US embassy cable - 03ANKARA6198

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MFA CAUCASUS OFFICIAL ON ARMENIA, GEORGIA, AZERBAIJAN: PLANS, FEARS, AND HOPES.

Identifier: 03ANKARA6198
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA6198 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-10-02 13:19:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL TU GG AJ AM RS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2013 
TAGS: PREL, TU, GG, AJ, AM, RS 
SUBJECT: MFA CAUCASUS OFFICIAL ON ARMENIA, GEORGIA, 
AZERBAIJAN:  PLANS, FEARS, AND HOPES. 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  In a September 23 conversation with poloff, 
MFA Caucasus Department Head Murat Adali worried about 
Russian influence in the Caucasus, particularly Georgia, 
during a period when U.S. attention was turned to Iraq. 
Adali expressed eagerness for the U.S. and Turkey to work 
together to ensure the region focused west toward Europe. 
Turkey sought Armenian movement on Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) in 
exchange for opening the border.  The Russian Embassy in 
Ankara was helping Abkhazians smuggle arms and materiel from 
Turkey to Abkhazia.  In Azerbaijan, Adali thought Ilham 
Aliyev would win and hoped he would emerge from elections 
strong enough to sell a final NK solution domestically.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
2.  (C) Adali previewed what he said would be a long working 
session at UNGA between Turkish FonMin Gul and Armenian 
FonMin Oskanyan to discuss a "roadmap" for Turkish-Armenian 
relations.  The GOT would negotiate bilateral issues on a 
"separate but parallel" track with NK.  Adali recognized the 
two issues were "apples and oranges."   However, if the GOT 
was going to open the border it would have to be able to fend 
off domestic criticism that it was turning its back to the 
plight of Azeris in NK.  The GOT would be satisfied with 
minimal GOAM concessions in areas such as return of 
territory, an open corridor to Nakhichevan, or IDP returns. 
The GOT would eventually like to host a 
Azerbaijan/Armenia/Turkey conference on NK at which, Adali 
said, the U.S. would be welcome as a "witness" to any 
agreement reached. 
 
 
3.  (C) Adali expressed great concern about Russian influence 
in Georgia.  During a recent MFA trip to Moscow, Adali said 
Russian officials openly expressed their dislike of President 
Schevardnaze and their support for breakaway Abkhazia.  Adali 
said the Russian Embassy in Ankara was helping Abkhazians 
residing in Turkey smuggle arms and materiel from Turkey, 
along the Russian coast and into Abkhazia. 
 
 
4.  (C) Adlai was confident Ilham Aliyev would win 
Azerbaijan's upcoming elections, and hoped he would emerge 
strong enough to sell a final NK solution in the face of what 
Adali recognized would be stiff domestic criticism.  He said 
Azeri opposition groups had tried, through him, to enlist the 
MFA's support, but he was not going to get involved and said 
he had not even returned their phone messages.  Musavat Party 
leader Isa Gambar claimed to be Turkey's best friend among 
Azeri politicians, and was close to Turkey's nationalistic 
National Action Party (MHP), but Adali did not trust his 
expressions of friendship. 
 
 
 
 
EDELMAN 

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