US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1979

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS UNSUCCESSFUL IN TWO ATTACKS ON 
ARMED POLICE 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  On October 10 and 12, Maoists launched the 
two largest attacks on Nepalese security forces since before 
the January 2003 ceasefire.  In both incidents, between 300 
and 500 Maoists attacked Armed Police Force (APF) camps in 
the southern lowlands (Terai) of the mid-western region.  The 
armed police, with some Royal Nepal Army (RNA) support, 
managed successfully to repel both attacks with only limited 
casualties.  The clashes resulted in the confirmed deaths of 
between 62 - 78 Maoists and 17 APF personnel.  Over 45 
weapons were recovered from the Maoists while security forces 
lost 11 Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs) and three .303 rifles. 
According to Chief of Army Staff Thapa, the success of the 
security forces' defense was due in large part to 
intelligence received from local villagers and support from 
RNA helicopters.  The willingness of locals to provide the 
government with information, coupled with fewer numbers of 
Maoist attackers than prior to the ceasefire, could indicate 
a loss of popular support for the insurgency.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) At approximately 2100 hours on October 10, roughly 450 
Maoists attacked an Armed Police Force (APF) base staffed 
with roughly 150 security personnel near the main East-West 
highway in Banke District in the western Terai of Nepal.  The 
media reported that the Maoists first attacked with 2-inch 
mortars from 24 locations around the camp's perimeter and 
then attempted unsuccessfully to overrun the camp.  Press 
reports also indicate that 53 Maoists were killed (although 
only 37 bodies were recovered) while three APF personnel died 
and five others were wounded during the eight-hour-long gun 
battle.  The APF recovered 10 Indian-made SLR rifles, 2 
sub-machine guns, 16 .303 rifles, 6 shot-guns and three 
12-bore guns from the insurgents.  Eyewitnesses reported that 
the Maoists fled after Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and APF 
reinforcements arrived from nearby Nepalgunj and 
Shamshergunj.  According to local villagers, two to three 
days before the attack, the Maoists had ordered each 
household to send one person along with weapons to join the 
insurgents, but many refused to cooperate. 
 
3. (U) Media sources suggest that the Maoists chose to attack 
the camp in Banke District because the camp had been 
established in June in order to prevent the Maoists from 
importing weapons from India.  This attack was the second 
Maoist attack on the Banke APF camp; the first was on 
September 5. 
 
4. (U) At approximately 2215 hours on October 12, at least 
300 Maoists in Bhalubang Bazaar in neighboring Dang District 
launched an assault on a second APF camp.  Police sources 
indicate that roughly 25 insurgents were killed while 14 APF 
personnel died and 11 were wounded during the seven-hour-long 
clash.  Twelve of the 14 armed policemen killed were ambushed 
while returning from a patrol in the surrounding area; the 
two other APF personnel were killed at a road block outside 
the camp.  The Maoists reportedly struck the training camp 
four times with 81mm rocket launchers that had been looted 
from an RNA camp two years ago.  The insurgents also snapped 
three layers of barbed wire that lay around the camp's 
perimeter in an attempt to penetrate the camp. 
 
5. (C) In response to the attack, the RNA sent two 
helicopters:  one with night vision capability and one 
without.  However, according to COAS Thapa, the full moon and 
clear skies enabled the helicopters to operate successfully 
and helped the APF to repel the insurgents.  The moonlight 
enabled the helicopters to drop mortar rounds through 
jerry-rigged PCV pipe sections onto the Maoist positions. 
The retreating Maoists reportedly seized three passenger 
buses on the main East-West highway, using them to extract 
their dead and injured from the area.  Security forces 
recovered four .303 rifles and one shotgun while security 
personnel lost 10 SLRs to the Maoists. 
 
6. (C) The Chief of Army Staff, General Pyar Jung Thapa, 
publicly praised the Armed Police Force for successfully 
repelling the Maoist attacks.  Thapa also reported to the 
Ambassador that the success of the security forces was due, 
in part, to intelligence received from local citizens prior 
to the attack. 
 
7. (C) Comment.  Following a relative lull in Maoist activity 
during the Dasain holiday, these attacks represent the most 
massive Maoist assaults since before the January 2003 
ceasefire.  The fact that the insurgents used scarce 
munitions suggests that the attacks were intended to be major 
operations.  However, the numbers of Maoists attackers were 
far lower than similar attacks in 2002.  Both the Banke and 
Dang District attacks involved significant planning, most 
likely at the national level.  The Maoists reportedly had 
maps of both camps and managed to block large sections of the 
East-West highway prior to the attacks despite local curfews. 
 What the Maoists perhaps were not counting on was that local 
villagers would provide security forces with valuable 
intelligence on the insurgents' movements in and around the 
area.  The ability of the security forces to capitalize on 
local intelligence gathering is a new trend and, coupled with 
the reduced number of Maoist attackers, might indicate a 
decline in grassroots support for the Maoist insurgency. 
Also, as COAS Thapa raised with the Ambassador, is the 
question of why the Maoists chose clear moonlit nights for 
these assaults in rapid succession when aerial operations 
would have an advantage.  One explanation is that the Maoist 
leadership is impatient for a victory to boost insurgent 
morale and replenish supplies of arms and ammunition.  End 
Comment. 
MALINOWSKI