US embassy cable - 03ABUJA1761

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001761 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2013 
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PTER, EPET, PHUM, NI 
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF RENEWED FIGHTING IN WARRI 
 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1656 
     B. ABUJA 1684 
     C. ABUJA 1325 
     D. LAGOS 1535 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CDA RICK ROBERTS FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d). 
 
 
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Indications from various sources in the 
Warri area suggest strongly that the relative peace seen in 
the region for the past seven weeks is about to break. 
Reports of a recent Ijaw attack on a boat of unarmed Itsekiri 
villagers attempting to return to villages destroyed by Ijaw 
militants in March, and the high prospects of Itsekiri 
retaliation, may hasten Nigerian military plans to send 
troops on operations far into the creeks.  This could include 
a planned Joint Task Force attack on the key Ijaw militant 
base of Okerenkoko.  Should that happen, there could be 
numerous casualties among both combatants and non-combatants. 
 END SUMMARY 
 
 
NEW PHASE OF MILITARY OPERATION 
------------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C/NF) "Operation Restore Hope" carried out by a Joint 
Task Force under the command of General Zamani was launched 
in early August with the ambitious tasks of: 1) disarming 
militants in the swamps around Warri; 2) curbing the 
bunkering of oil in the area; 3) protecting oil production 
installations; and 4) restoring law and order to Warri town. 
So far it appears to have been effective only in maintaining 
a fragile peace in Warri town.  The riverine areas of Warri's 
Southwest, South and North local government areas (LGAs) 
remain closed -- lawless and not patrolled by Joint Task 
Force personnel.  This was confirmed to CRO and Lagos Poloff 
and Econoff by oil company and NGO sources during an October 
7-8 visit to Warri town, and the Chevron terminal at Escravos 
in Warri Southwest. 
 
 
3. (C/NF) Chevron security and management officials at 
Escravos and Shell security manager in Warri town indicated 
the Joint Task Force sent in to implement Operation Restore 
Hope has shown underwhelming operational prowess.   Both 
companies believe that forces sent to the area were deployed 
with almost no logistical support and, consequently, have 
done little more than deploy a few hundred men at the four or 
five reopened Shell flow stations, and these deployments have 
been funded largely by Shell. 
 
 
4. (S/NF) During their visit to Warri, CRO and accompanying 
officers met with Shell's Security Manager for Shell's 
Western Division Tony Obuaya.  Obuaya claimed that the 
military's plans for Operation Restore Hope included the 
establishment of a permanent military base in the swampy area 
of Warri, from which patrols could be launched.   Despite the 
current limited scope of the military's deployment thus far, 
he suggested this plan might be implemented soon.  The area 
of Jones Creek (site of a key Shell flow station) has been 
selected for the base, and within that area, the town of 
Okerenkoko on the Escravos River has been identified as the 
key point, Obuaya claimed. 
 
 
5. (S/NF) Once an Itsekiri village, Okerenkoko lies between 
Escravos and Warri near major water arteries leading 
throughout the troubled region.  It is now the base for the 
Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), the Ijaw 
militants who stage attacks throughout the Warri creeks from 
this town.  The Joint Task Force may be planning a major 
offensive to search Okerenkoko for weapons and then establish 
a Nigerian army base there, according to Obuaya. This would 
provide the military an excellent reach into the swamps, he 
noted.  It could also be a vicious fight, he conceded. 
 
 
6. (S/NF) Obuaya admitted that Shell assumed some liability 
for human rights incidents when it enlisted the military's 
aid to restart oil production and funded many of the 
military's deployment costs.  "We want to keep civilian 
casualties to a minimum," he declared, and claimed the U.S. 
experience in Iraq proved that confronting well-armed 
insurgents in difficult terrain often leads to the loss of 
innocent lives.  (Comment:  We do not know whether Obuaya's 
candor would be approved by Shell's front office, but his 
continuing use of "we," his military planning details, and 
other observations by our reporting officers made a 
convincing case that this Shell/Nigeria Security Manager 
based in Warri is coordinating oil and military deployments 
closely with the senior officers of the Joint Task Force. 
End Comment) 
 
