US embassy cable - 03ROME4637

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 004637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MOPS, MNUC, KN, IR, IT, KICC 
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON DISCUSSES ARTICLE 98, PSI, IRAN AND 
DPRK WITH ITALIAN OFFICIALS 
 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON FOR REASONS 1.5(B)(D 
) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY. U/S Bolton discussed Article 98, PSI, North 
Korea and Iran with senior Italian officials from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the President's office and Prime 
Minister Berlusconi's office during meetings on October 2 in 
Rome. The Italians agreed to review language recently 
negotiated with Colombia on Article 98 scope of coverage that 
might break the impasse between the US and EU, and offered to 
raise both PSI and Iran's nuclear weapons program with 
Russian officials, including President Putin, during November 
meetings in Rome and Moscow. They also agreed to continue to 
use Italy's influence to press Iran to comply with the IAEA 
and sign and implement the Additional Protocol.  On North 
Korea, the Italians see a role for the EU once the key 
parties reach a general understanding.  Italy is willing to 
work constructively with the US during the remainder of its 
EU Presidency to help move North Korea toward the negotiating 
table.  END SUMMARY. 
 
NORTH KOREA 
----------- 
2. (C) U/S Bolton discussed North Korea's weapons program in 
his meetings with MFA Director General Giancarlo Aragona, MFA 
U/S Margherita Boniver, Berlusconi's Diplomatic Advisor 
Giovanni Castellaneta and President Ciampi's Diplomatic 
Advisor Antonio Puri Purini.  Aragona asked U/S Bolton to 
clarify the impact of the recent Presidential Determination 
that allows the release of the last tranche of FY03 funding 
for KEDO, adding that the EU is focused primarily on KEDO 
because of its financial commitment to the program.  Italy 
favors suspending the KEDO program rather than a more lasting 
interruption or termination, according to Aragona. U/S Bolton 
explained that the $3.72 million allotment was limited to 
administrative expenses only and that the proposed FY04 
budget includes no KEDO funding.  The Presidential 
Determination, which in effect allows the program to continue 
for another 12 months, reflected the strong preference 
expressed by South Korea and Japan to suspend (rather than 
terminate) the program in order to avoid disputes with 
contractors, he said. 
 
3. (C) On six-party talks with DPRK, the EU is willing to 
play a role in keeping North Korea at the negotiating table, 
Aragona said, but it would be premature to get more involved 
until the key parties reach a general understanding.  The 
Chinese reportedly told Japanese officials that they don't 
expect more six-party talks in 2003, something they had not 
conveyed during September meetings with President Bush, U/S 
Bolton said.  However, the Chinese are not likely to let the 
next round of talks slip too far, he added.  The IAEA will 
continue to have a big role but the five nuclear states 
should also be involved.  The USG is looking carefully at 
what would meet North Korean concerns other than a statement 
on assurances by the President, and is working with South 
Korea and Japan on a verification regime, he said.  Aragona 
offered the EU's help, should that be of use, during the 
remaining three months of the Italian Presidency. 
 
4. (C) In a later meeting, U/S Boniver agreed that the EU 
role would remain limited until there was some movement by 
North Korea.  She noted that the Chinese take their role as 
facilitators very seriously, in part because of the threat of 
refugee flows from North Korea into China.  One explanation 
for the 150,000 troops North Korea recently moved into the 
border region is to prevent refugees from crossing into 
China, U/S Bolton replied. The USG is focusing on 
interdiction efforts to reduce the flow of hard currency to 
North Korea and reduce the DPRK's ability to further 
strengthen its nuclear weapons program. 
 
PSI 
--- 
5. (C) Aragona noted that Italy opposes naming countries of 
proliferation concern, which he said was likely to be a 
sensitive issue at the October 9/10 meeting in London on the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Apart from 
potential political problems, naming countries would limit 
PSI's impact, he said.  U/S Bolton countered that naming 
countries will bolster PSI, although the same impact may 
result from conducting actual interdictions that will 
demonstrate how PSI will work.  A key point will be how to 
associate other participating governments with the core 11 
now involved in PSI, he said.  Some countries may not 
 
 
understand that they can subscribe to the principles of PSI 
and help with interdictions without formally joining the 
initiative.  U/S Bolton noted that Putin and President Bush 
briefly discussed PSI at Camp David and that Russia is still 
forming a position.  Aragona said he would mention PSI during 
his upcoming trip to Moscow. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
6. (C) The EU position on Iran's nuclear weapons program, and 
nonproliferation in general, has toughened in recent months, 
Aragona said, although there is still concern about upsetting 
the political balance and strengthening hardliners.  He asked 
U/S Bolton for an update on Iran and the IAEA, particularly 
since Italy is now on the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG). 
Iran continues to obfuscate its intentions, U/S Bolton said, 
and the prospect of UNSC involvement has not changed Iran's 
behavior.  The USG wants the matter to be referred to the 
UNSC by the end of 2003 to make it clear that the 
international community takes this seriously; Russia and 
China, however, continue to resist.  Iran's noncompliance 
undermines the IAEA and the NPT, he added.  Aragona said EU 
Ministers had a good discussion on Iran and the tripartite 
initiative at their September 29 meeting in Brussels. He 
agreed that an international response will be necessary if 
Iran fails to respond by the October 31 deadline.  If 
Germany, the UK and France decide to send another letter 
urging Khatami to comply, they should send it soon, he and 
U/S Bolton agreed, so that Iran has to respond well before 
the end of October or the November BOG meeting.  USG 
willingness to take some positive action if Iran signs the 
Additional Protocol would help in the BOG debate, Aragona 
added.  U/S Bolton stressed that the USG standard is the 
Evian Leaders' Statement, which provides that Iran must sign 
and also immediately begin implementing the Additional 
Protocol without conditions. 
 
7. (C) Berlusconi's Diplomatic Advisor Giovanni Castellaneta 
told U/S Bolton in a later meeting that the Prime Minister 
may be able to raise Iran's actions with Putin while he is in 
Rome November 5-6 to sign two Global Partnership agreements. 
He also offered to use Italy's relations with Iran to press 
them to comply.  U/S Bolton noted that Putin and President 
Bush had discussed Iran during their recent Camp David 
meetings.  Putin had repeated that Russia does not want Iran 
to have nuclear weapons, and said Russia would not supply 
fuel until the question of Iran's nuclear weapons program is 
resolved.  It would increase the pressure on Iran 
considerably if Russia would acknowledge publicly Iran's 
efforts to build a nuclear weapons program, he emphasized. 
 
ARTICLE 98 
---------- 
8. (C) Colombia and the USG recently negotiated Article 98 
language that might provide a way around the US-EU impasse on 
scope of coverage, U/S Bolton reported at all of his meetings 
with Italian officials.  He pointed out that 30 of the 68 
countries that have now entered into Article 98 agreements 
with the USG are also party to the Rome Treaty creating the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), a fact that bolsters the 
argument that there can be more than one legal interpretation 
of Article 98.  Aragona agreed to study the Colombia 
agreement's language but said that he has seen no shift in 
the EU position on Article 98's scope of coverage.  Europe 
has a completely different philosophy about the ICC, he 
explained, which has considerable public and parliamentary 
support.  In later meetings, Castellaneta and President 
Ciampi's Diplomatic Advisor Puri Purini also doubted that 
there would be much change in the EU position.  Castellaneta 
added that Italy is open to finding an acceptable solution. 
Puri Purini, who was less familiar with the issue, stressed 
that Italy's efforts to work constructively with the US had 
to remain within the framework of maintaining a consistent EU 
position. 
 
EU, THE IGC AND CIAMPI'S WASHINGTON VISIT 
----------------------------------------- 
9. (C) Puri Purini told U/S Bolton that a major theme of 
President Ciampi's November trip to Washington and New York 
will be European unification and its impact on the 
transatlantic partnership. Strengthening EU institutions and 
integration will make the EU a better partner in solving 
global problems, he said.  The idea that a stronger EU is 
needed to create a new balance of power is obsolete; the 
western world balances on two pillars, he stated.  Puri 
 
 
Purini also raised the EU Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 
(which opened in Rome on October 4).  Noting that "failure is 
not an option", he told U/S Bolton that Italy is working hard 
to have a draft of the Constitutional Treaty approved by the 
end of 2003. 
 
10. (U) U/S Bolton has cleared this message. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2003ROME04637 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL