US embassy cable - 03ANKARA6279

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006279 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, MOPS, MARR, PINR, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRAQ: PUK "PM" BARHAM SALIH IN TURKEY - 
SUGGESTS BETTER IF TURKS DON'T SEND TROOPS, OPTIMISTIC 
ABOUT FUTURE OF IRAQ, SEES HIS FUTURE IN IRAQI NATIONAL 
POLITICS 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch.  Reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan "Prime Minister" Barham 
Salih visited Ankara October 6-7 for talks with Turkish 
officials.  He met DCM, PolMilCouns and PolMilOff Oct. 6 and 
said that while he expected terrorism in Iraq to get worse 
before it got better, he was optimistic about the future, and 
that improvements in Iraq in general had exceeded his 
expectations.  None of the "doom and gloom" predictions had 
come true.  Salih, whose visit received considerable press 
coverage, told us that while he believed Iraqi Kurds should 
not object to a Turkish troop deployment to Iraq if it meant 
fewer US casualties, he worried that the introduction of 
Turkish troops would complicate the coalition's task, and 
that it would be better to have Iraqis do the job.  (Press 
headlines read "PUK Doesn't Want Turkish Troops in Iraq.") 
Salih told us and the Turks that the PUK wanted PKK/KADEK out 
of northern Iraq, and confided to us that this would require 
close PUK/Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) cooperation, and 
that the PUK and its leader Jalal Talabani would be prepared 
to help.  He also said that we should not use the military 
option against the PKK/KADEK for the time being.  He said he 
believed that Secretary Powell's six-month timeframe for 
completion of an Iraqi constitution was achievable, and that 
the problems would not be with treatment of religion or 
federalism, but rather with how to re-draw administrative 
boundaries, and that this could be left until after 
ratification.  Salih's term as PUK "PM" will end in January 
2004.  He told us he will not seek re-election, but rather, 
intends to get involved in national politics in Baghdad.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
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Salih Optimistic Long-Term, But Expects Terrorism 
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2. (C) On Oct. 6, DCM, PolMilCouns and PolMilOff met with 
visiting PUK "PM" Barham Salih, who was in Ankara for talks 
with Turkish officials en route back to Iraq from Washington. 
 Salih said that he was optimistic about the future of Iraq 
and that the situation there was already better than he had 
expected before the war.  None of the "doom and gloom" 
predictions had come true.  However, terrorism was polluting 
the atmosphere.  The "bad guys" smell blood, he cautioned, 
and said he expected problems with terrorism to get worse 
before they got better. 
 
 
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Salih on Turkish Troops for Iraq 
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3. (C) DCM noted that the USG thought that in the right 
conditions the introduction of Turkish troops would 
contribute to security and stability in Iraq.  Salih replied 
that he had told Masoud Barzani that if the introduction of 
Turkish troops would reduce the casualties and risk to US 
forces, the Iraqi Kurds should not say no, after what the US 
had done.  He then said that it was doing harm to speak to 
the issue as Iraqi Kurds, and that the matter of foreign 
troops should be an Iraqi issue at the national/Governing 
Council level.  Seeming to move away from his original 
statement, Salih added that putting in Turkish troops would 
complicate the coalition's task, and that it would be better 
to have Iraqis do the job.  The Turks, he continued, do not 
speak the language and unlike the US forces, whom Salih 
called extremely impressive, do not appeal to people's 
humanity.  "You may end up with a problem from this.  Be 
careful," he said.  Salih said he had told MFA Undersecretary 
Ziyal that Turkish troops would be deliberately attacked by 
former regime loyalists, that Turkish press headlines would 
accuse the KDP, PUK or PKK/KADEK of the attacks, and that the 
Turkish forces would not exercise the control and composure 
of US forces in the situation.  All of this, Salih opined, 
would amount to political and security liabilities for 
Turkey, Iraq and the coalition. (Press play mirrored these 
points: Turkish Daily News quoted Salih: "Deployment of 
Turkish soldiers or those from other neighboring countries 
could harm the security and political environment.  This 
could be against the interests of the Iraqi people and at the 
same time those of Turkey.") The DCM noted that the Turks had 
been told that the Sunni Arabs would welcome Turkish troops. 
Salih disagreed and said Iraqi Arabs were telling the Turks 
what they thought Turkey wanted to hear. 
 
 
4. (C) Salih said that at the end of the day, Iraq needed 
Turkey as a partner and a model, even with all of its 
shortcomings, but that a Turkish troop deployment would muddy 
the waters in this regard, and would push Iraqi nationalists 
toward confrontation with the Turks. 
 
