US embassy cable - 03ZAGREB2217

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 002217 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
EUR/SCE FOR KABUMOTO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, HR, Political Parties/Elections 
SUBJECT: POLITICAL PARTIES IN CROATIA - ELECTION PRIMER, 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
REF: ZAGREB 2132 
 
Classified By: Poloff A.F.Godfrey for reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C) Croatia's transition from socialism through war and 
finally towards integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions has 
led to a proliferation of political parties.  Fully sixteen 
parties are now represented in Croatia's parliament and still 
others hope to win seats in the next Sabor.  Some of these 
parties were created when larger parties split; others are 
regional parties in semi-permanent coalition with 
national-level parties. 
 
2.  (C) As the November 23 date for parliamentary elections 
draws near, all of these parties are either recasting 
themselves to appeal to as many voters as possible or are 
trying to align themselves with likely coalition partners to 
ensure they break the five-percent vote threshold to qualify 
for seats in the next parliament and thereby ensure their 
political survival.  This cable is intended to serve as a 
reference.  Taken together with a primer on political 
personalities (ref) and an upcoming guide to Croatia's 
electoral rules, we hope it will be useful for those 
following Croatia's political race. 
 
========================= 
Parties Now in Opposition 
========================= 
 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 
------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The HDZ of today bears little resemblance to the 
corrupt, nationalist machine of founder Franjo Tudjman, but 
is a long, long way from becoming "Croatia's Republican 
Party" as party president Ivo Sanader tries to portray it. 
Although he won the presidency of the HDZ in 2000, Sanader 
waited until 2002 to begin a ruthless purge of his rivals in 
the party.  Sanader portrays the purge as "democratization," 
but the main standard used to decide who stayed or went in 
the HDZ was personal loyalty.  The HDZ damaged whatever 
pro-Europe credibility it had when it did not vote to ratify 
Croatia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with 
the EU in 2001.  Moreover, few observers believe that an HDZ 
government would readily cooperate with ICTY requests to 
surrender "Croatia's heroes" like PIFWC Ante Gotovina or 
support the calls of the international community on refugee 
return.  Sanader and a handful of other modern-looking 
politicians represent a thin veneer of respectability 
covering up the same old crowd of crony nationalists (absent 
a few of the most rotten apples).  Sanader is desperate to 
lead the HDZ back to government and would consider a deal 
with practically any party to get there. 
 
4.  (C) The HDZ has a rock-solid electorate, mainly rural, 
and relatively uneducated.  Consistently the highest-polling 
party, the HDZ also leads the "party I'd never vote for" 
category, and IRI pollsters opine that the HDZ has topped out 
at 30 percent.  More loyal even than Cubs fans, HDZ voters 
would turn out rain or shine; an election with low turnout 
would help the HDZ. 
 
Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Under the imperious Drazen Budisa's leadership, the 
HSLS went from being the second most important party in 
Croatia to the brink of political irrelevance in less than 
three years.  The HSLS is now fighting its way back again, 
but only as a member of the opposition.  Budisa's 
egotistical, absolutist leadership brought about two 
destructive splits in the party; first Croatia's Liberal 
Party (LS) broke away and more recently a group of centrist 
MP's broke away to form the "Libra" party and keep a Budisa 
hissy fit from bringing down the Racan government.  Now, the 
HSLS' main policy platform seems to be "get Racan" and Budisa 
seems ready to make any deal to avenge himself on the SDP. 
Without the balance of the eight MP's who left to form Libra, 
the HSLS has become more reactionary than the HDZ and would 
oppose any cooperation with ICTY which would impugn the 
"dignity of the homeland war." 
 
6.  (C) The HSLS formed a pre-election coalition with the 
Democratic Center, a group which broke away from the HDZ in 
2000.  Although observers are shocked by this "unnatural" 
alliance (Budisa was persecuted by the Tudjman government), 
polls suggest this was a canny political move.  While the 
HSLS and DC were separately polling at three and two percent 
respectively, together they poll more than nine percent, much 
greater than the sum of their parts. 
 
Democratic Center (DC) 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Mate Granic, who was Tudjman's Foreign Minister for 
most of that regime, broke away from the HDZ to form DC with 
two other less-nationalist MP's after the elections of 2000. 
Granic expected the HDZ to self-destruct after being thrown 
from office and wanted to give conservative, but not 
nationalist, HDZ members an option.  But when the HDZ held 
together, the DC never got off the ground.  Through tireless 
work, Granic has built a party infrastructure in most parts 
of Croatia, using his personal name recognition to keep DC's 
label in the public eye.  Until recently, DC's polling 
numbers were disastrous (why vote for "HDZ-lite" when you can 
vote for the real thing?), but a coalition with Drazen 
Budisa's HSLS has made it likely that DC will break the five 
percent threshold and win seats in the next Sabor. 
 
