US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI4612

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 004612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
DOD FOR OSD/NESA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE OFFICIAL ADVISES USG TO ALLOW IRAQ GOVERNING 
COUNCIL TO EXERCISE MORE AUTHORITY 
 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: MFA Assistant Undersecretary for Political 
Affairs Abdullah Rashid Al-Noaimi stressed to Charge that it was 
in the best interests of the USG if the Iraq Governing Council 
(IGC) was allowed to assume more authority.  He expressed his 
concern that the Iraq Governing Council (IGC) was being viewed 
as a puppet regime, and that its inability to make decisions 
undercut its legitimacy with the Iraqi people.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On October 14, Charge and econchief met with MFA 
Assistant Undersecretary for Political Affairs Abdullah Rashid 
Al-Noaimi.  During the course of the meeting, Al-Noaimi said 
that he wanted to convey UAEG concern on the need for the Iraqis 
to assume more authority.  He said that he thought that the USG 
and the UAEG agreed on the principle that the Iraqis needed to 
be encouraged to lead themselves, but added this did not appear 
to be the case in fact.  He saw a contradiction between our 
desire to have the Iraqis "in charge" and the widespread 
perception that we were not giving them any authority. 
 
3. (C) Al-Noaimi noted that the longer it took the IGC to be 
seen as playing the leading role in governing Iraq, the harder 
it became for the coalition and for the IGC itself.  He said 
that the UAE did not want to see an internal conflict in Iraq or 
worse, a military conflict, and urged that the USG give the IGC 
more visible authority.  The bottom line was that the Iraqis 
needed to be seen to be in charge. 
 
4. (C) The Charge asked whether Al-Noaimi had specific examples 
to illustrate his concern.  Al-Noaimi answered that Ambassador 
Bremer's statement that it was up to him and not the IGC to 
determine whether Turkish troops would deploy was not helpful. 
He added that he didn't think that countries in the region 
(specifically listing the GCC, Jordan, Syria, and Iran) would 
welcome Turkish troop deployments.   A Turkish troop deployment 
would exacerbate the internal Iraqi situation and Iraqi - 
Turkish relations.  He stated that while the GCC had not 
formally discussed the matter of Turkish troop deployments, GCC 
member states have been expressing concerns about the matter. 
 
5. (C) In general, Al Noaimi expressed his concern that the IGC 
was not being seen as in charge, which helped reinforce the 
public's perception that it was a puppet organization.  He 
admitted that this might be, in part, a problem of public 
perception.  In other words, the Iraqis were exercising 
authority, but not communicating this well.  For example, he 
noted that he had not seen much press reporting about Iraqi 
Governing Council deliberations and decisions.  He speculated, 
however, that the Iraqis might not believe that they were 
allowed to exercise authority and were thus not taking the 
initiative. 
 
6. (C) He stressed that the Iraqi people needed to feel that 
they were having some say over their lives.  The security 
situation combined with the (perceived or actual) inability of 
the government to exercise authority undercut Iraqi support for 
the government and denied it legitimacy.  The danger was that 
such a situation would encourage troublemakers such as Maqtada 
Sadr to attempt to fill the void.  He stated that it was in the 
USG's interest to have the Iraqis exercise some authority in 
order to increase their legitimacy.  He also said that he was 
concerned that the current situation attracted opponents of the 
U.S. (including possibly UAE nationals) to Iraq to fight U.S. 
troops.  He said "we don't want to be in the situation where 
some of our citizens are fighting your citizens in Iraq" and 
added it would be far better if the Iraqis handle more of their 
own security. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  The UAEG views a secure and stabile Iraq (one 
that can counterbalance Iran) as a national security priority. 
To that end, they have striven to support the IGC politically 
and poured $80 to $100 million into humanitarian relief and 
support for coalition deployments.  At the same time, however, 
they want to see the U.S. do more to enhance the IGC's 
credibility.  In recent meetings with Assistant Secretary Burns, 
de facto Foreign Minister Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and Chief 
of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces Mohamed bin Zayed raised 
similar concerns about the lack of IGC credibility.  End 
Comment. 
 
ALBRIGHT