US embassy cable - 03HARARE2095

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CHAT WITH A CHIEF

Identifier: 03HARARE2095
Wikileaks: View 03HARARE2095 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2003-10-21 14:18:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL ZI ZANU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2008 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI, ZANU-PF 
SUBJECT: CHAT WITH A CHIEF 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a meeting with poloff October 8, ZANU-PF 
MP (appointed by the President) and Deputy Minister of Local 
Government, Public Works and National Housing Chief Fortune 
Charumbira identified weaknesses in the nation's municipal 
administration and outlined efforts to improve them.  He 
stressed the need for the international community to make due 
allowance for the central political importance of land 
ownership in its relations with Zimbabwe.  The Chief made a 
predictable pitch for the lifting of USG's individually 
targeted sanctions (to which he is subject) in order to send 
a positive signal that could be reciprocated in some 
unspecified way.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Chief Charumbira explained that he sits on the 
National Council of Chiefs and is one of 10 chiefs selected 
by President Mugabe to sit in Parliament.  He was elected 
president by the Council a couple of years ago but declined 
because of the press of business obligations -- his 
consultancy work had him tied up with an institutional reform 
program for the World Bank in Tanzania at that time. 
Nonetheless, the other chiefs relied heavily on him on a host 
of issues facing the Council.  He noted that chiefs in 
Zimbabwe historically had a reputation of supporting the 
government in power -- ZANU-PF now and the Smith regime 
before it.  He said this was generally true, although he 
considered himself and some others to be independent 
thinkers. 
 
3.  (C) Charumbira elaborated on some of his priorities as 
Deputy Minister of Local Government, Public Works and 
National Housing.  He recognized the potential for political 
friction between MDC municipal governments and the central 
government.  A key to minimizing these would be collaboration 
on municipal strategic plan frameworks on which work 
commenced last March.  The concept called for parties to 
agree on priorities, values, implementation issues in advance 
so as to promote a depoliticized buy-in from relevant players 
before opportunities for finger-pointing emerged. 
Municipalities were now submitting their strategic plans, 
which would be circulated for peer review before undergoing 
further revision and eventual implementation. 
 
4.  (C) More problematic than potential political friction 
were poor planning capacity and incompetence among municipal 
authorities, according to Charumbira.  The interaction among 
peers and with central government in the framework review 
would help, but under the Urban Council Act responsibility 
ultimately devolved to the local level.  The government had 
considered legislating performance standards for 
municipalities, but ultimately concluded such an approach 
would be anti-democratic and likely unworkable.  For the 
foreseeable future, the central government's posture toward 
towns would be "hands off, eyes on." 
 
5.  (C) Charumbira cautioned against assuming that the 
problems of MDC Harare Mayor Mudzuri would be representative 
of other MDC mayors.  Instead, they were typical of mayors of 
Harare, regardless of political affiliation.  He noted that 
more than one ZANU-PF mayor of Harare had been fired for 
malfeasance.  Mudzuri was his own worst enemy, Charumbira 
maintained.  His abrasive style alienated even those from his 
own party and he refused to be reasoned with by the Ministry. 
 Instead of responding to explicit Ministry overtures to 
address problems face to face, he preferred to take 
everything to the newspapers.  And like many of its ruling 
party predecessors, Mudzuri's administration showed evidence 
of corruption that bore investigation. 
 
6.  (C) The Chief emphasized the importance of the land 
ownership issue in Zimbabwe, particularly for the institution 
of chief.  Land and soil traditionally have been perceived as 
central to nearly everything that mattered: rains, luck, 
prosperity, and authority.  The MDC's inadequate appreciation 
of this was a serious liability with the rural masses; the 
party's belated and limited conversion to land reform came 
across as politically opportunistic and disingenuous.  The 
chief acknowledged that land reform was fraught with many 
unspecified problems that the government would have to 
address, and urged that the international community recognize 
domestic political factors constraining GOZ land policies. 
 
7.  (C) Charumbira complained that USG policy on Zimbabwe was 
ill-advised and unnecessarily detrimental to bilateral 
relations.  He conceded that the "sanctions" cited by the GOZ 
as impeding development did not have a large impact per se, 
but that they sent an influential message to international 
investors that adversely affected Zimbabwe's prospects for 
foreign direct investment.  He asserted that USG lifting of 
sanctions (i.e. travel and financial sanctions  against named 
individuals, including himself) would be an excellent 
confidence-building measure that could engender a more 
constructive posture by the GOZ toward the USG and the 
domestic opposition.  We gave him no grounds to expect any 
such USG move in the absence of major changes in the 
political landscape here. 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT: Charumbira is among ZANU-PF's numerous 
erudite, well-educated technocrats, apparently comfortable 
with domestic and international interlocutors alike. 
Unfortunately reflecting the ruling party's current culture 
of conformity, though, he is likely to be more chary of 
frankly sharing the insights of his education and experience 
with his own party superiors than he is with his Tanzanian 
clients.  The Chief keeps a much lower profile than his 
immediate superior, Minister Ignatius Chombo, in a ministry 
that will be potentially instrumental in the opposition's 
performance in municipal administration.  In any event, 
individuals like Charumbira are a potential springboard for 
evolution or moderation of ruling party policies given the 
right changes in environment.  We have heard pleas for "good 
faith" from similarly situated party principals affected by 
USG sanctions but continue to doubt that adjustment of 
targeted sanctions would positively influence the ruling 
party in any way at this time. 
SULLIVAN 

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