US embassy cable - 03ROME4684

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 004684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ET, IT, AVIATION 
SUBJECT: ITALIAN REQUEST FOR USAF ASSISTANCE TO TRANSPORT 
AXUM OBELISK 
 
REF: ROME 03576 
 
Classified By: POL M/C T. Countryman; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary and Action Request: EmbOffs met with MFA 
Africa Director General Cabras to follow-up on the GOI's 
request for the use of USAF C-5 aircraft to fly three large 
pieces of the Axum obelisk from either Rome or Naples to Axum 
(reftel). POL M/C described the procedural steps required and 
presented an estimate of costs to be covered by the GOI. 
Cabras thanked the USG for its response, confirmed the GOI's 
commitment to returning the obelisk, discussed other 
transportation options and requested a follow-up technical 
meeting to go over details. Request Department's advice on 
status of GOI request for assistance, particularly whether or 
not Department intends to inform DOD/OSP that it is in U.S. 
national interest. End Summary and Action Request. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
2. (C) POL M/C, DAO representative and PolOff met with MFA 
Director General for Sub-Saharan Africa, Bruno Cabras, to 
discuss the GOI's request for US Air Force assistance in 
transporting the Axum Obelisk back to Ethiopia. In 1937, the 
Axum Obelisk was cut into three pieces by Mussolini's forces, 
brought to Rome and erected in front of the Ministry of 
Italian Africa (now the Food and Agriculture Organization). 
The obelisk still stands today somewhat worse for wear from 
pollution and a recent lightning strike. In 1997 the GOI 
formally committed to returning the obelisk and is now 
actively planning its final return. The GOI plans to divide 
the obelisk into three large parts that can then be airlifted 
to Axum. The dismantlement operation began October 10, 
according to the press. Due to the large size and weight of 
the pieces, the GOI is requesting USG assistance. 
 
PROCEDURES AND COSTS 
 
3. (C) During the meeting POL M/C explained that in order for 
USG aircraft to be used, the Department of State had to 
certify that the project was of national interest to the USG. 
Once a formal request is made by State to DOD/OSP, the final 
procedural steps lie with DOD officials. Furthermore, if the 
project is accepted, the timing, final costs and technical 
aspects come under DOD authority. 
 
4. (C) POL M/C presented the DOD's estimated figure of USD 
3.5 million based on the size and weight specifications 
provided by the GOI. This figure is based on the need for 
four C-5 missions from Naples to Axum and includes Axum 
airport feasibility studies. POL M/C emphasized that this was 
an unofficial minimum estimate of costs. 
 
5. (C) Cabras understood the procedural steps required and 
did not balk at the estimated cost. He did however, explain 
that he was expecting three rather than four missions. He was 
certain that the GOI Office of Antiquities would not permit 
the obelisk to be divided into four parts. 
 
6. (C) DAO Representative expressed the requirement to divide 
the obelisk into four rather than three pieces due to the 
estimated weight (86 tons) of the largest piece. Cabras 
stated that the GOI needed to make a more precise estimate of 
the weight of the three pieces. The partition of the obelisk 
is one of the technical issues that must be clarified in 
order to finalize transportation and cost details. 
 
OTHER OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 
 
7. (C) In addition to focusing on three rather than four 
missions, Cabras also explored the possibility of using a mix 
of AN-124s and C-5s. He felt that by using the C-5 for only 
the largest pieces and the AN-124 for other pieces, the GOI 
might be able to accomplish the mission at a lower cost. 
 
8. (C) POL M/C and DAO representative inquired about other 
options - specifically sea-land routes - entering through the 
ports of Massawa or Djibouti. Cabras stated that these 
options were not feasible due to political and infrastructure 
obstacles. Regarding Massawa, the Ethiopian and Eritrean 
governments remain at odds over their border deliberations 
and it would be politically risky to give Asmara the chance 
to interfere with the shipment. In addition, the road from 
Massawa to Axum is in bad condition. Although there are no 
 
 
political obstacles with Djibouti, the same holds for the 
trajectory from Djibouti to Axum. Cabras reiterated that the 
only option that GOI experts had yet identified as feasible 
would be an airlift directly to Axum. 
 
REQUESTS AND COMMITMENTS 
 
9. (C) Cabras requested a follow-up meeting between DOD 
representatives and GOI engineers in October in order to 
clarify and define the project and expressed his hope that 
the USG would accept the project. POL M/C and DAO 
representative committed to presenting a formal request to 
the Department and to holding a follow-up meeting in the 
coming weeks. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2003ROME04684 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL