Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 03THEHAGUE2367 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03THEHAGUE2367 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy The Hague |
| Created: | 2003-09-19 14:53:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | PARM PREL CWC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002367 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS(GOLDMAN) NSC FOR CHUPA WINPAC FOR FOLEY E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM, PREL, CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): DIRECTOR-GENERAL'S REVISED BUDGET PROPOSAL ON EVE OF EC-34 This is CWC-93-03. 1. (SBU) Summary: On Sept. 19, OPCW Director-General Pfirter made a strong pitch to delegations for an effective increase in the 2004 OPCW budget of approximately 7.4%. Pfirter assured the delegates that he and the leadership of the Technical Secretariat (TS) would work hard to identify and implement cost-cutting measures and efficiencies, but argued that the increase was imperative for the OPCW to be able to perform its core functions. He also requested greater flexibility to be able to more effectively allocate resources. Some of the delegations (including the U.S.) made strong statements in support of the DG's request, others noted that there would be difficulties convincing national governments to concur with a 7.4% budget increase, and others simply noted they would need instructions. While there certainly will be substantial discussion of the DG's proposal, it is doubtful agreement on a specific number for a budget increase will be achieved during the Sept. 23-26 Executive Council (EC) session. End Summary. 2. (SBU) DG Pfirter participated in the September 19 final session of informal consultations on the OPCW Program and Budget before the opening of the thirty-fourth Executive Council. He was accompanied by the Deputy Director General and Director for Administration. Pfirter took the lead by presenting to the 17 participating delegations a new proposal to cut 1% from his initial request for a 8.34% increase in the 2004 budget (which totaled 74,291,534 Euros), stating that any deeper cuts would cut into the OPCW's core activities. He circulated a note (faxed to AC/CB) further explaining and justifying this position for review prior to the opening of EC-34. Pfirter's appeal came after the facilitator of the budget group (Beerwerth/FRG) announced that delegations were close to concensus on a 6% budget increase. 3. (SBU) The DG stated that quick agreement by the EC on a recommendation to the Conference of State Parties on the 2004 budget was important to maintain a "solid political atmosphere" and demonstrate that the OPCW was putting its management back in order and was moving on to address the many substantive issues before the EC. On the necessity of the budget increase, he noted that statutory requirements alone accounted for a 3.06% rise, and that the CSP's decision on adopting a new tenure policy accounted for a further 2.92% increase, leaving only 2.36% for new programs endorsed by the Conference. Moreover, he continued, a further 250,000 euros would be allocated to International Cooperation and Assistance programs, requiring an additional 0.4% reduction in other areas. On top of these constraints, Pfirter cited the track record of States Parties falling short of their assessed obligations by 2.5%. All this, he explained, was tantamount to a 4% budget reduction. 4. (SBU) Pfirter recognized the tight fiscal constraints on States Parties, and said he had consulted closely with delegates about possible areas for savings. To the extent that additional savings could be found during the year, he undertook to provide more funds, up to the 2003 level of 350,000 euros, for ICA. He appealed for flexibility to enable the Technical Secretariat to deliver the full program of core activities within the proposed new budget framework. Finally, the DG noted that the OPCW's program was in the hands of the States Parties. If they were not prepared to fund a 7.4% increase, they would have to agree on what programs to cut. 5. (SBU) In the following question and answer period, virtually every delegation endorsed the need to fully implement the OPCW's core functions of verification and ICA. In response to questions, Pfirter: - estimated that his new budget proposal would entail a 7.9% increase in Member States' assessments (as compared to a 9% increase in the initial budget proposal); - explained that ongoing initiatives to cut the costs of inspections, verification, and inspectors' salaries would likely bear fruit in future years, but were not ready for implementation in 2004; - assured delegates that Action Plans for Universality and for National Implementation, and the implementation of Results Based Budgeting, would guide future budget planning and priorities; - endorsed the importance of ICA as making an essential contribution to the OPCW's goals, benefiting "rich and poor, large and small alike;" - agreed that further savings might well be found, (citing death and disability insurance, consultants, accumulated leave, official travel, and verification practices), but noted that unforeseen liabilities could also emerge (such as a challenge inspection or judgments against the OPCW by the ILO); - stressed that funding had to be sufficient to retain a measure of operational flexibility. 6. (SBU) Ambassador Javits thanked the DG for his forceful and cogent presentation, and for its sensitivity to the constraints faced by Member States. He suggested that other delegates make clear to capitals that of the increase, some 6% was attributed to unavoidable, statutory requirements, and that some further increase was essential to further the common goals of all Member States. In particular, the Ambassador defended the need to fund ICA as an "indispensable training tool" for those nations that did not fully understand or subscribe to the goals of the Organization. He recognized the need to provide adequate funding to maintain the positive momentum generated by the Review Conference and urged other delegates to find an early consensus on a budget figure. 7. (SBU) The U.K. supported the DG and U.S. statements, stating that full program delivery "is close to our hearts," but also echoed other delegations in recommending that further savings and efficiencies were highly desirable. However, the tenor of most delegates' comments reflected extremely tight fiscal constraints. -- Italy flatly stated that it could not support the DG's proposed budget increase. -- Japan, which had consistently cited its Zero Nominal Growth policy for funding international organizations, said it would seek new instructions on the basis of the DG's presentation. -- Germany and France also said that they would need to request instructions. Both had indicated in informal discussions that they could accept a budget increase of only 5.5%. -- Russia also had a zero-growth policy as its starting point, and observed that the informal consultations had identified many areas for potential cuts. -- Australia reminded the group that its government was required to reduce its budget by 1% in real terms every year. -- Canada, which was prepared to fund a 7.5% increase in assessments, complained that this was a large bill to pay on top of last year's 10% budget increase, the steep appreciation of the euro, and late payments by some member states. 8. (SBU) On spending priorities, France and other western representatives urged that ICA funding be targeted at National Implementation as a priority for developing nations. Spain focused on the need to ensure that the goal of Universality be adequately supported (voicing special concern about the Mediterranean area) in the DG's revised budget. India took the lead for developing countries, reacting defensively to mentions of possible changes in ICA funding and calling for full implementation of the OPCW's core functions. Iran and others seconded that intervention. 9. (SBU) In his concluding remarks, Pfirter repeated that the TS would continue to search for savings but that sufficient SIPDIS flexibility, as well as funding, was required to efficient manage the organization's finances. He candidly acknowledged that "the budget will always be higher than it is today" due to the CSP's decision on tenure policy and increase verification activities, but promised to faithfully carry out core activities within his proposed budget. 10. (SBU) Following the formal session, several western representatives noted that Pfirter's proposal still seemed to contain some fat that could be reduced. One described the DG's approach as "risky," and "overselling his hand." The U.K. rep described some of the numbers in the DG's note as "dodgy," and others agreed. The general sense among those delegates was that further reductions would be necessary to find room for consensus. 11. (SBU) Comment: We believe the DG has a good case for his proposed budget numbers, and particularly for his request to have more flexibility to achieve efficiencies and savings. However, it is clear there is no consensus at this time in support of the DG's proposed 7.4% budget increase. As a result, there is little likelihood that agreement will be reached at EC-34 on the budget, and budget discussions likely will be needed in the run-up to the October CSP. 12. (U) Javits sends. SOBEL
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04