US embassy cable - 03SANAA2410

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002410 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, ASEC, MARR, IZ, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: GEN ABIZAID'S 9/19 MEETING WITH SALEH: EMPHASIS ON 
CONTINUED CT COOPERATION; ROYG ARREST OF AL-QAIDA CELL IN 
YEMEN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (a), (d) 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary: In his first visit to Yemen, GEN Abizaid, 
CDR USCENTCOM, met with the Country Team and called 
separately on Chief of Staff Qasimi (septel) and President 
Saleh.  Saleh briefed the CDR on the ROYG's discovery and 
arrest of a terrorist cell over the previous few days.  Saleh 
revealed that the cell had planned to target the U.S. and UK 
Ambassadors, in addition to senior Yemeni officials and the 
Central Bank.  He undertook to share full details of the 
operation via intel channels over coming days.  Saleh 
provided an upbeat account of Yemen's CT cooperation with 
Saudi Arabia, and engaged in an extended discussion of 
challenges facing coalition forces in Iraq.  Yemeni media 
featured GEN Abizaid's meetings and robust U.S.-Yemeni 
security cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
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Yemeni-Eritrean Relations 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) GEN Abizaid, accompanied by CJTF-HOA Commander BG 
Robeson, Ambassador, DCM (notetaker) and OMC Chief called on 
President Saleh at the Presidency during a 5-hour visit to 
Yemen on 9/19/03.  The CINC noted that he had just visited 
Asmara and bore greetings to Saleh from President Isaias. 
Saleh welcomed this, noting that Yemeni-Eritrean relations 
were OK except for some disputes over traditional fishing 
which were "not big." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
CT Cooperation; al-Qaida Cell in Sanaa 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (S/NF) In response to questioning by the CDR, Saleh stated 
that U.S.-Yemeni cooperation was good, although the USG 
processes were slow.  The CDR expressed appreciation for 
Yemen's CT cooperation, and observed that it was showing good 
results.  In reply, Saleh revealed that ROYG authorities had 
recently scored a major success: breaking up an al-Qaida cell 
in Sanaa that had planned a series of terrorist attacks, 
including a strike against the Ambassador. 
 
4. (S/NF) Referring to a written report, Saleh provided the 
following selected details from the ROYG investigation: 
 
--    The attack against the Ambassador was to involve RPGs 
followed up by a car bomb.  Saleh said that the group had 
targeted the Ambassador twice (nfi).  The actual attack was 
to be carried out by Saudi nationals. 
 
--    One member of the group was to bring al-Qaida money 
from Saudi Arabia to purchase TNT and missiles.  Saleh 
mentioned two types of missiles: "loo" and "milal" (as heard). 
 
--    Other targets on the cell's hit list included: the 
British ambassador; former Yemeni PM Abdelkarim al-Iryani; 
Defense Minister Aliwa; Military Chief of Staff GEN Qasimi; 
PSO Chief Gamish; Interior Minister Alimi; PM Bajammal; and 
the Yemeni Central Bank.  (Comment: Embassy has briefed UK 
Ambassador) 
 
--    Yemeni authorities in Sanaa discovered the plot by 
chance, when criminal investigation of a "girl" in connection 
with a moral offense (nfi) turned up documents linking her 
with an al-Qaida cell operating in the city.  The group, 
including two Saudis, two Syrians, the girl and one Yemeni, 
was headed by Omar Abdel Rahman al-Sharif, whom Salah 
described as the man who had succeeded Abu Ali al-Harithi as 
head of al-Qaida operations in Yemen.  Sharif and the others 
are in custody. 
 
5. (S/NF) Saleh did not provide a linear account of the 
alleged plot or the Yemeni investigation that cracked it, and 
follow-up questions from GEN Abizaid and the Ambassador 
elicited little additional detail.  Saleh said the Political 
Security Organization would pass a copy of the written report 
to the Embassy via intel channels soon. 
 
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Saudi-Yemeni CT Cooperation 
------------------------------------- 
6. (C) In response to questioning by GEN Abizaid, Saleh said 
CT cooperation with Saudi Arabia was going well.  Information 
is being exchanged, and both sides have rendered terrorist 
suspects to the other.  He pointed to the previous week's 
Yemeni handover of al-Ghamdi as a recent case in point, and 
said Yemen was waiting for the Saudis to turn over eight 
suspects.  Nevertheless, said Saleh, money from Saudi Arabia 
and elsewhere in the Gulf continues to flow to extremist 
elements inside Yemen.  He added that Saudi Arabia provided 
insufficient financial help to Yemen, and that by comparison 
the United States does better. 
 
----- 
Iraq 
----- 
 
7. (S/NF) Saleh expressed considerable interest in the 
progress of coalition operations in Iraq, and asked if the 
overall situation was improving.  He commented that President 
Bush was making good use of the tools of state, including 
military, economic and diplomatic power.  The CDR responded 
that the situation is improving, with the central region -- 
including Baghdad, Rumadi and Tikrit -- remaining dangerous 
while the north and south are calm.  Saleh joked that the 
British remained in Basra because the UK's colonial 
experience in Iraq told them it would be less dangerous. 
 
