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| Identifier: | 03THEHAGUE2527 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03THEHAGUE2527 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy The Hague |
| Created: | 2003-10-03 05:59:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | SNAR PTER KCRM PREL NL |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002527 SIPDIS SENSITIVE ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR WALTERS, AGRESTI DEPT FOR G - U/S DOBRIANSKY, INL - ACTING A/S SIMONS, EUR - A/S JONES, EUR/ERA, EUR/UBI, DOJ FOR OIA, AFMLS, NDDS BRUSSELS FOR NAS, DOJ, AND FBI DEA HQS FOR ADMINISTRATOR TANDY AND OFE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR, PTER, KCRM, PREL, NL SUBJECT: DUTCH JUSTICE MINISTER PLANS TO TARGET COCAINE SMUGGLERS AT SCHIPHOL AIRPORT 1. (SBU) Action request: Please see Paragraph 7. 2. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Sobel met with the Dutch Justice Minister Donner October 1 to discuss the Ministry of Justice's proposed Action Plan aimed at disrupting the cocaine traffic transiting Schiphol airport from the Caribbean. Currently, GONL estimates that 20-40,000 kilos of cocaine comes through Schiphol annually, mainly from the Netherlands Antilles, but also from Suriname and Venezuela. Only 20-25% is currently being interdicted. One aim of the plan is to triple the interdiction rate, thereby reaching a "tipping point" at which the cocaine suppliers will decide that it is not cost effective to use Schiphol anymore. A second aim is to gain leverage over the government of the Netherlands Antilles (GONA) by putting at risk their tourist industry. Targeted airplanes would have to go to sealed gates and all passengers would go through lengthy, time consuming and intrusive procedures. GONL hopes that the threat of this would force Netherlands-Antilles government to deal with the problem at source. The downside to the plan is that the resulting arrests would strain the Dutch penal system to breaking point. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) plans, therefore, to prosecute only smugglers caught with large amounts of cocaine (newspaper accounts suggest 2 kilos or more). All others will be arrested, immediately deported and put on an airline blacklist. Ambassador Sobel voiced strong concern that the plan "virtually decriminalizes" smaller amounts and places the problem back in the lap of the Netherlands Antilles - which has similar resource/cell limits. This would be particularly harmful to the Netherlands reputation given that the Netherlands is also a significant source country of Ecstasy. Donner took his point, but claimed that they face a choice between imperfect solutions - turnaround or turn a blind eye. The judicial and prison capacities have reached their limits. Embassy requests guidance from INL, ONDCP, and DEA. (Please see para. 7) END SUMMARY 3. (SBU) In a meeting with Justice Minister Donner, Ambassador Sobel discussed Dutch plans to disrupt the transshipment of cocaine coming through Schiphol Airport. The action plan, which is still being formulated, aims to triple the interdiction rate and thereby reach a "tipping point" at which suppliers see continued use of Schiphol as unprofitable and look for alternative supply lines. Currently, 20- 40,000 kilos of cocaine are transshipped through Schiphol each year. Approximately 10% is for use in the Netherlands with the rest going to other countries in Europe (principally Germany, Spain and the UK). The vast majority of the cocaine comes to Schiphol on 29 "direct risk" flights each week, mainly from the Netherlands Antilles, but also from Caracas, Paramaribo and Aruba. The drugs are either ingested by "bollita swallowers" or smuggled in on cargo or in luggage. The Dutch have indicated that the crackdown would be temporary and that they would review its effectiveness in the short term. 4. (SBU) Under a September 2002 plan to fight this problem (through increased police monitoring, construction of more prison facilities and a prison at Schiphol airport), the arrests for smuggling increased from 1300 in 2001, to 2200 arrests in 2002. MOJ D/DG Jan van den Hoevel, who is directing the action plan told the Ambassador that current arrests are about 200 per month. The new plan to triple interdiction rates through increased manpower, greater use of intelligence, and other methods such as the creation of a database to track returnees, would lead to a unsustainable burden on the Dutch justice and penal system Donner said. Accordingly, the plan will allow Dutch authorities to focus on larger smugglers and return those smuggling smaller amounts to their place of origin. By arresting and taking to court only those who carry "larger amounts" (newspaper accounts suggest 2 kilos or more) Donner hopes to deal a blow to the supply of cocaine while not overburdening the Dutch legal system. Those with smaller amounts would be arrested but then deported. 5. (SBU) Ambassador Sobel strongly voiced his concern that failing to deal with those who smuggled smaller amounts sent the wrong signal and was not a long-term solution to this problem. Minister Donner noted the Ambassador's concern. Donner further explained that it is difficult for the Netherlands to get agreement with the Netherlands Antilles as it is "part of Kingdom, but cannot be ordered around." He said that he might want to discuss ways in which the USG could put pressure on The Antilles. Ambassador Sobel responded that the US recognizes that there are complex political issues and we want to be careful not to get caught in between the two sides. The U.S. is very active in counternarcotics in the Caribbean and wants to be as helpful as possible. Ambassador Sobel noted that the upcoming visit of Coast Guard Command Collins to the Netherlands offers an opportunity to discuss some practical measures. Donner agreed that that was a good idea and said that an appropriate MOJ official would be glad to meet with him. 6. (SBU) In a general discussion on drugs policy, Ambassador Sobel raised the possibility of having DEA Administrator Tandy or ONDCP Director Walters visit the Netherlands to share information and views on the drug trafficking. Ambassador Sobel noted that the reputation of the Netherlands internationally with regard to drugs was not good and that they should make efforts to improve this. Ambassador Sobel said that one reason that the Netherlands was attractive to drug smugglers and producers was the low sentencing and permissive attitude towards drugs in this country. Donner claimed that the actual time served for drug crimes in the Netherlands was about the same as the rest of Europe. Donner also acknowledged that it was worth looking at this initiative in a broader context in which the drug problem as whole could be attacked. Ambassador Sobel stressed that this is an opportunity for the Dutch to put additional resources into fighting synthetic drugs. 7. (SBU) Action request/Comment: Embassy's judgment is that a temporary crackdown at Schiphol is at best a stopgap measure that will not make a significant long-term difference to the problem of narcotics smuggling to the Netherlands. At the same time, we judge that there is no political will or resources in the near future for creating the judicial and penal capacity needed to handle the flood of drug couriers. We think that GONL however might be open to the argument that they need to combine this crackdown with other measures that would make a difference in stemming the traffic. For example, we might argue that the Netherlands should implement in parallel a temporary program for the use of criminal infiltrants and "pass-throughs" that would enable them to go beyond interrupting couriers and begin arresting the gang leaders. These measures would have the added value of being useful practices that can be applied to the other Dutch drug problem - the production of Ecstasy. Past experience however suggests that expectations must not be raised too high. Post seeks INL, ONDCP and DEA input on other practical measures that we could recommend that the Dutch employ on a trial basis in parallel with this crackdown. Sobel
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