US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO1708

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001708 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  10-01-13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SOCI, EINV, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Key Muslim Minister discusses peace process 
issues with Ambassador 
 
Ref:  Colombo 1693, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador met September 30 with 
Rauf Hakeem, Muslim party leader and Minister of Ports 
and Shipping.  Asked for his views regarding the peace 
process, Hakeem expressed his concern over the Tigers' 
absence from the negotiating table and their apparent 
efforts to marginalize Muslim political leaders. 
Despite reports to the contrary, he did not think 
Muslims in the east were being radicalized by funding 
from the Middle East.  Hakeem also spoke about improving 
the President-PM cohabitation relationship and touched 
on plans for Colombo Port.  While clearly worried about 
the LTTE, Hakeem appeared relatively upbeat about the 
peace process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) MEETING WITH MUSLIM LEADER:  On September 30, in 
his first official courtesy call after presenting his 
credentials on September 26, Ambassador Lunstead met 
with Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim 
Congress (SLMC), the country's largest Muslim party. 
Hakeem also serves the United National Front government 
as the Minister of Port Development and Shipping, 
Eastern Development and Muslim Affairs.  AID Director 
and poloff also attended the meeting. 
 
3.  (C) INSIGHTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS:  Asked for his 
views on the status of the peace process, Hakeem 
expressed concern about the Tigers' continued absence 
from the negotiating table and their apparent efforts to 
marginalize national Muslim political leaders by meeting 
with "civil society" Muslim leaders at the local level 
in the east.  Despite personal assurances by the LTTE 
leadership that the group would address Muslim concerns, 
Hakeem was worried that the Tigers' focus on Muslim 
civil society groups was, in fact, an attempt to avoid 
substantive political dialogue with Muslim leaders.  The 
important thing, the Ambassador and Hakeem both agreed, 
was maintaining a pluralistic political society in the 
east.  Hakeem added that the GSL and the LTTE had agreed 
at the Bangkok round of talks in January to include a 
separate Muslim delegation at an appropriate point in 
the future.  The Tigers had now backed away from that, 
and were refusing a separate Muslim delegation.  Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe had further indicated that he 
would welcome a Muslim-delegation response to the 
Tigers' awaited "counterproposal" to the government's 
north/east interim administration proposal.  Sharing his 
thoughts about the motivations behind the LTTE's delay 
in returning to the negotiation table, Hakeem 
characterized the group's actions as a stalling tactic. 
He felt the Tigers were using the break in talks to 
create legitimacy for their own infrastructure and 
organizations in the north/east. 
 
4.  (C) Hakeem also expressed appreciation for the 
United States' sustained expression of public concern 
about the LTTE.  In that regard, the Ambassador 
explained that the LTTE would soon be redesignated a 
U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization.  The Ambassador 
also noted the significance of the international 
community's united front in support of the peace 
process, as evidenced by the joint statement issued at 
the Tokyo conference follow-up meeting held in Colombo 
on September 12. 
 
5.  (C) MUSLIM RADICALIZATION IN THE EAST?:  Responding 
to a question, Hakeem stated he was monitoring the 
environment in the east, but did not think that Muslims 
there were being radicalized.  Although Middle East 
sources were providing some funding for mosques and 
madrassahs, the needs of Sri Lankan Muslims, as a 
minority needing to co-exist in the wider community, 
were different from Middle Eastern Muslim-majority 
countries.  Hakeem felt that radicalization, if it were 
to occur, would be the result of the poor socioeconomic 
situation prevailing in the east.  He and AID Director 
then discussed the unemployment problem affecting the 
Muslim community in the east and the possibility of AID- 
supported skills development programs. 
 
6.  (C) COMMENTS ON COHABITATION:  Regarding Sri Lanka's 
endemic cohabitation tensions, Hakeem stated that the 
President and the Prime Minister needed to put aside 
their differences and work together in the national 
interest.  That said, he believed the PM had made a 
serious error by not formally including the Opposition 
in the peace process from the beginning.  Dismissing all 
the specific issues that provoke public cohabitation 
tension, Hakeem said the President's agitation stemmed 
from her lame-duck status:  she is unable to run again 
for President when her term is up in two years, but 
would not be content to swap the executive presidency 
for the prime minister's office.  Hakeem said he would 
try to work to calm down cohabitation tensions. 
 
7.  (C) IMPROVEMENTS AT COLOMBO PORT:  Switching gears, 
Hakeem and the Ambassador also discussed the development 
potential of Colombo Port.  Hakeem described a "quantum 
leap in productivity" for the largest port in South Asia 
and one of the largest 35 in the world.  Ships were 
being processed three times as fast and the port was 
handling 24 percent more containers compared with last 
year.  Hakeem said he had negotiated long-term 
agreements with several major shipping companies despite 
their financial interests in the privatized side of the 
port.  The Ambassador stated that U.S. companies were 
very interested in Sri Lanka, and infrastructure 
improvements, such as those for the port, would be key 
in these companies' investment decisions. 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT:  Hakeem used the meeting to brief the 
Ambassador on his concerns regarding the Tigers.  That 
said, after getting these concerns off his chest, Hakeem 
seemed relatively upbeat about the peace process.  In 
particular, he seemed fairly confident that the Muslims 
would have an independent seat at the peace negotiating 
table, despite current Tiger opposition.  END COMMENT. 
 
9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD