US embassy cable - 03THEHAGUE2508

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OPS PLEASE PASS TO D STAFF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MD, PARM, NL, RU, OSCE, EUN 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DEPUTY FM TRUBNIKOV ON MOLDOVA 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary E. Daly for reasons 1.5 (b and 
d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  At a September 30 bilateral meeting in The 
Hague, Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov told 
EUR/SNEC Ambassador Perina that he would soon be calling the 
Deputy Secretary with specific ideas on how the U.S. and 
Russia can cooperate on Moldova.  Trubnikov claimed that he 
and the Russian MFA were doing everything possible to move 
forward the Transnistria status negotiations and the 
withdrawal of weapons under the Istanbul Commitments. 
Certain other individuals and ministries were hampering the 
effort, however.  Nonetheless, Putin had the right 
intentions, Smirnov had been called to Moscow to be 
"seriously pressured," and even the weapons withdrawal could 
be finished largely on time if the Transnistrians allow two 
loading areas--Colbasna and Tiraspol.  Trubnikov also agreed 
with the Dutch to start expert-level talks on a Russian-EU 
peacekeeping force.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Perina began by telling Trubnikov that the U.S. was 
concerned and puzzled by Russian actions.  We wanted Moldova 
to be an example of successful U.S.-Russian-EU cooperation in 
solving a regional conflict, but Russian actions put us at 
cross-purposes.  The arms withdrawal had stopped, and the 
Deputy Head of Putin's Presidential Administration--Dmitri 
Kozak--seemed to be working unilaterally in the region.  This 
could lead to real problems for all of us at the Maastricht 
OSCE Ministerial. 
 
3.  (C) Trubnikov said he was aware of U.S. concerns and 
suspicions.  But we should know that Kozak was dispatched by 
Putin at Voronin's request, and without his (Trubnikov's) 
knowledge or advice.  Kozak was an expert constitutional 
lawyer who was trying to give Voronin what he wants in a 
legal document.  But the political job of persuading Smirnov 
to accept such a document could not be done by Kozak, nor was 
Kozak negotiating any security guarantees. 
 
4.  (C) Trubnikov said that putting pressure on Smirnov was 
still a problem.  He (Trubnikov) and the MFA were doing 
everything possible to exert such pressure, but certain other 
individuals and ministries were hampering their efforts. 
Some people had "material interests" in Transnistria, and 
others saw it as an outpost of continued Russian influence. 
This was all silly because Russia would always have influence 
in Moldova, but it afforded Smirnov protection.  Trubnikov 
admitted that Russia had "a lot" of compromising information 
about Smirnov and his family, but it was held by other 
ministries and not in the hands of the MFA. 
 
5.  (C) Nonetheless, Putin wanted to help Voronin.  Smirnov 
was currently being summoned to Moscow to be "seriously 
pressured" on both the political talks and the arms 
withdrawal.  Trubnikov predicted that there would be an 
agreed political document before the end of the year.  Even 
the arms withdrawal could come near completion if Smirnov 
allowed two loading and dispatch points--Colbasna and 
Tiraspol.  Trubnikov said he realized that arms withdrawal 
had to be back on track before the Maastricht Ministerial and 
predicted that it would be. 
 
6.  (C) When asked where this left the security guarantees, 
Trubnikov admitted that some in Moscow would like to see a 
permanent Russian military presence in Moldova.  However, the 
MFA understood that this would cause big political problems 
for Voronin and diplomatic problems for Russia.  A 
multilateral force and mandate would have to be negotiated at 
the right time.  Trubnikov avoided further comment on this 
subject. 
 
7.  (C) Perina stressed that the U.S. wanted to work with 
Russia to ensure that Moldova becomes a joint success and not 
a source of recrimination and suspicion.  He asked Trubnikov 
how the U.S. could help to produce such positive outcomes. 
 
8.  (C) After a pause, Trubnikov said he had been thinking 
about the same thing since his telephone conversation the 
previous week with Deputy Secretary Armitage.  He wanted to 
give it more thought and see how the Moscow meetings with 
Smirnov progress.  He promised to call the Deputy Secretary 
soon, however, with some specific ideas on how the U.S. and 
Russia could cooperate constructively on Moldova. 
 
9.  (C) Following the meeting, Ambassador Perina compared 
notes with Dutch OSCE coordinator Daan Everts, who had also 
met with Trubnikov.  Trubnikov's comments at both meetings 
were similar.  However, Everts added that Trubnikov agreed to 
the start of expert-level talks with the Dutch on a possible 
Russian-EU peacekeeping force in Moldova.  Everts said he 
would issue formal invitations for the Russians to come to 
The Hague in a week or two. 
 
10.  (C) Comment:  Everts was elated after his meeting with 
Trubnikov, believing that some agreements on Moldova might 
still be achieved in time for the Maastricht Ministerial. 
Trubnikov has failed to deliver on Moldova before, however, 
and appeared particularly resentful of Voronin's request to 
bring someone new like Kozak into the process.  Still, 
Trubnikov appeared sensitive to the problems that could 
result from unilateral Russian actions in Moldova and sincere 
in his wish to avoid them in any Transnistria settlement. 
Continued U.S. and EU pressure on the Russians will be 
necessary to keep open any chance of positive results on 
Moldova in time for Maastricht. 
 
11.  (U) Ambassador Perina has cleared on this cable and 
provided the above comment. 
SOBEL