US embassy cable - 03ANKARA6020

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PINS, PHUM, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S EAST AND SOUTHEAST KURDS WARN RECENT 
REINTEGRATION LAW INADEQUATE TO ATTRACT PKK MILITANTS 
 
REF: ANKARA 4787 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Following is a field report from Consulate Adana 
Principal Officer. 
 
 
2. (C) Summary: In a political environment which has once 
again become tense, Kurdish political and community leaders 
in Turkey's east and southeast assert vigorously that the 
GOT's recent reintegration law is inadequate to attract 
PKK/KADEK members back from the mountains in northern Iraq. 
They say GOT efforts to pressure families with suspected 
links to KADEK to urge family members to repatriate are 
having the opposite effect.  In the face of this widespread 
sentiment GOT officials in the region assert that public 
relations efforts related to the reintegration law are 
adequate.  End summary. 
 
 
3. (C) A Sept. 14-22 regional trip by Adana PO revealed a 
polarized political situation in southeast and eastern 
Turkey.  Many cities and towns which have seen relative calm 
in the last four years were visibly tense and fearful of 
renewed violence in the wake of the announcement of the end 
of the KADEK unilateral cease-fire and press reports of 
U.S.-GOT consultations on PKK/KADEK.  Kurdish mayors and 
community leaders in southeast and eastern Turkey almost 
unanimously express deep suspicions about the GOT's new 
reintegration law.  They see the law as virtually identical 
with past unsuccessful amnesties and state bluntly that their 
communities simply do not trust the government to keep its 
promises.  They point to local non-implementation of recent 
EU harmonization laws (e.g., allowing Kurdish names for 
children and Kurdish language education), sparsely available 
and oft-censored Kurdish print media, and virtually 
non-existent Kurdish radio/television media as examples of 
why Kurdish distrust of the authorities continues. 
 
 
4. (C) Some Kurdish leaders, especially in DEHAP-controlled 
municipalities, go further to say that many respected 
individuals in their communities as well as families with 
ties to active KADEK cadres are actively encouraging KADEK 
cadres to remain loyal.  Asked about possible 
confidence-building measures which might persuade KADEK 
active cadres to demobilize, almost every Kurdish community 
contact and every DEHAP municipal leader replied that nothing 
short of a general amnesty would change community 
perceptions. 
 
 
5. (C) On the other hand, many provincial governors and, even 
more so, sub-governorate officials in visibly tense areas 
such as Hakkari, Bingol and Sirnak, asserted to PO that 
"KADEK is only still alive because of outside support" and 
said they are counting on the U.S. decisively to end that 
support soon.  They could not understand "anything less" from 
a longtime Ally now controlling the territory from which 
those who have tried to destroy Turkey are now operating, one 
Sirnak sub-governor told PO on 9/21.  This and similar 
declarations were often delivered in monologue fashion with 
subordinates taking notes in formal transcript fashion and 
accompanied by dramatic pictures of past PKK violence. 
 
 
6.(C) There has been little visible evidence of a GOT 
reintegration law information campaign with the exception of 
a few handbills and posters in Baskale in Van province and 
Cizre in Sirnak province.  Our efforts to discuss local 
knowledge of the terms being offered by the GOT usually were 
smothered by uniformed and non-uniformed police (TNP) 
presence, as well as by obvious non-TNP security presence in 
southeast towns.  Asked about their efforts to publicize the 
law, only the Van province officials both at the province and 
sub-province levels reflected a common province-wide program 
based on posters, leaflet distribution in public spaces and 
community outreach.  Officials in a Van sub-governorate and 
at the Sirnak governor's office mentioned helicopter 
distribution of leaflets, but did not have information on 
where or when this occurred. 
 
 
7. (C) Many GOT officials opined that it is to soon to tell 
the success of such a new law and repeatedly asserted there 
is enough press and official discussion on the Turkish 
television and radio, as well as contact with the suspected 
KADEK members, families, to constitute adequate promulgation 
of the new law.  Some GOT officials also noted that some of 
the handful of people surrendering in the last several weeks 
described heavy KADEK counter-information efforts, such as 
allegedly limiting KADEK cadre access to western European 
satellite television broadcasts sympathetic to the Kurdish 
cause, as well as increased internal discipline.  When asked 
whether the GOT is modifying its information effort to adapt 
to alleged KADEK counter-efforts, GOT officials said that 
they see little need beyond perhaps re-contacting families to 
stress the need for them to continue pressure on KADEK cadre 
family members to proceed. 
 
 
8.(C)  Asked about how GOT family lobbying is perceived in 
their communities, most Kurdish contacts voiced deep 
skepticism about GOT lobbying tactics which they described as 
often heavy-handed.  Some said that the GOT lobbying only 
intensifies family efforts to encourage continued loyalty to 
KADEK. 
 
 
9. (C) Deepening the polarization is the widespread 
perception in DEHAP municipalities that they are being 
intentionally marginalized in government disbursements.  We 
heard the deepest resentment expressed regarding Turkish 
authorities' response to the 2003 Bingol earthquake.  DEHAP 
officials throughout southeast Turkey point to the State's 
refusal to include Bingol in government emergency budgets, in 
contrast to its response after the 1999 earthquake in the 
Marmara region of western Turkey, as proof of how the State 
really feels about Kurds.  They also point to the refusal of 
regional military commanders and provincial officials to 
shake their hands or announce their names at official events 
as further evidence of the State's "true intentions". 
 
 
10. Several Kurdish contacts in Bingol, Hakkari and the 
Hakkari sub-governorate of Yuksekova expressed concern that 
KADEK could re-start limited operations in some areas to 
maintain internal morale.  Zaza contacts in Tunceli wondered 
whether other terrorist organizations in their region 
(probably a reference to DHKP-C, which has support in this 
heavily Alevi province) would join in if KADEK cadres became 
active again. 
 
 
11. (C) Comment: Local Kurdish sentiment and assessments in 
the east and southeast echo the concerns we hear from 
prominent Kurdish politicians in Ankara, both on the left and 
the right.  End comment. 
 
 
12. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN