US embassy cable - 03THEHAGUE2573

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AM, AJ, PARM, NL, RU, OSCE, EUN 
SUBJECT: MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIRS BRIEF CIO DE HOOP SCHEFFER, 
MEET AZERBAIJANI AND ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary E. Daly for reasons 1.5 (b and 
d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: In Paris October 2, the Minsk Group Co-Chairs 
held separate discussions with the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
foreign ministers, urging the two sides to quickly arrange 
meetings between the two presidents and announcing their 
desire to visit the region soon after the Azeri elections. 
FM Oskanian welcomed the Co-Chairs at any time, while 
Azerbaijani FM Guliyev tentatively suggested early November 
depending on the outcome of the elections.  Guliyev was 
unable to commit to an early meeting of the presidents.  The 
Co-Chairs also briefed OSCE CiO de Hoop Scheffer September 30 
in the Hague on the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations, 
emphasizing the need for compromise by all parties and the 
importance of rapidly restarting talks stalled by 
presidential elections.  The Co-Chairs recommended de Hoop 
Scheffer press the new Azeri president to initiate contact 
during his late October visit.  End Summary. 
 
Meeting with the Chairman in Office 
 
2.(C) The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, accompanied by 
Russian First Deputy Foreign 
Minister Trubnikov, briefed OSCE CiO de Hoop Scheffer 
September 30 on the current state of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
negotiations.  The Co-Chairs welcomed de Hoop Scheffer's 
recently announced decision to visit the region Oct. 29-30 
(subsequently revised to Oct. 21 and 22), and urged him to 
press PM (and presumed President) Ilham Aliyev rapidly to 
restart negotiations with Armenia.  They also stressed the 
need for the CiO to convince the Armenian government to take 
advantage of the post-election period in both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan by negotiating quietly and seriously.  The 
Co-Chairs emphasized that no deus ex machina existed in the 
conflict--both sides need to make difficult compromises, and 
time is not/not on either side. 
 
3.(C) OSCE CiO de Hoop Scheffer posed several questions 
relating to how the Azeri elections Oct. 15 would impact the 
peace process. The Co-Chairs emphasized the two presidential 
campaigns had almost stopped progress during the previous 
year.  They noted that Azeri frustration with a perceived 
lack of progress in the negotiations could lead to an 
increasing level of violence along the line of contact.  The 
Co-Chairs stressed they themselves were also frustrated by 
the cancellation of four planned visits to the region by one 
or the other side.  They were cautious in discussing new 
proposals for the N.K. peace process, and wary of raising 
expectations too high.  They pointed out that both sides are 
searching for "new ideas" providing magical solutions 
requiring neither compromise nor sacrifice.  Ambassador 
Perina noted that the Co-Chairs do have some new ideas and 
approaches to discuss with both sides, but that the essential 
element for a settlement is the willingness of both sides to 
show flexibility and compromise.  DFM Trubnikov urged de Hoop 
Scheffer to push the Azerbaijani side, post-election, to take 
the first step in restarting the peace process.  Trubnikov 
argued that the Armenian side would be waiting until after 
the election for a signal from Azerbaijan to move forward. 
 
Meetings with Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers 
 
4.(C) On October 2, the Co-Chairs held separate meetings in 
Paris with the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. 
Their message to both ministers was similar:  the Co-Chairs 
hoped to visit the region as soon as possible after the 
Azerbaijani elections where they will encourage both 
presidents to have an early meeting and offer to help 
facilitate such a meeting if the presidents agree.  They 
would also suggest some new ideas and approaches for the 
presidents to discuss but present no formal new proposals at 
this time.  The Co-Chairs stressed that an important window 
of opportunity would open with new mandates for both 
presidents and a new president on the Azerbaijani side.  It 
was important to take advantage of this opportunity and not 
lose it through delay, tactical gamesmanship, or actions 
which might further damage the atmosphere between the two 
sides and make progress even more difficult.  The Co-Chairs 
also gave each minister a suggested text concerning the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for use at the OSCE Maastricht 
Ministerial in December and asked that they provide their 
views at an early point so that a text can be agreed prior to 
the ministerial meeting itself. 
 
5.(C) Armenian FM Oskanian assured the Co-Chairs that Armenia 
was anxious to resume peace negotiations and that they would 
be welcome in Yerevan at any time.  On the question of an 
early meeting between President Kocharian and the future 
Azerbaijani president, Oskanian said he was virtually certain 
that Kocharian would agree, and undertook to secure 
Kocharian's agreement within a week.  Oskanian urged the 
Co-Chairs to try and convince the new Azerbaijani president 
to resume negotiations at the point at which they had been 
suspended, or at least to take the experience of the last ten 
years of negotiations into account, rather than seeking to 
begin talks from a blank state. 
 
6.(C) Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Guliyev stressed that he 
was constrained in responding to the Co-Chairs, since the 
question of who would be president was still undecided and he 
did not know if he would still be foreign minister in a few 
weeks.  Nonetheless, he said that he assumed the new 
president would want an early meeting with the Co-Chairs, and 
suggested that they tentatively plan to visit Baku sometime 
between November 5 and 10.  As regards an early meeting 
between the new president and Kocharian, Guliyev said that 
Kocharian enjoyed an advantage by already having a government 
in place, while the new Azerbaijani president would need time 
to assemble his cabinet and formulate policy.  An early 
meeting might be possible, but he (Guliyev) could make no 
promises on this.  On the substance of the peace process, 
Guliyev said only that experience had shown that the Armenian 
wish for a comprehensive settlement was impossible, and that 
any successful settlement had to respect Azerbaijani 
territorial integrity and be based on a step-by-step 
approach. 
 
7.(C) While Oskanian was for understandable reasons more 
receptive to an early meeting between the two presidents than 
Guliyev, he admitted that such a meeting might be strained 
and difficult particularly if -- as is most likely -- the 
Azerbaijani president-elect is Ilham Aliyev.  Oskanian said 
that Kocharian and Ilham have had no prior bilateral meetings 
and have seen one another only at multilateral gatherings. 
At the recent CIS Summit in Yalta, which Aliyev attended in 
his capacity as Prime Minister, the two men had an 
inauspicious encounter.  According to Oskanian (please 
protect), Aliyev objected to some changes requested by 
Shevardnadze to a text concerning Georgia.  Kocharian then 
took issue with Aliyev, telling him in front of other leaders 
that it was the custom at CIS meetings to let each president 
have the final word on texts concerning that president's 
country.  Aliyev dropped the matter but may well have felt 
embarrassed by the exchange. 
 
8.(U) Ambassador Perina has cleared this cable. 
SOBEL