8. (S/NF) GEN Abizaid replied that the UK soldiers were very 
good, and reviewed positive developments in the country, 
including the ongoing training of new military and police 
units, reopening of schools and universities and general rise 
of economic activity.  He added that the overall challenge 
was more political and economic than military -- mainly 
because Saddam had left the country in poor condition -- and 
cited the need for greater participation by the Sunni 
community.  People in the north and south are already better 
off than under the old regime, and those in the middle must 
also join the rebuilding effort and be part of the solution. 
Above all, stressed the CDR, the old regime was gone for 
good.  Forty-three of 55 former regime officials were 
accounted for, although it remained important to find Saddam 
Hussein.  Saleh expressed the view that arresting or killing 
Saddam would not end resistance, and GEN Abizaid agreed.  He 
said the resistance came mainly from terrorists and Islamic 
zealots rather than Baathi loyalists. 
 
9. (S/NF) Saleh asked about the number of foreign terrorists 
active in Iraq, noting that he was aware of 6,000 Saudi 
terrorists who had fled police pressure in the KSA.  The CDR 
estimated that perhaps 1,000 foreign fighters were in Iraq, 
and about 10 Saudis were in custody.  Saleh expressed 
surprise that a larger percentage of the fugitive Saudis had 
not turned up in Iraq.  GEN Abuzaid said some Yemenis had 
also been apprehended in Iraq, although Syrian fighters were 
the most numerous national group.  Saleh responded that he 
knew of Yemeni students in Iraq, but not terrorists.  The 
Ambassador pointed out that recent intel showed the beginning 
of networks to recruit Yemenis for combat in Iraq.  Regarding 
the Syrians, Saleh posited that they were "individuals," as 
it was not SARG policy to send them to Iraq. 
 
10. (S/NF) GEN Abizaid reviewed the range of challenges 
facing coalition forces in Iraq, including Baathi loyalists, 
Islamic extremists and foreign fighters.  Saleh observed that 
much of the resistance came from the four million or so who 
had benefited from the regime of Saddam Hussein.  GEN Abizaid 
pointed out that the number of resistance fighters was far 
lower. 
 
11. (S/NF) Saleh ventured to put himself in the place of U.S. 
planners and offered his counsel on Iraq.  First, he urged 
coalition action to close Iraq's borders to stem the inflow 
of foreign fighters, noting that the coalition was "legally 
responsible" for border security.  He cited the decision to 
dissolve Iraq's military and security structure as a mistake, 
and the cause of much of the current disorder.  Finally, he 
advised against placing too much faith in former exiles like 
Ahmed Chalabi and warned of the danger of erecting political 
institutions based on ethnic and religious affiliation. 
Focusing on separate Kurdish, Shia and Sunni identities 
creates division and impedes progress.  Saleh called for an 
inclusive political solution and reconciliation with all 
Iraqis, including those connected with the former regime.  He 
stressed that he did not want see Americans continue to be 
targeted in Iraq nor to see the United States face long-term 
enmity either in Iraq or in the region.  It is thus necessary 
to move quickly toward the model democracy in Iraq that 
President Bush has spoken of, declared Saleh. 
 
12. (S/NF) The CDR said AMB Bremer understands the complex 
challenge of doing just that and is managing it well. 
Moreover, a huge majority of Iraqis support the 
reconstruction effort, although, again, the Sunni community 
needs to engage more actively.  Saleh acknowledged that most 
Iraqis were supportive, but observed that if even 10 percent 
remained non-supportive it would cause problems.  He 
expressed worry that all the terrorists in the world will now 
get together in Iraq, as they used to do in Afghanistan.  He 
immediately concurred with GEN Abizaid's assertion that the 
terrorists would fail, but worried aloud at the tension and 
damage they could create in the near term. 
 
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Other Issues 
--------------- 
 
13. (C) Saleh reiterated the value of training and continuing 
information exchange.  He added that U.S. assistance to the 
Yemeni Coast Guard had been extremely valuable.  The 
continuing influx of illegal immigrants from Somalia was a 
huge problem for Yemen.  A recent fatwa by Afghan clerics had 
legitimated the export of drugs to finance weapons purchases, 
and this was creating new concerns for Yemen.  He also 
welcomed U.S. assistance on economic development issues, 
adding that he and the Ambassador spoke often on this. 
 
14. (U) Following the meeting President Saleh hosted a lunch 
iho GEN Abizaid that was attended by more than 100 senior 
government and military officials.  As in the past, Yemeni 
media provided ample coverage of GEN Abizaid's visit and 
reaffirmed robust Yemeni-U.S. security cooperation. 
 
15. (U) This cable was cleared by USCENTCOM. 
 
16.  (S/NF) Comment: We will be analyzing information to be 
provided through intel channels on the disrupted al-Qaida 
cell, but caution against premature conclusions based on 
Saleh's sketchy account. 
HULL