US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU1859

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001859 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MCAP, PTER, IN, NP, India Relations 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  INDIAN SECURITY COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 5046 
 
     B. KATHMANDU 0330 
     C. KATHMANDU 1638 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  According to Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran, the 
Indian government is sending a defense consultation group to 
Kathmandu the week of September 22 to "institutionalize" 
bilateral security assistance and support to the Government 
of Nepal (GON).  A few weeks later in New Delhi, the GOI will 
seek conclusion of a bilateral extradition treaty and mutual 
legal assistance treaty to that end.  Saran said he does not 
believe that Maoist hints that they might call a ceasefire 
during the October Dashain holiday are sincere and would 
recommend against a temporary ceasefire.  Although he 
believes that the security forces have scored some recent 
successes against the insurgents, he expressed concern that 
the Army and police might be consolidating their forces 
within the Kathmandu Valley at the expense of the rest of the 
country.  The GOI's willingness to examine and attempt to 
accommodate the GON's security needs on a more regularized 
basis--as well as the Ambassador's readiness to share that 
information with us--is an encouraging sign of the 
increasingly helpful role the GOI is adopting in helping its 
neighbor address the Maoist conflict.  End summary. 
 
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GOI TO "INSTITUTIONALIZE" SECURITY SUPPORT 
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2.  (C)  In a September 19 conversation with the Ambassador, 
Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran reported that his government 
had been pleased by the success of the September 10 US-India 
regional dialogue on Nepal, headed by A/S for South Asian 
Affairs Christina Rocca for the US (Ref A).  The GOI regarded 
A/S Rocca's visit to New Delhi as extremely helpful in 
advancing mutual understanding of the two countries' 
respective roles, strategies and perspectives in assisting 
the Government of Nepal (GON) face down the Maoist 
insurgency, Saran said. 
 
3.  (C)  Saran told the Ambassador that a defense 
consultation group composed of Indian military and security 
personnel would be in Kathmandu the week of September 22 to 
examine how best to "institutionalize" Indian support and 
bilateral security assistance to Nepal.  (Note:  The group, 
which includes Indian DMI Gen. Richard Khare, is currently in 
Kathmandu.  End note.)  Among the topics to be discussed is 
exchange of information regarding cross-border movements of 
suspected terrorists.  Following the end of the Dashain 
holiday in mid-October, the GOI plans to move ahead on 
concluding extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties 
with Nepal in order to address the question of Nepali Maoists 
purportedly living in India.  The GOI is frequently 
criticized by the Nepalis for being lax in pursuing and/or 
detaining Maoists believed to be sheltering on its territory, 
Saran observed.  Concluding the treaties will be an effort to 
"put everything on an objective and transparent plane."  If 
Nepali Maoists in India are found to have broken Indian law, 
the GOI will try them, Saran said.  If they are found to be 
using Indian territory to plot against the GON, the GOI will 
hand them over to Nepal upon receiving appropriate requests. 
 
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VIEWS ON MAOIST STRATEGY 
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4.  (C) The Nepali security forces have been using 
intermittent curfews imposed on various parts of the 
Kathmandu Valley to perform neighborhood sweeps, Saran said, 
a tactic which he described as successful in netting 
suspected insurgents.  He reported hearing that the Maoist 
leadership had tasked its cadres with raising more than USD 5 
million before the October Dashain holdiay; hence their 
accelerated extortion efforts.  If the Maoists offer a 
ceasefire during the extended Dashain-Tihar holiday in 
October (as some of their recently reported statements have 
hinted), the move would be purely tactical, Saran speculated, 
and not at all indicative of a sincere desire for 
negotiations.  He would advise the GON against accepting such 
a spurious offer.  Instead, the Maoists want to maintain 
political and psychological pressure on the GON to "set the 
stage for talks in four or five months," he predicted.  While 
the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has scored some recent significant 
successes against the Maoists, Saran expressed concern at 
reports of the civil police closing a number of posts, 
including in the southern industrial city of Hetauda where 
many Indian businesses are located, and of the RNA 
concentrating half of its manpower within the capital. 
 
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COMMENT 
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5.  (C)  Saran is correct in his observation that the GOI is 
frequently blamed by Nepalis for being too lax on suspected 
Maoists, who are believed able to cross with ease into and 
shelter on Indian territory.  The August 20 arrest in Chennai 
of Maoist Central Committee member Chandra Gajurel (Ref C) 
did much to tamp down such criticism.  Acting to regularize 
the exchange of information on cross-border movements by 
suspected Maoists is another concrete and positive step. 
Ambassador Saran's willingness to share that development with 
us is an important measure of the close coordination between 
our Embassies on our respective bilateral assistance to the 
GON.  We agree with Saran's view that a temporary "ceasefire" 
over the holidays would not serve the GON's interests, as the 
Maoists will be expected to use the respite to regroup in the 
field while continuing to extort funds in the cities. 
 
 
MALINOWSKI