US embassy cable - 03SANAA2440

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002440 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, PGOV, PREL, PTER, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: ROYG BRIEFING ON DISRUPTION OF AL-QAIDA CELL IN 
SANAA 
 
REF: A. (A) SANAA 2434 
 
     B. (B) SANAA 2410 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (C), (G). 
 
1. (C) Summary: On 9/28 Interior Minister Alimi called in 
Ambassador, with ambassadors of Italy, France, UK and 
Germany, to brief on ROYG's recent disruption of a 
Sanaa-based al-Qaida cell targeting U.S., other Western, and 
Yemeni objectives.  Alimi's briefing elaborated on 
preliminary information provided by President Saleh during 
GEN Abizaid's 9/20 visit (ref b).  The group -- calling 
itself the "Unification Brigades" -- reportedly targeted 
Ambassador's motorcade on past two occasions, but was 
deterred by his security escort.  The group had compiled a 
long list of potential targets, but only one -- an assault on 
the UK Embassy -- was in operational preparation.  Alimi 
noted that explosives and weapons for that attack were to be 
procured in Marib and al-Jawf with money sent from Saudi 
Arabia, and had in fact not/not yet been sent to Sanaa. 
While the leader of the group ('Amr Abdul Rahman al-Sharif) 
is in custody with three confederates, Alimi stressed that at 
least one group member (Abdul Rahman Basoura) remained at 
large (probably in Saudi Arabia) and there could be others. 
Accordingly the ROYG had boosted security at all sites on the 
target list, and urged Western embassies to exercise caution. 
 Alimi said he had briefed the Saudi Deputy Interior 
Minister, and  would ask the Iranian ambassador for Tehran's 
cooperation in the ongoing investigation because Basoura was 
based in Iran.  Embassy Sanaa's EAC discussed the information 
and issued a warden message 9/28 (ref a), and held a wardens 
meeting 9/30.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Yemen's Interior Minister, Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, on 
9/28 convened a meeting of key Western embassies to brief on 
ROYG's recent disruption of an al-Qaida affiliated cell in 
Sanaa.  Attendees at the briefing were the Ambassador 
(accompanied by DCM and RSO), British Ambassador, Italian 
Ambassador, French Charge, and German DCM.  Alimi noted that 
the operation was carried out by Central Security 
Organization forces under his ministry.  His read-out 
elaborated on initial information provided by President Saleh 
in his 9/20 meeting with CENTCOM Commander GEN Abizaid on 
9/20 (ref b).  Alimi said the investigation was ongoing, 
stressing that further information would be provided to the 
embassies as it became available "because all of us are 
targets now." 
 
---------------------------- 
A Long List of Targets 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Alimi reviewed the group's lengthy target list, which 
included: the UK embassy; the Italian embassy; the French 
cultural center; DHL; Spectrum (a local language school that 
specializes in English but has no affiliation with the U.S. 
or UK embassies, but which, Alimi pointed out, is close to 
the home of PSO chief Gamish); the Hadda Compound (home to 
many foreign workers and diplomats, including more than a 
dozen U.S. Embassy families); the Red Cross; the Hertz car 
rental company; American restaurants (e.g. the Pizza Hut and 
Kentucky Fried Chicken franchises); Yemenia Airlines; PSO 
headquarters; the Presidential Palace; Parliament; the 
Radio/TV center; the Central Bank; The Interior Ministry's 
Immigration and Passports Office the Civil Records Office; 
The Yemeni International Bank; Spacetel (a mobile phone 
company); Coca Cola; the Procter and Gamble office in Taiz 
(closed more than a year ago, suggesting a gap in the 
terrorists' research); Defense Minister Aliwa; Interior 
Minister Alimi; PSO Chief Gamish; former PM Iryani; and 
current PM Bajammal. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Plan to Target UK Embassy 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Alimi cited three main modes of attack the group had 
envisioned: car bombs, ambush/assassination attacks, and 
standoff attacks with RPGs.  This was theoretical, however, 
as the group had not yet acquired the necessary arms and 
explosives. 
 
