US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT4681

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 004681 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARN, NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL, SY, IS, TU, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) SYRIA:  GOK TO HOST BASHAR AFTER RAMADHAN 
 
 
Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The GOK is concerned that Bashar al-Asad 
lacks the power to remove his late father's old guard and 
adapt to the new regional reality.  It expects him to visit 
after Ramadhan, and would be happy to pass on any messages. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) NEA PDAS Larocco called on Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid 
al-Hamad al-Sabah, Chairman of Kuwait's National Security 
Bureau, October 13, during a brief visit to Kuwait.  This 
message reports what Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid (protect 
throughout) had to say about Syria (other topics septels). 
 
3.  (C) According to Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid, the GOK was 
livid at Syria's behavior in the lead-up to the aborted UNSCR 
on Iraq last spring.  After the collapse of the Saddam regime 
in April, (then de-facto) Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah 
al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah went to Damascus and met with 
President Bashar al-Asad.  With Syrian FM Farouq al-Shara 
present, Sabah al-Ahmed pointed at Shara and said "he is the 
architect of all your mistakes.  Now it is in Syria's own 
hands to determine its future.  Act swiftly before the window 
closes."  Sabah al-Ahmed added that he had stood with 
Bashar's father as an ardent pan-Arabist, but those days were 
now gone, never to return.  There was a new reality in the 
region, and Syria needed to recognize that, for its own 
interests.  Bashar replied that Syria had made great mistakes 
before the invasion of Iraq, but was now under new pressures, 
with US troops on the border, conflict with Israel still 
plaguing it, and Turkey causing problems.  He felt hemmed in. 
 Sabah al-Ahmed agreed, but advised him not to look to others 
for solutions; Bashar could solve his problems by his own 
actions.  The Kuwaiti came away unconvinced that Bashar had 
understood. 
 
4.  (C) On the eve of (now de-jure) Prime Minister Sabah 
al-Ahmed's September trip to Washington, Shara had come to 
Kuwait for a couple of hours.  He had whined on and on about 
Syria's problems, saying the US misunderstood:  the Syrians 
were cooperating, but the US was asking too much.  The PM 
retorted that Shara did not understand reality:  he (Shara) 
was the problem, and had no hope of a solution.  He needed to 
change his approach completely, because time was running out. 
 
5.  (C) Sabah al-Khalid remarked to PDAS Larocco that the 
Kuwaiti leadership had held great hope that Bashar's Cabinet 
reshuffle last month would get rid of Shara.  The fact that 
he remained in the Cabinet indicated to the Kuwaitis that 
Bashar was too weak to make the needed changes.  He needed to 
remove the old guard, but apparently could not.  The Kuwaitis 
were very concerned about Syria's future actions.  Right 
after the Israeli air strike in Syria last week, the GOK had 
sent Bashar a message:  be careful, do nothing rash.  The 
Kuwaitis intended to remain engaged with Damascus, out of 
necessity.  It was a sad commentary that Shara had felt the 
need to come to a small, weak country like Kuwait the way he 
had:  that showed how weak the Syrian leadership had become. 
Bashar had accepted Kuwait's invitation to make a full 
two-day visit after Ramadhan.  The GOK would be happy to pass 
on any messages. 
 
6.  (U) Ambassador Larocco was the source of this message, 
but did not have time to clear the cable itself. 
 
7.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
JONES