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| Identifier: | 03ABUJA1812 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ABUJA1812 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2003-10-17 15:23:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | ENRG ECON EFIN EINV NI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 171523Z Oct 03
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001812 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE PASS TO OPIC (CONAL DUFFY AND JIM WILLIAMS) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG, ECON, EFIN, EINV, NI SUBJECT: NEPA INVOKES FORCE MAJEURE IN AES CONTRACT SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED LEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 1. (SBU) Summary: Nigeria's National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) on October 7 invoked force majeure and informed AES that it (NEPA) would be unable to pay approximately 18 million USD due on the Lagos Emergency Power Barge Project (the Ebute plant). Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has provided $200 million of political risk for AES's equity investment in the project and is thus concerned about the problems the project is now encountering. The notification could also have a significant adverse impact on the GON's efforts to attract foreign investment and could hamstring privatization efforts. AES informed us on October 17 that it is moving "in the right direction" in talks with NEPA. AES has not requested USG assistance, and its interests may conflict with those of the USG. End summary. Background to Ebute ------------------- 2. (SBU) The Ebute plant is located about 35 miles east of Lagos, close to the 1,320 MW Egbin power plant. Ebute consists of nine floating barge units and provides a total of 290 MW. 3. (SBU) The GON, Lagos State, and NEPA are the parties to the Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) with AES. A 60 million dollar letter of credit (LOC) issued by Citibank provides payment security to AES Nigeria Barge Limited and may be drawn in the event NEPA's payments are more than 15 days late. As of October 17, the Nigerian parties were approximately 18 million USD in arrears bout three and a half months' worth of payments. 4. (SBU) Enron started the project in response to a request received from the governor of Lagos State in September 1999. The project was initially scheduled to commence commercial operations in June 2000. However, for various reasons, including the changing of the project site from Lagos to its present location, the initial project commissioning was delayed until June 2001. AES acquired the barge project from Enron in the fall of 2000 for 58 million USD. The project reached completion in March 2002. Total project costs, including the acquisition fee, were approximately 225 million USD. OPIC's Board of Directors (on which the Department of State is represented) approved the 200 million dollar political risk insurance coverage in May 2001. Tension within the GON: who should pay, and how? --------------------------------------------- --- 5. (SBU) NEPA's letter does not appear to be the last word. Econoff met separately on October 7 with Minister of Finance (Dr.) Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Minister of Power and Steel (Senator) Liyel Imoke. Both made clear that the GON itself is struggling with two highly charged questions. First, who should be held responsible for the payments - the Federal Government, NEPA or the Lagos State government? Second, can the GON justify to itself and to the public the seemingly exorbitant rates being charged by AES for the Ebute output. 6. (SBU) NEPA also has ideas about who should pay. According to Tom Simpson, an AMCIT energy consultant resident in Abuja, NEPA complains that federal government entities regularly fail to pay their electric bills. In NEPA's view, says Simpson, the federal government is thus largely to blame for NEPA's inability to pay on the AES PPA. (Simpson works for Nexant, a London based energy sector consulting firm that has just completed a USAID- sponsored, pre-privatization assessment for NEPA. Extensive media reporting during the last year likewise aired NEPA's grievances over non-payment by federal government entities.) 7. (SBU) AES officials told CDA in September (in London) that they believed the Lagos State Government had likewise fallen behind on making payments to NEPA and that this was contributing to NEPA's woes. 8. (SBU) Whether AES is charging exorbitant rates, as Minister of Finance Okonjo-Iweala claimed, is a matter of opinion. The barge option was significantly more expensive (per KWH) than the conventional power plant option but was chosen as a means to more quickly supplement existing power supplies and alleviate critical power shortages in Lagos. Moreover, AES negotiated a take or pay arrangement, which means it gets paid for everything it produces, regardless of whether the power is used. Okonjo- Iweala complained also about this. 9. (SBU) That said, the tariff under the PPA is 2.7 cents per KWH, less than a third of the tariff that NEPA is charging its customers and about a quarter of what various experts have estimated it costs NEPA to generate power. Ramifications for privatization and investment --------------------------------------------- - 10. (SBU) The USG interest is twofold. Firstly, OPIC could be required, in the event of non-payment of an arbitration award, to pony up as much as 200 million dollars. Although this is still a long ways down the road, it is not a pleasant prospect. 11. (SBU) Secondly, non-payment by NEPA and/or the Lagos State Government and the GON could have severely adverse repercussions for investment and privatization in Nigeria. If OPIC gets burned, other insurers (some of whom may be more risk averse than OPIC) will be less willing to back projects in Nigeria. And without political risk insurance, few if any companies are likely to invest in Nigeria's planned privatizations. AES's interests versus USG interests ------------------------------------ 12. (SBU) AES is playing this close, and was not entirely comfortable meeting with us October 7 (they ran into us unexpectedly at the Ministry of Power and Steel). They had not, as of October 17 (ten days later), informed OPIC of the force majeure letter, which letter is quite arguably a material event about which the contract would require notification. 13. (SBU) Econoff spoke October 17 with AES Ebute plant manager Mark Miller (an AMCIT), who said that AES has acquired from NEPA assurances that partial payments on arrears would resume sometime toward the end of October or in November. Miller characterized this as "movement in the right direction." He added that AES had officially notified NEPA that it considered the force majeure claim to be without legal basis. He said that AES did not at present require USG assistance but agreed to keep us apprised. 14. (SBU) It is quite possible that AES views publicity of NEPA's payment difficulties as adverse to their own interests. If so, this could well weaken AES's hand in any discussions with NEPA. Miller mentioned to Econoff that AES is interested in moving forward on other financing deals and that it is therefore in AES's interest to quickly reach an acceptable arrangement with NEPA. The reference to other deals tracks in general tenor with comments AES officials made to CDA in London in September. Comment: Clarify legal issues and relative interests first --------------------------------------------- ------------- 15. (SBU) We recommend that Department (E, AF and possibly L) sit down with OPIC to discuss the legal ramifications of any action on our part. From there, we can proceed in a manner that best protects the USG interests described above. Post will report any significant developments on this end. MEECE
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