 
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PUK Will Cooperate Against PKK/KADEK 
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5. (C)  The DCM noted that the US was committed to eliminate 
the PKK/KADEK threat in Iraq and that we believed the Turkish 
Reintegration Law was an opportunity for most of the 
PKK/KADEK elements in Iraq to return and reestablish 
themselves in Turkey.  Anything the PUK could do to help them 
understand that they will not be allowed to remain in Iraq 
would be appreciated.  Salih answered that he was surprised 
by the grip the PKK/KADEK leadership had over the rank and 
file, and that getting any significant numbers of them to 
return to Turkey would require close PUK-KDP cooperation.  He 
urged the US to avoid any military engagement with the 
PKK/KADEK at this time, as it could unbalance the stability 
in the north.  Salih added that if the US could convince the 
PKK/KADEK rank and file that a good reception with 
international monitoring by an NGO, the UN or the US awaited 
them if they surrendered, there would be better odds of 
getting them back to Turkey.  "We don't want them in Iraq 
either," he said.  "Their leaders are bad guys, and their 
followers are blind to reality.  I don't trust them.  They 
are opportunistic liars.  If you can get rid of them, it will 
be better for us."  Salih suggested using the VOA Kurdish 
service to broadcast messages about the opportunities 
available under the Turkish Reintegration Law.  Talabani and 
the PUK would cooperate with the US in its effort against the 
PKK/KADEK, he promised.  He thought Barzani would help as 
well, especially if it meant an end to the Turkish troop 
presence in northern Iraq, but said Barzani and the KDP would 
have to understand that it was not/not useful or helpful to 
use the PKK/KADEK presence to pressure Turkey.  Salih said 
there were people in Europe the PUK could talk to for help 
against the PKK/KADEK and that Turkey should try to get 
Ocalan to help as well.  First, he said, there needs to be 
more comfort about the Reintegration Law.  "Don't use too 
much pressure too early," he counseled, or Kurds generally 
will believe that Turkey is pushing the US into a 
confrontation to create a schism between the US and the 
Kurds. 
 
 
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Turkish Concerns - Iraqi Constitution and Ethnicity 
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6. (C) Salih told us that in his meeting with MFA U/S Ziyal 
earlier in the day, Ziyal was focused on issues of the Iraqi 
constitution, federalism and ethnicity.  Salih said he told 
Ziyal that the Autonomy Law from the 1970s provided for 
autonomy for the Kurdistan region (not for specific ethnic 
groups in the region), and would be a basis for discussion in 
the constitutional process.  He also said that the Iraqi 
Kurds would accept a modality to resolve the status of 
Kirkuk.  Salih asked the Turks to encourage the new Iraqi 
Turkmen Front (ITF) leadership to work with the PUK.  The 
Turks told Salih that Syria and Iran had asked Turkey for a 
tripartite meeting about the situation in northern Iraq, 
about which both Damascus and Tehran were agitated, but the 
Turks refused.  Salih told us that he would see TGS reps the 
morning of Oct. 7, but that on future visits he would not see 
Turkish intelligence (TNIO) or military reps, as the nature 
of the relationship had changed and those entities should see 
their Iraqi counterparts, while he should confine himself to 
political and foreign policy contacts. 
 
 
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Salih on Constitution Timeline, Personal Future 
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7. (C) Salih told us he believed the Iraqi constitution could 
be completed within the six-month timeframe suggested by 
Secretary Powell.  He was confident the Iraqis could agree on 
 
SIPDIS 
language concerning the role of religion and the nature of 
federalism.  The contentious piece would be the determination 
of administrative boundaries, which he said could be deferred 
and considered by a "blue ribbon" commission after completion 
of the constitution.  In any case, he noted, constitutions 
have never been very important in the Middle East.  Salih 
noted that, unlike the KDP, the PUK had decided to fly the 
Iraqi flag side-by-side with the Kurdish flag.  This was a 
particularly hard decision to adhere to when Secretary Powell 
visited Halabja, he added, noting that the symbolism of 
flying the Iraqi flag over the Halabja cemetery was painful. 
The people of northern Iraq, he said, feel increasingly 
connected to Baghdad, and that he would like more support 
from Baghdad for the administration of Sulaymaniyah.  Salih 
told us that PUK leader Talabani would visit Ankara on 
November 19, while serving as IGC Chairman, at the invitation 
of the GOT.  Turning to his own political future, he said 
that his term as PUK "PM" would end in January and that he 
would not seek reelection.  He hopes to find a role for 
himself in national politics in Baghdad in 2004. 
 
 
8. (U) Baghdad Minimize Considered. 
EDELMAN