 
IJAW MILITANTS PROVOKED BY SHELL RETURN TO PRODUCTION 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
7. (C/NF) Mission officers October 7 met separately with 
leaders of the two main Ijaw militant groups in the Warri 
area:  the Gbaramatu clan's Federated Niger Delta Ijaw 
Communities (FNDIC), and the Egbema clan's Egbema United 
Front (EUF).  Both groups expressed irritation with Shell's 
efforts to resume production in the Warri swamps using 
military protection, and threatened to disrupt Shell's 
operations if their grievances (read extortion demands) were 
not addressed.  Israel Tiemo, the Vice President of the EUF, 
was quite clear.  He noted that the EUF controls the Egbema 
region of Warri North LGA -- home to two Shell flow stations 
not yet reopened -- and declared that the EUF would not 
respect any Shell negotiations with other Ijaw groups (i.e. 
FNDIC) over resumption of production.  Shell must deal 
directly with EUF, Tiemo demanded.  (NOTE: The EUF was 
involved in the mid-July kidnapping of a Nigerian Chevron 
official in Warri, reported in refs C and D, for which Israel 
Tiemo was arrested.  Both the Chevron and Tiemo have since 
been released. END NOTE) 
 
 
RETURN OF ITSEKIRI REFUGEES TRIGGERS NEW VIOLENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
8. (C) Mission officers met in Sapele and Koko October 8 with 
leaders of the Itsekiri communities displaced from their 
villages in the Warri swamps since March 2003.  Although 
appreciative of the disaster relief assistance given by the 
USG and Chevron, the Itsekiri leaders complained that the 
assistance had run out and the situation for most refugees 
has become dire.  Food and clothing are in short supply, and 
some youths in these refugee communities are now turning to 
crime and prostitution in an attempt to sustain themselves 
and their families.  The pressure to return to their 
destroyed villages, despite the severe insecurity in the 
swamps, has become acute. 
 
 
9. (C)  Itsekiri community leaders bemoaned what they claimed 
were the Ijaw militants' regular killing of Itsekiri 
civilians who have gone back to their original villages in 
attempt to restart their homes and lives.  One Itsekiri youth 
bitterly denounced the federal government for its abject 
failure to protect the Itsekiri villagers; "all they care 
about protecting is oil," he said.  Most striking were 
reports from the community leaders that a boat of 80 Itsekiri 
refugees heading for their original communities along the 
Benin River in Warri North local government area was attacked 
on October 7 by several speedboats of Ijaw militants. 
According to the refugee community leaders in Sapele, many of 
the passengers were killed.  Some of the injured made it to 
Chevron's Escravos terminal, where they were treated at 
Chevron's clinic, although two of the villagers died on the 
Chevron dock before they could be treated, the elders 
claimed.  (NOTE: While visiting Chevron's Escravos terminal 
and tank farm October 7, Mission officers were told by 
Chevron security personnel that some Itsekiri villagers -- 
the apparent victims of the waterborne Ijaw attack -- had 
arrived at Escravos asking for and receiving medical 
attention for gunshot wounds. END NOTE). 
 
 
COMMENT 
------ 
 
 
10. (C/NF) Indications from our varied sources on all sides 
suggest fighting is about to escalate in the Warri area. 
Unlike the mid-August round of fighting, which focused 
exclusively on Warri town, this will be deep in the swamp and 
may force the military to deploy into areas beyond its 
comfort level.  Greater fighting could be triggered by any or 
all of three factors:  an upsurge in reciprocal attacks on 
Ijaw and Itsekiri villages by each tribe's militants; attacks 
on Shell facilities by Ijaw militants demanding Shell 
compensation for resuming production in the area; or the 
military's plans to occupy Okerenkoko, egged on by Shell. 
 
 
11. (S/NF) The plan to secure Okerenkoko and the surrounding 
Jones Creek area has Shell's fingerprints on it.  Shell 
attempted to reopen its Jones Creek flow station in August, 
but was forced to retreat in the face of a militant threat. 
Such a new deployment seems more than the Nigerian military 
can sustain on its own, and most likely would depend on 
Shell's funding and involvement.  Chevron, which has still 
not tried to resume its production in the area, seems to have 
distanced itself more from the Joint Task Force's operations 
-- although it continues to provide support GON security 
personnel stationed at its Escarvos terminal.  Septel will 
report on the two companies' divergent policies towards the 
Warri fighting and resumption of production in this oil-rich 
swamp.  End Comment. 
ROBERTS