTY Cooperation and Refugee Return 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) We have been frustrated with the Racan government's 
progress on ICTY cooperation and refugee return, but the 
alternative is worse.  The HDZ has made it clear that they 
view PIFWC Ante Gotovina as a "hero, not a criminal."  The 
HSLS, which would be the HDZ's coalition partner, has 
declared that it would seek to change Croatia's law which 
makes cooperation with the  Tribunal obligatory.  Current GoC 
officials have privately expressed serious concerns to us 
about their ability to protect police operatives who have 
been involved in the search for indicted war criminals should 
a right-wing government come to power.  On returns, despite 
our urging, the HDZ has not encouraged local leaders to 
facilitate refugee returns; an HDZ government would not 
improve even the Racan government's mixed record. 
 
 
7.  (C) The Racan government has made important progress 
toward building good-neighborly relations with Serbia and 
Montenegro.  While some of its achievements -- like the 
Prevlaka agreement -- cannot be reversed, others would be at 
risk and the pace of rapprochement would certainly slow. 
Croatia under Racan has severed inappropriate links to Croats 
in BiH.  HDZ President Sanader has told us privately that his 
party has dropped the Tudjman-era policies harmful to Dayton, 
but he nonetheless is campaigning in the hard-line Croat 
areas of BiH using nationalist themes. 
 
8.  (C) Sanader's public statements on Iraq have been music 
to our ears, but it is unlikely that an HDZ government would 
be able to deliver the two-thirds parliamentary majority 
required to deploy a Croatian contingent to Iraq.  A Sanader 
cabinet would not consider itself bound by the Racan 
Cabinet's June 12 political decision (not ratified by 
parliament before it dissolved) to deploy troops to Iraq. 
Several of Sanader's likely coalition partners have already 
taken public positions against deployment. 
 
What to Do? 
----------- 
 
9.  (C) There is little that we can -- or should -- do to 
influence the outcome of the November 23 elections.  But with 
the parliament dissolved and the Racan government in 
caretaker status until elections, there is no value in 
pushing Croatia to take new action on reforms until a new 
government is seated.  We would instead advocate looking for 
ways to highlight the accomplishments of the Racan government 
and the progress Croatia has made toward Euro-Atlantic 
institutions under its stewardship.  The upcoming meeting of 
the Adriatic Charter Partnership in Washington may provide us 
with an opportunity to make this point.  More welcome for the 
Racan government and far more useful from an election 
standpoint would be messages of support from EU countries or 
international organizations. 
FRANK 
 
 
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