US embassy cable - 03ANKARA5964

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 005964 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2013 
TAGS: CY, IZ, MARR, PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S NSC SECGEN TAKES CONSERVATIVE APPROACH ON 
IRAQ/CYPRUS WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
(U)  Classified by Ambassador Eric A. Edelman.  Reason:  1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  During their initial meeting on the eve of 
the September 19 NSC meeting that would consider a troop 
contribution to the stabilization force in Iraq, new NSC 
Secretary General General Sukru Sariisik revealed little to 
 
SIPDIS 
the Ambassador of what would occur at the meeting.  He noted 
that the decision on a contribution was the National 
Assembly's to make, and that there would be no decision 
before that body reconvened. The Ambassador refuted 
Sariisik's statement that the USG had done little to address 
Turkey's PKK/KADEK problem, eliciting the general's 
acknowledgment that our forces in Iraq were busy and "must do 
many things."  Regarding Cyprus, Sariisik, a former commander 
of Turkish forces on the island, alleged Athens and Nicosia 
were attempting to influence the northern Cypriot elections 
in December.  Finally, Sariisik asserted that the NSC's 
functions need not change to comply with EU requirements, all 
NSC activities were already governed by domestic laws and 
regulations and were "consistent with the EU."  End summary. 
 
 
Iraq:  No Quick Decisions 
------------------------- 
 
 
2.  (C)  The Ambassador paid an initial call on NSC Secretary 
General Sukru Sariisik on September 18.  (Note:  This was a 
day before the September NSC meeting where possible troop 
contribution to the Iraq Stabilization Force was a major 
agenda item.  End note.) 
 
 
3.  (C)  Sariisik noted that the NSC was prepared to support 
all forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation based on 
principles established by the Turkish General Staff, and 
would discuss Iraq the following day. 
 
 
4.  (C)  Sariisik sidestepped the Ambassador's question about 
the timeline for a GOT decision on a troop contribution to 
Iraq.  He said that the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA) would make the decision, and it would reconvene soon 
(Sept 29).  There was no reason to decide before then, he 
said.  He confirmed that the PKK/KADEK presence was "of great 
importance," and suggested that this could be an obstacle for 
greater Turkish involvement in Iraq.  "This is a primary 
issue for us."  He hoped that this problem would be 
eliminated as quickly as possible.  (The Ambassador outlined 
our past cooperation, US policy and the process we have 
launched for responding to PKK/KADEK presence in Iraq.) 
Still, he accepted the Ambassador's argument that Iraq's 
future was important for Turkey.  Although Ankara continued 
to have concerns about the role of Barzani and Talibani in a 
future government, Sariisik said "Turkey is ready to shoulder 
its responsibility as an ally", while reiterating the 
decision was the TGNA's to make. 
 
 
Other Issues 
------------ 
 
 
5.  (C)  Cyprus:  The Ambassador expressed our hope for a 
solution in Cyprus and recalled our recent demarches that 
both sides avoid the annual fall exercises this year. 
Sariisik, a former commander of Turkish forces in Cyprus, 
provided a fairly standard recitation of the history of 
Cyprus since 1974.  He alleged that Athens, Nicosia and the 
EU were attempting to influence the outcome of northern 
Cyprus' December elections.  Nonetheless, he called for all 
parties to control their emotions and for the elections to 
occur "naturally." 
 
 
6.  (C)  NSC Reform:  In response to a question, Sariisik 
denied that the NSC was being reformed to accord with EU 
harmonization requirements.  "All of our activities are 
limited by law and regulation, which is consistent with the 
EU." 
 
 
Comment:  Only the Party Line 
----------------------------- 
 
 
7.  (C)  Comment:  Sariisik, although not speaking from 
notes, revealed nothing new or different during this meeting. 
 His refrain on the PKK/KADEK presence in northern Iraq is 
consistent with other interlocutors' and underscores once 
again how this issue is entwined with Turkish thinking on 
Iraq and its relations with the US.  End comment. 
EDELMAN