5. (C) Alimi stressed that only the UK embassy compound 
attack was in an operational planning stage. He showed 
surveillance notes and tactical sketches the group had made 
of the compound's entrances others, and promised to provide 
the UK Ambassador with a copy of a surveillance videotape 
they had made.  The group was awaiting weapons and explosives 
for the attack which were to be acquired in Marib and al-Jawf 
with money sent from Saudi Arabia, and then the arms were to 
be sent on to Sanaa.  Alimi expressed high confidence that 
the weapons/explosives had not/not reached Sanaa. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Targeting the U.S. Ambassador 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The Minister noted that the group had "more than once" 
targeted the U.S. Ambassador's motorcade for assassination, 
but were deterred by his security escort. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Members of the "Cells of Faith and Unity" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
7. (C) Alimi stated that four members of the group were in 
custody, and provided general information on several group 
members: 
 
--  The head of the group, now in custody, is a Yemeni named 
'Amr Abdul Rahman al-Sharif, aka Abu Saqr al-Mekki, who had 
been a long-term resident of Saudi Arabia.  Alimi described 
him as the 4th ranking al-Qaida leader in the Arabian 
Peninsula, noting that he had succeeded Abu Ali al-Harithy as 
head of al-Qaida operations in Yemen.  A peninsula-wide 
al-Qaida reorganization in the aftermath of Harithy's death 
and the arrest of Fawaz al-Rabi'e moved Sharif up in the 
hierarchy and gave rise to a new nomenclature.  Sharif's 
group called itself the "Cells of Faith and Unity," and 
claimed to be part of a larger grouping called the 
"Unification Brigades." 
 
--  Sharif's deputy, Abdul Rahman Basoura, also Yemeni, 
remains at large.  He was sent to Saudi Arabia to get money 
for the group, so Alimi hopes he will be apprehended in the 
KSA or in Yemen when/if he returns.  Basoura is based in 
Iran, and on that basis Alimi said he planned to call in the 
Iranian Ambassador and request Tehran's assistance in the 
investigation. 
 
--  Another group member still at large, Ghalib al-Zaidi, was 
perhaps charged with the task of bringing the arms and 
explosives, once obtained, from Marib to Sanaa. 
 
8. (C) Alimi revealed that discovery of the cell resulted 
from investigation of an 18 year-old girl who, having run 
away from her family, was living with members of the group. 
A police inquiry into this illicit connection led to 
discovery of documents establishing the group's terrorist 
aims.  Alimi said police did not consider the girl a "member" 
of the group as such, but surmised that she would have been 
used in some way in a future operation.  He observed that the 
immoral use of a young girl reflected the falsity of the 
group's pretense of religious rectitude. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Yemeni-Saudi Cooperation 
--------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Yemeni authorities recovered a wealth of information 
in the round-up of cell members, including documents, 
computer disks and telephone numbers.  Alimi stated that the 
telephone numbers were all being monitored, and might lead to 
more arrests.  The information also included telephone 
numbers in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis -- specifically 
Deputy Interior Minister Mohamed bin Naif, who was in Sanaa 
9/28 -- had been given all details.  He repeatedly 
underscored both the closeness of ongoing cooperation with 
the Saudis and the fact that "all the group's money and 3/4 
of its leadership" was to be found in the Kingdom. 
 
----------------------------- 
Follow-up Inside Yemen 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Alimi added that further information, including 
written documentation, would be provided to the U.S. Embassy 
by the PSO later the same day.  While expressing confidence 
that the cell's operational plans had been disrupted, Alimi 
urged that the embassies be alert to possible action by 
elements as yet unknown.  One aim of the continuing 
investigation in Yemen, he told the Ambassador, was to 
discover any location the group had used in Yemen for 
training. 
12. (C) In response to a question from AMB Hull, Alimi said 
the ROYG would maintain stepped up security at potential 
target sites but would not make a full public statement until 
the investigation was further along.  He noted with evident 
satisfaction that the investigation had proceeded 
productively for a full week without any loss of secrecy. 
 
13. (C) The German DCM asked if a ROYG order for German 
archaeologists to leave Sirwah and return to Marib was 
related to this investigation.  Alimi replied in the 
affirmative, stating that the German team should either work 
in the Marib area -- which would pose no security problem -- 
or return to Sanaa. 
 
14. (C) The German DCM praised the work of the MOI in 
disrupting this cell, a sentiment echoed by Ambassador Hull. 
 
15. (S/NF) Comment: Disruption of this Sanaa-based cell is a 
major success for the Interior Ministry, which seems to have 
moved quickly to round up cell members and conduct productive 
interrogations.  The Political Security Organization has 
provided ORCA with further documentation on the disrupted 
cell that will be reported via intel channels.  Post will 
probe ROYG for maximum detail on the two reported instances 
of targeting Ambassador's motorcade and reassess security 
arrangements accordingly.  Ambassador's security escort 
currently includes both Embassy bodyguards and Yemeni police 
elements.  Post issued a 9/28 warden message (which was 
previewed to Alimi) and held a wardens meeting on 9/30. 
 
Hull 
HULL