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) 
------------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) Long the bastion of Croatia's extreme right-wing 
nationalists, the HSP may have damaged its faithful following 
by finally repudiating (in September 2003) Croatia's WWII 
fascist government.  Until then, the "Ustashe" symbols and 
black-shirted thugs were welcome at HSP rallies.  For most of 
the past three years, the HSP supported Sanader's assertions 
of party reform by making the HDZ look reasonable by 
comparison.  With recent polls showing that the HSP might be 
needed to bring a right-wing government to power after 
elections, the HSP leader Anto Djapic is hastily getting rid 
of some of the nationalist trappings which would be most 
objectionable to the international community.  Ironically, 
HSP MP Tonci Tadic is broadly considered to be the Croatian 
parliament's hardest-working and usually best-prepared MP. 
 
Croatian Bloc (HB) 
------------------ 
 
9. (C) When Ivic Pasalic, Tudjman's former hatchet man, was 
ejected from the HDZ after losing a close, bruising battle 
for the party presidency to Ivo Sanader, he formed the 
"Croatian Bloc" party to give his still-faithful followers a 
new political home.  The experiment is failing despite 
Pasalic's eager infusions of cash, purportedly from secret 
offshore accounts.  HB supporters are returning to the HDZ 
brand name, and Pasalic may not garner enough votes at the 
next election to win himself a seat in the Sabor.  HB has 
staked out the ideological ground to the right of Sanader's 
HDZ (opposing any cooperation with ICTY, urging slower 
rapprochement with Serbia and Montenegro), but to the left of 
HSP.  HB signed a pre-election coalition with Croatian True 
Revival (HIP). 
 
Croatian True Revival (HIP) 
--------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Dissatisfied with Sanader's leadership of his 
father's party, Miroslav Tudjman founded HiP as a political 
home for all those disappointed with the HDZ's 2000 loss. 
HiP did well in 2001 local elections, but soon fizzled, since 
it had little infrastructure and only Tudjman's name to trade 
on.  HiP's role in its coalition with HB will be to provide 
Croatia's dimmest voters with another Tudjman to vote for. 
 
Right-Wing Fringe Parties 
------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) The extreme right-wing is littered with small 
parties trying to stake a claim to Croatia's most nationalist 
voters.  Although some of these parties, like the Croatian 
Pure Party of Rights (HChSP) and the Croatian Christian 
Democratic Union (HKDU), will continue to win seats at the 
local level, it is very unlikely that any of them will again 
break the five-percent threshold to win seats in parliament. 
 
========================= 
Parties Now in Government 
========================= 
 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
----------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Croatia's SDP has not gained strength from its three 
years as leader of the ruling coalition in government. 
Although it has shed the ideology of its origins in Croatia's 
Party of Communists, the SDP retains some of its worst 
organizational aspects and still struggles to identify its 
own post-socialist political identity.  In pursuing the 
government's reform agenda, the SDP has alienated some of its 
natural constituencies, particularly organized labor.  As the 
election approaches, many Croatian voters identify the 
successes of the coalition government with the SDP's 
 
 
coalition partners.  The government's failures, however, seem 
to have stuck with the SDP, which catches the blame for 
foreign policy gaffes, reductions in the social safety net 
and (according to a recent poll) for being the cause of 
squabbles between coalition partners. 
 
13.  (C) While Croatia's other leading parties have updated 
and streamlined their leadership structure in advance of the 
election, the SDP has not.  PM Ivica Racan maintains a firm 
hold on the party presidency, and together with a few party 
leaders like Defense Minister Zeljka Antunovic, Foreign 
Minister Tonino Picula and Labor Minister Davorko Vidovic, 
tries to present a modern, left-of-center image of a "normal" 
European Social Democratic party.  But Racan did not take 
advantage of the SDP's time in government to bring new blood 
into the top ranks of the leadership and to retire some of 
the figures who look like throwbacks to SDP's communist 
roots. 
 
14.  (C) Other parties have cranked up their public-relations 
machines, but the SDP has yet to get going.  Earlier polls 
suggested that the existing coalition had a comfortable 
margin; SDP focused its efforts on how to divide up 
ministerial portfolios rather than on the campaign.  New 
polls show this was folly; the SDP's inaction has given the 
opposition a running start.  It may not be too late, however, 
since polls suggest that the biggest block of undecided 
voters are overwhelmingly young and female.  This is where 
the SDP needs to focus if it wants to gain ground in the 
sprint to elections. 
 
15.  (C) The SDP has signed a pre-election coalition 
agreement with the Istrian Democratic Union (IDS).  This 
tactical alliance will probably help the two parties corner 
most of the votes in Istria, Croatia's most highly-developed 
region, but has put the noses of some SDP faithful out of 
joint. 
 
Croatian People's Party (HNS) 
----------------------------- 
 
16.  (C) With its urban, professional appeal, the HNS has 
grown significantly since elections in 2000.  Despite its 
small representation in the parliament (only two seats), the 
HNS probably benefited most from being in government.  Public 
Works Minister Radimir Cacic (HNS) gets most of the credit 
for a popular highway project and while President Mesic by 
law had to resign from the HNS when he took office, HNS 
strategists never let the public forget where the popular 
president's political roots are.  HNS is left-of-center and 
appeals most to younger, educated voters, which puts it in 
competition for the same electorate with which SDP seeks to 
improve its standing.  Conflicts with the SDP, especially in 
the Zagreb city council, have spoiled an otherwise productive 
relationship.  HNS has signed pre-election coalition 
agreements with two much smaller regional parties, one near 
Rijeka, the other in the eastern part of Croatia.  These 
agreements will help both the regional parties and HNS win 
seats in contested districts.  Some say that HNS has not done 
enough to build a party infrastructure outside of Zagreb. 
 
Croatian Peasants' Party (HSS) 
------------------------------ 
 
17.  (C) As Croatia's third-largest party, the HSS has grown 
used to the gravy that being "kingmaker" in the coalition 
brings.  Its core constituency is (naturally) rural, older, 
and churchgoing.  Party President (and parliament speaker) 
Zlatko Tomcic rules the party with an iron hand in all 
respects, from policy choices to personnel.  While the HSS 
has in general been a loyal coalition partner, it has 
prevented the GoC from moving forward in some aspects of 
privatization.  Although it is a strong supporter of the 
GoC's bid for EU membership, it has taken a back seat on 
foreign policy choices.  The HSS presents itself as a 
right-of-center party, and has a party platform similar to 
that of Christian Democrats elsewhere in Europe.  But HSS 
critics say that the HSS has no ideology; it is only in 
government for what it can get out of it for itself and its 
constituents. 
 
18.  (C) The HSS reorganized itself into regional subunits 
well in advance of elections and has been running a modern, 
American-style campaign at the grass roots.  The HSS declared 
months ago that it will not form any pre-election coalitions. 
 While HSS party leaders tell us privately that they would 
not plan on entering a coalition with the HDZ, most believe 
the HSS would go with whichever side offered them the best 
deal. 
 
Libra 
----- 
 
 
19.  (C) Libra broke away from the HSLS in June 2002 when a 
group of eight MPs chose to stay with the Racan government 
rather than force early elections.  With no time to develop 
an effective national-level infrastructure and no soldiers to 
serve the eight "generals" who lead the party, Libra will not 
make it into the next Sabor unless PM Racan chooses to reward 
its loyalty by including a few Libra leaders on SDP's list of 
candidates.  Libra's centrist, academic approach is effective 
in parliament, but useless in an election campaign. 
 
 
Regional Parties 
---------------- 
 
20.  (C) Istrian Democratic Union (IDS).  The IDS has run 
Croatia's western, most developed county since independence, 
despite Tudjman's attempts to displace it with the HDZ.  The 
IDS still polls higher than any other party in Istria, but 
party leadership has been tainted by scandal.  The IDS 
generally supports progressive policies at the national 
level, and has championed minority rights in the parliament 
(Istria has a significant Italian minority).  The IDS has 
signed a pre-election coalition agreement (valid only for 
Istria) with the SDP. 
 
21.  (C) Primorsko Goranski Union(PGS). A micro-party in 
Rijeka, Croatia's third-largest city, the PGS' alliance with 
the HNS will likely mean at least one seat in the parliament. 
 PGS has supported the Racan government's progressive 
policies, although not formally a member of the coalition. 
 
22.  (C) Croatian Slavonia - Baranya Party (SBSH).  Another 
micro-party, this time from the agricultural heartland of 
eastern Croatia.  This party, although generally more 
conservative than PGS, has formed a pre-election alliance 
with the HNS in one electoral district. 
MOON 
 
 
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