US embassy cable - 00THEHAGUE1695

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001695 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR S/P, IO/UNP, EUR/RPM, PM/ISO, EUR/UBI 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA-NATO 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, MARR, NL, MPOS, NATO, EUN 
SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPING REMAINS SENSITIVE ISSUE IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
 
REFS: A) THE HAGUE 588  B) THE HAGUE 980 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
 
1. SUMMARY: SINCE THE FALL OF THE SREBRENICA ENCLAVE IN 
1995, DUTCH POLITICIANS HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN REVIEWING THEIR 
PEACEKEEPING DECISIONMAKING PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT DUTCH 
TROOPS WILL NEVER AGAIN BE PLACED IN SUCH AN IMPOSSIBLE 
POSITION.  GIVEN THEIR CONTINUING BELIEF IN THE GOAL OF 
PROMOTING PEACE AND THE RULE OF LAW, MOST DUTCH GOVERNMENT 
AND POLITICAL LEADERS REMAIN, IN PRINCIPLE, PREPARED TO 
PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. BUT THEY ARE 
NOW ALSO INCLINED TO APPLY MUCH STRICTER CRITERIA. AS A 
RESULT, DUTCH PKO PARTICIPATION SHOULD NO LONGER BE TAKEN 
FOR GRANTED BY THE US, NATO, UN OR EU. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2. DUTCH POLITICIANS SAY THEY LOST THEIR INNOCENCE IN 
SREBRENICA. IN THE EARLY 1990S, THE DO-GOOD DUTCH CHERISHED 
THE ILLUSION THAT THEY COULD BRING PEACE AND STABILITY 
THROUGH PEACEKEEPING.  THE TRAGEDY OF SREBRENICA RUDELY 
OPENED THEIR EYES. ALTHOUGH NUMEROUS SEASONED MFA, MOD AND 
MILITARY LEADERS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THOSE POORLY ARMED DUTCH 
SOLDIERS COULD DO LITTLE TO STOP THE GENOCIDE BY THE SERBS 
OF THOUSANDS OF MUSLIMS, MOST PARLIAMENTARIANS AND CITIZENS 
HAVE NEVER STOPPED WONDERING HOW THIS COULD HAVE EVER 
HAPPENED. 
 
 
3. SREBRENICA STILL PRESENTS THE DUTCH BODY POLITIC WITH A 
DILEMMA: MOST DUTCH REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO PROMOTE 
THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW, IF NECESSARY THROUGH MILITARY 
OPERATIONS. BUT NO ONE WANTS TO BE EXPOSED TO SUCH RISKS 
AGAIN. WHILE CONCEDING THAT PEACEKEEPING WILL NEVER BE FREE 
OF RISKS, DUTCH POLICY MAKERS SINCE 1995 HAVE BEEN TRYING TO 
DEFINE ON WHAT TERMS THEY MIGHT AGAIN PARTICIPATE. 
RESPONDING TO PARLIAMENTARY AND PRIME MINISTERIAL ANGST, THE 
FOREIGN MINISTRY IN 1995 INITIALLY PRESENTED GUIDELINES FOR 
FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING. THEY INCLUDED THE 
DESIRE FOR A CLEAR MANDATE FROM THE UN OR ANOTHER 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, "NO DUAL-KEY COMMAND AND 
CONTROL," VIABLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY GOALS, AND A 
MULTINATIONAL FRAMEWORK.  THE LATTER EVOLVED INTO THE 
CURRENT-DAY DE FACTO REQUIREMENT OF INVOLVING A MAJOR ALLY 
SUCH AS THE U.S. OR THE UK. 
 
 
4. IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, DUTCH POLITICS HAS BECOME OBSESSED 
WITH REVIEWING AND ANALYZING PAST OPERATIONS. 
THE SREBRENICA TRAGEDY WAS, AND STILL IS, THE SUBJECT OF 
VARIOUS INVESTIGATIONS.  THE PARLIAMENT SET UP A SPECIAL 
COMMISSSION TO INVESTIGATE HOW THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT AND 
PARLIAMENT CAME TO DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL 
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS, THE SO-CALLED BAKKER COMMISSION.  THE 
FOCUS IS, AGAIN, PRIMARILY ON SREBRENICA, BUT PARTICIPATION 
IN OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AND UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN 
CYPRUS, ANGOLA AND CAMBODIA IS ALSO UNDER REVIEW.  A MAJOR 
PURPOSE OF THIS EXERCISE IS TO LEARN FROM PAST EXPERIENCE SO 
THAT TROOPS ARE NOT AGAIN DISPATCHED ON IMPOSSIBLE MISSIONS. 
 
 
5. THE PARLIAMENT ALSO ASKED THE GOVERNMENT TO EVALUATE THE 
KOSOVO CRISIS FROM THE DUTCH PERSPECTIVE. THIS WAS ANOTHER 
LESSONS-LEARNED EXERCISE, WHICH ALSO BROUGHT TO THE FORE 
SIMMERING DISCONTENT ON PERCEIVED EXCLUSION FROM 
DELIBERATIONS AMONG THE LARGER NATIONS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
SIZEABLE MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS THAT THE DUTCH BELIEVE THEY 
MAKE (REFTELS). 
 
 
6. THE ABSENCE OF A UNSC MANDATE FOR OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
TRIGGERED A DEBATE ON CONDITIONS THAT PERMIT HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION IN THE EVENT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. 
FOREIGN MINISTER VAN AARTSEN HAS ORGANIZED TWO SEMINARS 
ABOUT THIS IN THE PAST YEAR.  THESE SEMINARS PRODUCED A LIST 
OF CONSIDERATIONS THAT SHOULD PRECEDE A MILITARY 
INTERVENTION.  THESE INCLUDED A CLEAR URGENCY TO ACT WITH 
THE GOAL OF STOPPING GRAVE AND LARGE SCALE HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS. THE ACTION SHOULD ALSO STAND A REASONABLE CHANCE 
OF SUCCESS AT ACCEPTABLE COSTS. 
 
 
7. ALL OF THESE EFFORTS REFLECT A FRANTIC SEARCH FOR 
OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING 
MISSIONS.  BUT THEY ALSO GIVE EVIDENCE OF CONSIDERABLE 
UNDERLYING EMOTIONAL RESERVATIONS.  RISK AVOIDANCE SEEMS TO 
BE THE WATCHWORD IN TODAY'S THE HAGUE.  IT IS NO COICIDENCE 
THE DUTCH ARE DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM ON-THE-GROUND 
COMMITMENTS IN PLACES LIKE KOSOVO, CYPRUS OR WESTERN SAHARA. 
STILL, IT WOULD BE INCORRECT TO COUNT THE DUTCH OUT ENTIRELY 
IN FUTURE PKO'S, ALTHOUGH THEY WILL SEEK DIFFERENT TERMS. 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL HEAR THE DUTCH DEMAND SOUND 
ARGUMENTS, REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC CONSULTATION 
PERIODS, AND LIKELY SEEK GUARANTEES ABOUT CONSULTATION AND 
DECISIONMAKING BEFORE COMMITTING TO NATO, UN OR EU 
DEPLOYMENTS IN THE FUTURE. FENDRICK